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The years following the April 21, 196? Greek coup
d'etat have been marked by a considerable degree of anti-
Anaericain sentiment felt and expressed by people in Greece
who have been statinch allies of the United States since
the end of the Second World War, A major consequence of
this anti-American sentiment has been a serious degradation
in relations between the United States and Greece, This
thesis examines the American relationship with the military
rulers of Greece between 196? and 197^ in order to better
understand the origins of Greek grievances with the U.S,,
the cause of the present estranged relations, and the
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In April 196?, the countries of the free world, parti-
cularly the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the Council of Europe, were shocked and
dismayed to witness the abrupt termination of democratic
government in Greece, the birthplace of democracy and the
cradle of Western civilization. The fact that Greece had
experienced a coup was not surprising, for the coup in
April 1967 was only one in a succession of military inter-
ventions in Greece in the twentieth century. However,
Greece was the first nation in the noncommunist, post-World
War Two world to fall prey to military intervention.
Furthermore, the I967 coup broke tradition with previous
twentieth century coups in that the leaders attempted to
retain power after restoring order rather than relinquishing
control to civilian political elites as in the past.
As weeks turned into months and then into years, the
traditionally close and warm relations between Greece and
the U.S. were strained to the breaking point. One visible
manifestation of the estrangement in relations was a grow-
ing anti-American sentiment among Greeks, even among seg-
ments of society typically considered sympathetic to, if
not pro, America. The cause of that sentiment was the




Since the demise of the junta in 197^» Greek resentment
of America for its actual and perceived role in the seven
and one-half year dictatorship, has been exacerbated by the
Cyprus crisis in mid-197^t "the perceived American 'tilt*
toward Turkey and the dispute between Greece and Turkey
over the Aegean Sea. In all these cases, the U.S. is
blamed for its inability to ameliorate the situations.
Today, Greek antipathy toward the U.S. is still wide-
spread, but largely latent. However, it is still exploited
by politicians on the left with considerable success, and
it remains a stumbling block in the efforts of the conser-
vative government of Greece to strengthen its ties with the
U.S.
It is out of concern for future Greek-American rela-
tions that this thesis examines the American relationship
with the regime of the Greek colonels in an effort to iden-
tify the origin of Greek anti-American sentiment.
Greek citizens did not accept the curtailment of demo-
cratic practices and civil liberties by the junta with com-
placence or resignation. Despite a history of militsiry
intervention in the past I50 years of modern Greece, the
resolution of political and social difficulties by military
coup d'etat is not viewed with favor by the vast majority
of Greeks. As in the past, most Greeks resisted the regime
of the colonels. Physical resistance, characterized by
acts of violence, was not uncommon. For most Greeks, how-
ever, resistance took the more passive form of
15

non-cooperation and nonsupport. The plight of the Greek
people elicited the support and sympathy of people of Greek
ancestry throughout the world. In the United States, the
highly influential Greek Lobby was split between pro- junta
and sinti-junta segments. While the anti- junta segments of
the Greek Lobby registered some victories in Congress, it
was the pro-junta segment and Administration preferences
which governed the American stance vis-S.-vis the Greek
colonels.
The events following the demise of the junta and the
restoration of democracy testify to the failure of Ameri-
can policies pursued after the militsury coupi (1) The rule
of the colonels came to an ignominious conclusion in the
July 197^ Cyprus debacle, which resulted in the Turkish
invasion and subsequent occupation of some forty percent of
the island. The U.S. was blamed for not preventing the
attempted overthrow by the colonels of Cypriot President
Archbishop Makarios, and the subsequent Turkish invasion.
Fxirthermore , the U.S. was unable to resolve the confronta-
tion which nearly brought the two NATO allies to the brink
of war. (2) The August-September 1978 lifting of the arms
embargo against Turkey, imposed in the immediate aftermath
of the 197^ invasion of Cyprus, signalled to the Greeks a
•tilt' toward Turkey by the U.S. (3) In August 197^, the
Prime Minister of Greece, Constantine Karamanlis, reacting
to popular pressure, withdrew Greek armed forces from the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization military command
16

structure while remaining a member of the alliance. Sub-
sequent efforts to reintegrate Greek forces have failed in
the face of Turkish intransigence, {k) Stemming in part
from the Cyprus debacle and Greek absence from NATO, dis-
putes between Greece and Turkey over Aegean Sea airspace,
territory and seabed mineral rights have been a major
stumbling block in the easing of tensions between the two
rivals, and ultimately with the U.S. Many Greeks as well
as Turks blame the U.S. for both the existence of these
disputes and the inability to settle them.
Little, if any, progress has been made in resolving
these issues during the past six years. With the passing
of time, the ability of the U.S. to ameliorate these situ-
ations has decreased. Some aspects of the problems may now
be virtually insoluble, such as the Greek refugees on Cyprus
most of whom have resettled and are building new lives.
Even so, bitter feelings have left a festering sore that
could erupt. While Americsm policy makers may regard these
issues, and the larger issue of the U.S. relationship with
Greece, as secondary in importsuice, the Greeks certainly do
not. It is outside the scope of this thesis to postulate
solutions to these imposing problems, a task which numerous
statesmen have so far been unable to accomplish. Rather,
the objective of this thesis is to provide the reader with
an understanding of Greek-American relations d\iring the
junta, and the rise of Greek anti-American feelings, in
order to better understand and deal with the present state
17

of relations between Greece and the U.S.
This thesis is divided into two major sections. The
first section, composed of Chapters One through Three,
examines the background of the coup, the coup itself, and
its consequences for Greece. Chapters Four and Five
exajnine the American relationship with the colonels and
Greece, the reaction the relationship provoked, and several
indicators of the character of the relationship. This
analysis attempts to establish that American policy
regsurding the regime of the colonels was ill-advised, ill-
conceived and, ultimately, a failure. The final chapter
concludes by discussing the significance of the Greek
estrangement from the United States in terms of several
current issues in Greece t the political leadership of the
country, geographical disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean
Sea, and the Greek relation with NATO.
18

I. BACKGROUND TO Tlffi COUPj TIffi ACTORS
AND FACTORS LEADING UP TO TJffi COUP
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Greece has been the scene of virtually constant turmoil
since its independence from the Ottoman Empire in the late
1820 's. It has been a republic three times (I827-I831,
192^-1935 and 1973 to the present) and a monarchy twice
(1833-1863 and I867-I973). The monarchies never worked
well. King Otho was expelled in 1862, King George I was
assassinated in 1913 t King Constantine I was twice deposed
— temporarily in 1917 and permanently in 1922, King
Constauitine's son reigned briefly before dying from a mon-
key bite. King George II was unseated in 192^ when a
republic was proclaimed. He returned in 1935 and reigned
with a great deal of difficulty until his death in 19^7.
He was followed by his brother King Paul, who died in 196^.
King Constantine II was ousted by the coup d'etat in I967
and lost his throne when the present Greek republic was
2proclaimed in 1973
•
Amidst all this turmoil the Greek army has acquired the
sacred quality of being the instrument of national libera-
tion and salvation. This has manifested itself in a pro-
liferation of successful and unsuccessful revolutions and
coups in the following yearst 18^3, 1862, 1909, 1916, 1922,
1923, 1925, 1926, 1933, 1935, 1936, 19^3-19^^ (in exile).
19

1951. 1967 and 1973.^
In addition, Greece has had eight constitutions (184^,
186^, 1911, 1927, 1952, 1968, 1973 and 1975), the Parlia-
ment has been dissolved at least forty-eight times and from
18^4 to 1967 one hundred and fifty different governments
k
have held office.
With this kind of record before him an observer of
Greek affairs could hardly call the coup d'etat of April
21, 1967 an atypical experience. In two ways, however, the
coup was unusual. First, Greece was the first noncommunist
European state since the end of World War Two to fall prey
to a military dictatorship. Second, starting in 1909 the
military had intervened in order to restore order after
which rule of the country was returned to the civilian
politicians. This remained the pattern until I967 when the
military officers who executed the coup opted to remain in
power rather than return control to the civilian political
elite once order was restored."^
B. THE SECOND WORLD WAR
World War Two devastated Greece, especially in economic
terms. Immediately after liberation, the British "stabi-
lized" the drachma at 50,000 million old drachma to one new
drachma, of which there were then 6OO to the British pound
sterling. It was lowered in mid-19^5 to 2,000 to the
potind, 20,000 by early 19^6 and 32,000 to the pound ster-
ling in 19^8. According to Constantine Tsoucalas, between
19^0 and 19^^, Greece lost 550,000 people or eight percent
20

of its population; ^01,500 homes were totally destroyed
leaving 1,200,000 people homeless; 1,770 villages were
totally burnt down; seventy-three percent of cargo ship
tonnage and ninety-four percent of passenger ships were
sunk; fifty-six percent of roads were unusable; sixty-five
percent of private cars, sixty percent of trucks aoid
eighty percent of buses were destroyed; sixty percent of
horses, sixty percent of cattle and eighty percent of
small animals perished; twenty-five percent of forests
were burnt down; and, in 19^^ t cereal production was dovna
by forty percent, tobacco production by eighty-nine per-
cent and currant production by sixty-six percent. ' De-
spite this toll, the Greek contribution to the war effort
was considerable. Winston Churchill estimated that the
Greek resistance tied down six to seven German divisions




From the occupation by Germans, Italians and Bulgarians
arose a much more damaging condition. On their entry into
World War Two, the people of Greece had been divided over
what is known as the National Schism, that is those Greeks
who had supported the King versus those who had sided with
the former Prime Minister, Eleutherios Venizelos, over the
issue of involvement in World War One, The Greek experi-
ence in World War Two superimposed upon this division a new




This new situation stemmed from the occupation. Greece
was occupied by the Germans and their allies, on the one
hand, and by the communists and their allies, on the other.
Greece experienced two resistance efforts — the commu-
nists formed the core of the active resistance movement and
fought the Germans, while Greek nationalists resisted both
Q
the communists and the Germans and their allies.
Furthermore, Greece became a pawn in the power struggle
between the leading allied powers dxiring World War Two.
Meeting in Moscow in October 19^^, British Prime Minister
Winston S. Churchill turned to the Soviet leader Joseph
Stalin and saidi
Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your
surmies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests,
missions and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-
purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia
are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety
per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety
per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about
Yugoslavia?^
°
While this was being translated, Churchill wrote it
down on paper and passed it to Stalin, who ticked his con-
sent with blue pencil amd ret\irned it. In this fashion
Greece becajne a British concern; it remained so until 19^7
when the British relinquished control to the United States.
C. BRITAIN, THE COMMUNISTS AND THE CIVIL WAR
The major resistajice effort in World War Two was orga-
nized and led by the Greek communists. As the war prog-
ressed they formed the National Liberation Front ( Ethniko
Apeleftherotiko Metopo - EAM) as the national resistance
22

movement. In April 19^2 the military arm of the EAM, the
National Popular Liberation Army (Ethnlkos Laikos Apel-
eftherotikos Stratos - ELAS) was established. Because of
rigid communist hierarchy, the EAM/ELAS was the best orga-
nized and most successful resistance organization, and, not
surprisingly, attracted the most recruits. However, most
of the rajik and file knew about or cared little for commu-
nist ideology, and were not communists. Yet enough were
that on December 1, 19^^ the EAM/ELAS laxinched a civil war
with the aim of seizing control of the reins of government
in Greece.
With considerable British effort this round of the EAM/
ELAS uprising was halted ajid a treaty between the communists
and the British was signed at Varkiza, Italy on February
12, 19^5. Ironically the methods the British employed in
putting down the rebellion were criticized and condemned by
the American press and State Department. Churchill later
wrotei
I little thought however at the end of 19^^ that the
State Department, supported by overwhelming American
opinion, would in little more than two years not only
adopt and carry on the course we had opened, but would
make vehement and costly exertions, even of a militsiry
character, to bring it to fruition. ^^
The third and final round of the civil war, or "anti-
bandit struggle," erupted again in 19^6 and raged until
mid-19^9. It was more than just a continuation of the
World War Two resistance movement. Several motives for the
civil war have been offeredi (1) that Stalin desired an
outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, yet this motive was offset
23

by his desire to avoid a clash with the West; (2) that
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria desired to annex Greek Macedonia,
but this was offset by mutual rivalry between Tito and
Dimitrov over the spoils; and (3) that the Slavophene
minority in Greece desired autonomy sind this objective was
compatible with the Greek communist ambition for absolute
12power
.
There is little evidence to support the first two
motives, whereas evidence does exist supporting the oppo-
site views, Milovan Djilas, in his book Conversations With
Stalin, quotes a conversation held between Stalin and the
Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Edvsird Kardelji
Stalin then turned to the uprising in Greece i "The
uprising in Greece has to fold up." (He used for this
the word svernut * , which means literally to roll up.)
"Do you believe" - he turned to Kairdelj - "in the success
of the uprising in Greece?"
Kardelj replied, "If foreign intervention does not
grow and if serious political and military errors are not
made,"
Stalin went on, without paying attention to Kardelj 's
opinion! "If, if! No, they have no prospect of success
at all. What do you think, that Great Britain sind the
United States - the United States, the most powerful
state in the world - will permit you to break their line
of communication in the Mediterranean Seal Nonsense,
And we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be
stopped, and as quickly as possible, "^-^
Once the northern communist neighbors of Greece withdrew
their support, and the Greek communists could no longer
obtain moral and material support, as well as sanctuary, the
civil war took a downward turn. An additional major factor
in the weakness of the communists at that time stemmed from
the nature of Greek society, Greece had minimal industrial

capacity and, consequently, the industrial working class
was small. In addition other political issues, such as
suffraige and representation, that had contributed to social
unrest in other countries, were absent in Greece, The
early support for the communists came primarily from the
large numbers of Greek refugees flowing into the country
following the Greek debacle in Asia Minor in 1922, These
factors, plus the mass disaffections from the EAM/ELAS
after the war was over, and the increasing level of commu-
nist atrocities, eroded any possible base of support the
communists may have had.
There are two opposing points of view on the role of
the British intervention in Greece in 19^^. The cold-war
interpretation says that without British, and subsequently
American, help Greece would today be a communist country.
The opposing revisionist interpretation says that British
intervention was a blunder based on misjudgement. Conse-
quently, the British equated the liberal democratic forces
in Greece with communism and, by aligning themselves with
the conservative forces, the British neutralized the liber-
al center in Greece and contributed to a polarization in
Greek society and politics. This in turn led to the civil
war and subsequent events up to and including the April 21
,
Ik
1967 coup. The pertinent point here is that the British
intervention was an important and critical factor.
The costs of the civil war were immense, especially
following on the heels of World War Two. Between June 19^5
25

and March 19^9 the Greek communists suffered 28,992 killed,
13 f 105 prisoners, 27i931 surrendered and an estimated
figiire twice that size wounded. The Greek National Army-
casualties were 10,92? killed, 23,251 wounded, 3,75^
missing, while about ^,000 civilians were executed, mur-
1
5
dered or lost in combat-related accidents, -^ The Greek
communists also abducted 28,000 Greek children and spir-
ited them across the border into East European countries.
D. THE UNITED STATES AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
U.S. involvement in Greece began in February 19^7 with
the receipt of a British notice that, as of April 1, 19^7f
they could no longer afford the economic burden of keeping
Greece free of the communists
1
The United States Government will readily understand
that His Majesty's Government, in view of their own situ-
ation, find it impossible to grant further financial
assistance to Greece. Since, however, the United States
Government have indicated the very great importance which
they attach to helping Greece, His Majesty's Government
trust that the United States Government may find it pos-
sible to afford financial assistance to Greece on a scale
sufficient to meet her minimum needs, both civil and
militairy.
His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to express the
earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that, if a joint
policy of effective and practical support for Greece is
to be maintained, the United States Government will agree
to bear, as from the 1st April, 19^7. the financial bur-
den, of which the major P9.?t has hitherto been borne by
His Majesty's Government. 1"
With little time to react, and the Greek civil war
raging, President Harry S. Truman addressed the U.S.




The United States has received from the Greek Govern-
ment an urgent appeal for financial and economic assis-
tance.
...We shall not realize our objectives, however,
unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain
their free institutions and their national integrity
against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon
them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank
recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free
peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, iindermine the
foundations of international peace and hence the seciirity
of the United States.
I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting at-
tempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures.
I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for
assistance to Greece auid Turkey in the amount of $^00,
000,000 for the period ending June 30, 19^8,,..
In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize
the detail of American civilian and military personnel to
Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to
assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the pur-
pose of supervising the use of such financial and material
assistance as may be furnished....^'
On May 22, 19^7 Truman signed the Act to Provide
Assistance to Greece and Turkey (Public Law 75) thereby
establishing the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG).
The first priority in this effort was defeating the commu-
nists, followed by reconstruction and recovery. U.S. in-
terests in Greece soon evolved into essentially the
followingi (1) maintaining U.S. and NATO bases in Greece
and denying Soviet access; (2) maintaining unrestricted
militsiry transit and overflight rights over Greek terri-
tory aind waters I (3) keeping Greek-Turkish relations as
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friendly as possible so as not to damage NATO; and (^)
developing and maintaining a favorable trade and investment
climate for American investment smd economic concerns in
18Greece,
The degree of U.S. intervention soon became apparent.
An aide-memoire, dated June 21, 19^7 from the Greek Embassy
in Washington to the State Department, expressed Greek
exasperation with U.S. interference:
It seems therefore expedient that it be made clear
whether the United States Government considers that the
Greek Government should be at liberty, without hindrance
or diplomatic intervention, to suppress the Communists*
activities in Greece. If so, it would be appreciated if
appropriate instructions could be transmitted to the
American Ambassador in Athens. ^°
The American point of view on U.S. involvement in Greek
affairs is evident in the following extract of a telegram,
sent by Governor Dwight P. Griswold of the U.S. Mission to
Greece to the Secretary of State on October 2^, 19^7i
It is my considered opinion that it would be wrong
for AMAG or for US Government to attempt to represent to
world opinion that AMAG does not have great power or that
it is not involved in Greek internal affairs ....
I believe it was intent of Congress that this Mission
act discreetly but forcefully to help in the rehabilita-
tion of Greece to the end that Communism would be checked
here. Congress also intended and visiting Congressmen
have stressed that strict control over expenditure of
American and Greek funds be exercised by the Mission.
This means involvement in internal affairs and I see no
advantage pretending it is something else.^^
A further elaboration on U.S. involvement in Greek
affairs was given by the State Department in its Position




Among the matters on which such high policy decisions
would be required are:
a) Any action by United States representatives in
connection with a change in the Greek Cabinet;
b) Any action by United States representatives to
bring about or prevent a change in the high command of
the Greek armed forces;
c) Any substantial increase or decrease in the size
of the Greek armed forces;
d) Any disagreement arising with the Greek or British
authorities which, regardless of its source, may impair
cooperation between American officials in Greece and
Greek and British officials;
e) Any major question involving the relations of
Greece with the United Nations or sutiy foreign nation
other than the United States;
f
)
Any major question involving the policies of the
Greek Government toward Greek political parties, trade
unions, subversive elements, rebel armed forces, etc.,
including questions of punishment, amnesties and the
like;
g) Any question involving the holding of elections in
Greece.
The foregoing list is not intended to be inclusive
but rather to give examples. ^-^
It is hardly surprising that Greeks then and now shared
the opinion that nothing important could happen in Greece
without the green light from Washington.
Between 19^7 and 1952, the U.S. supported centrist and
left-of-center political parties as the best hope for
thwarting communism in Greece, This changed radically by
1952. A clegir exajnple of blatant U.S. interference in
Greek elections is evident in a statement by U.S. Ambassador
John Peurifoy published March 15 1 1952 on page one of the
Athens newspaper Eleftheria i
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Because the American government believes that the
reestablishment of the "simple proportional" election
method, with its unavoidable consequences of the continu-
ation of governmental instability, would have destructive
results upon the effective utilization of American aid to
Greece, the American Embassy feels itself obliged to make
its support publicly known, for the patriotic position of
the Prime Minister Plasteras with regard to this
subject. ^
A weakness in Greek politics since the early 1950 's has
been the support given to the conservative right by the
U.S., while virtually no effort has been expended to culti-
vate favorable relations with center or center-left politi-
cians and parties.
E. GREEK POLITICS; FROM PAPAGOS TO PAPADOPOULOS
1. Political Parties in General
Since World War Two there have been at least
ninety-five political parties on the Greek political
stage. Of these, sixty-three participated only once in a
general election. Only thirteen ever entered more than two
electoral contests, either alone or in a coalition with
others . ^
Political parties in Greece are heavily personal-
istic, and are structured around the charisma and person-
ality of individual political figures, rather than a
political ideology or program. These major figures often
shift parties, or form their own. The significance of a
political party often boils down to the assistance it ren-
ders voters in dealing with the state bureaucracy and
other power structures. Out of this situation arises a
form of client-type relationship between the politic iajis
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and the voters? thus, when a particular politician leaves
the party, he takes along his loyal followers as a form of
dowry. This type of political system contains some "basic
weaknesses I (1) a tendency for liberal politicians to
question the validity of the constitutional foundation,
especially the King (while Greece was a monarchy); (2) con-
servative leaders accuse their liberal colleagues of being
dupes or collaborators with the pro-communist left; (3) a
deliberate inefficiency exists in the bureaucracy; (4) the
press exploit the situation to increase circulation; (5)
uncertainty exists around an ever changing electoral sys-
tem; and (6) there is an inherent dishonesty in the fre-
quently changing voting procedure. -^
Since 19^5 the body of Greek voters has traditionally
been divided into three basic groupings i conservatives,
liberals suid leftists. The conservatives usually support
stronger ties with the West, oppose communist ideology, are
sympathetic to the King and have strong emotional attach-
ments to the national interest. The liberals attach great
importance to social improvements, are very sensitive to
charges of submission to the West, are indifferent if not
unsympathetic to the King, and favor more flexibility in
dealing with the communists and other socialist countries.
The third group either accepts Marxist-Leninism or, at
least, favor a basic reorientation of the social-political
structure toward a controlled economy and closer ties with




ELECTION RESULTS BY MAJOR POLITICAL
GROUPINGS, 19^6-196^
Election Conservative Liberal Left
Date % Seats ^ Seats I0 Seats
31 Mar 19^6 64.00 235 33.70 117 - -
5 Mar 1950 38.37 93 46.97 139 9.7 18
9 Sep 1951 43.29 146 44.76 132 10.57 10
16 Nov 1952 50.22 242 34.88 51 9.15
19 Feb 1956 50.48 165 (49.52) (135) (9.52) 18
11 May 1958 44.10 175 31.29 46 24.42 79
29 Oct 1961 49.60 174 34.30 103 15.10 23
3 Nov 1963 42.85 134 42.18 138 14.34 28
16 Feb 1964 35.26 105 52.78 173 12.00 22
SOURCE i D.G. Kousoulas
,




In this election the Liberals received approximately
40?S, plus 9.52^ for the Left (EDA), yielding a combined
total of 135 seats.
patterns by major groupings for the years 1946 to 1964.
2. Papagos and the Greek Rally
Between 1952 and 1964 Greece was governed by a
single party under Papagos, smd then Karamanlis, winning
four consecutive elections. Marshal Alexander Papagos
formed the Greek Rally ( Ellinikos Synagermos - ES) and
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ran for Prime Minister with the urging of the U.S. The
U.S. was successful in persuading enough defectors from
the coalition government of Prime Minister Plasteras*
National Progressive Union of the Center ( Ethniki Proodh-
eftiki Enosis Kentrou - EPEK) and the Liberal party of
Sophocles Venizelos to join the Greek Rally in order to
garner fifty percent of the vote and eighty percent of the
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seats in Psirliament in the November 1952 elections. '
3. Karamanlis and the National Radical Union
Following the death of Papagos, Constsintine
Karamanlis, a relatively minor Minister of Public Works,
was selected over the heads of more senior members of the
Greek Rally to become the new Prime Minister. Karamanlis
reorganized and renamed the Greek Rally as the National
Radical Union (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis - ERE).
During his long tenure from 1955 to 19^3 t Karamanlis
brought rapid economic growth and stability to Greece. To
a considerable degree, however, this was attributable to
the generally improved economic situation all over Europe,
especially West Germany, which made it possible to export
the Greek unemployed who then found jobs and sent their
money home, as well as to the increasing levels of tourists
28from Northern Europe and the U.S.
On the other hajid, Karamanlis was not without
fault. He continued traditional political practices of
distributing favors, subsidies, tax privileges and foreign
credits to buy support from people with extensive
33

29influence networks. Karamanlis was also criticized for
agreeing to the Zurich and London Agreement of 1959 which
30
created an independent republic of Cyprus.^
Following several conflicts, Karamanlis was forced
to resign in I963. First, the May 19^3 murder of a left-
wing deputy, Gregory Lambrakis, caused a public outcry.
The ensuing trial of the accused murderer by the Karamanlis
government was botched and this contributed to an erosion
31
of public support for Karamanlis.^ Secondly, several
actions by Karamanlis regarding the royal family were
criticized. The Karamanlis government had granted Princess
Sophia, the eldest daughter of King Paul, a £107,000 dowry
for her wedding to Prince Juan Carlos of Spain in May I962.
Then, in August I962, the King's Civil List was increased
from £137,000 to £202,000, and this coincided with a rise
in sugar prices, a freeze on civil servant wages and the
32
cessation of U.S. economic aid to Greece.-^ Finally,
Karamanlis came into opposition with King Paul over a pro-
posed visit to Britain in May I963. All of these factors,
combined with the relentless attacks of the opposition
Center Union party, forced Karamanlis to resign June 11,
1963.
4, Papaindreou and the Center Union
The Center Union party (Enosis Kentrou - EK) was
established September 19 » I96I by George Papandreou. At
that time it was a coalition of splinter center parties.
In the October 29, 1961 elections the EK won only 3^ of
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the vote, losing to Karamanlis ajid the ERE. Accusing
Karamanlis of terrorizing voters, Papandreou laxinched a
••relentless striiggle" against Karamanlis, which, together
with other factors, finally brought about his resignation.
In the 1963 elections, Papandreou was forced to
accept assistance from the United Democratic Left (EDA)
,
having failed to obtain an absolute majority. His party
only received a fraction of a percent less than the coali-
tion of the ERE with the center-right party of S.
Msirkesinis. Finding this an unacceptable situation,
Papandreou called for another election in February 196^ and
gained 52.78?^ of the vote, an absolute majority, elimi-
nating the necessity of relying on the leftist EDA, and
placing his party well ahead of the right.
The policies aind practices of George Papandreou
impinged upon everything that Karamanlis had built. The
defense budget was cut, imports were increased, income
taxes were reduced by ten percent while the prices of most
goods were increasing and inflation had set in. At the
same time, Papandreou practiced most of the sajne politics
as Karamanlis, providing supporters with civil service
posts and new jobs, indiscriminate spending, etc.^^ The
downfall of Papandreou and the role of his son will be
discussed in a subsequent section.
5. The Left Parties
The Greek communist party was outlawed in 19^7.




and by then the KKE ( Kommounistikon Komma Elladhos ) was
divided into three factions. In 1951 i the United Demo-
cratic Left (Eniaea Demokratiki Aristera - EDA) was legally
established to fill the void, and it was commonly recog-
nized as a front for the outlawed communist pairty.
Communist parties in Greece have traditionally
drawn no more than ten to fifteen percent of the popular
vote, with the exception of the 1958 election. There are
at least six reasons why communism has remained so unpopular
in Greece: (1) the KKE leadership is drawn mainly from the
disenchanted, bitter, frustrated, semi-literate segment of
society; (2) the KKE association with the Soviet Union and
other communist nations gives rise to Greek fears of domi-
nation? (3) Greeks enjoy private ownership and freewheeling
political activity and these conflict with communist com-
mand economy and single-party rule; (4) the KKE has a well-
published record of brutality during World War Two and the
civil war including the kidnaping of 28,000 Greek children;
(5) the peculiar language and dogma of communism is not
appealing; and (6) the presence of intraparty quarrels,
infighting and intrigues keeps people away.^
' As mentioned earlier, the Greek communist party is
presently split into three main factions. There are, how-
ever, numerous other tiny cells such as the pro-Chinese
Orgajiization of the Marxist Leninists of Greece (OMLE), and
the Greek Revolutionary Liberation Front (EEAM) and the
Greek Comm\mist Party/Marxist Leninist (KKE/ML) , both of
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which are Stalinist in their orientation. ^ The three main
factions include the KKE (Exterior) which is pro-Moscow and
supported financially and morally by the Soviet Union, the
KKE (Interior) which split off in February 1968, and the
third faction, which is called "Chaos •* and blajnes the other
two factions for the poor showing of the Left in Greece,-^
On the night of the coup, April 21, 196?, most of
the KKE leaders were arrested without the slightest resis-
tance and its archives were found intact in the headquarters
37
of the EDA.^' This fact casts suspicion on the justifica-
tion given by the junta of imminent communist takeover,
F. GEORGE PAPANDREOU, THE ASPIDA AFFAIR AND THE KING
Three main factors contributed to the political demise
of George Papandreoui the ASPIDA affair, his son Andreas,
2uid the attempt to fire the Defense Minister,
The first reports of the secret army organization
called ASPIDA (Aksiomatikoi Sosate Patridhan Demokratikia
Aksiokratia - Officers Save the Country, Ideals, Democracy
and Meritocracy) and the involvement of Andreas Papsmdreou,
came from General George Grivas on Cyprus. George
Papandreou kept this information silent for a period,
either because he doubted the authenticity of the informa-
tion or because it implicated his son as an accomplice in
the affairs of this secret left-wing army organization.-^
While the ASPIDA incident was still being investigated,
Papandreou attempted to fire his Defense Minister, Petros
Garoufalias, a man who refused to allow Papandreou a free
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hand with the army. This, combined with the fact that
Papandreou wanted to assume the post himself, and the
ongoing ASPIDA investigation, led to a constitutional
crisis.
On July 15 » 1965 » Papandreou confronted the King over
his attempt to fire the Defense Minister. Papandreou
offered to resign; the King accepted on the spot. This
incident led to a chaotic situation in the next twenty
months and "became a matter of great controversy. King
Constantine felt that Papandreou had attempted to subordi-
nate the military to the office of Prime Minister. This
was considered treasonous by the King, since the armed
forces were responsible to him, and it was his responsi-
bility to maintain absolute control over the only instru-
ment which could guarantee the well-being of the nation. -^^^
The basic issue turned on Article 31 of the 1952 Con-
stitution which said, "The King appoints and dismisses his
Ministers,** In practice, since I875, this has mesint that
a government rules only with the confidence and support of
Psirliament. The King could not appoint Ministers not sure
of having that confidence; nor could he dismiss them unless
they had lost the confidence of Parliament. Since, at
the time, both the government of the center and the oppo-
sition of the right were loyal, and the party system was
working, the crisis of July I965 need not have been fatal,
or even have happened, if cooler heads had prevailed.
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G. BREAKDOWN OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY! I965-APRIL 196?
Following the resignation or dismissal of George
Papandreou, six governments came to power in rapid order,
averaging about one every three or four months. Table 2
gives the chronology of Greek Governments from 1955 to the
coup. The first two governments during this chaotic
twenty-one month period, were formed by Center Union leaders
George Athanasiades -Novas and E. Tsirimokos from Center
Union defectors, and were called "Governments of Puppets"
by George Papandreou. Both were short-lived. The third
government, formed by S. Stephanopoulos, finally garnered
enough Center Union defectors to obtain a vote of confi-
dence. His government remained in power over a year.
The stability ajid legitimacy of parliamentary govern-
ment was shaken by prevalent strikes and riots. Between
1965 and April I967 there were an estimated 950 strikes,
or about twenty-four a month. Everything built during
the stable years of the Karamanlis government was eroded
by "strikes, chaos, anarchy, inflation, slsinderous attacks
upon institutions, the squandering of public funds, and
the demolishing of all sense of hierarchy." Andreas
Papandreou even went so far as to announce that he would
swear in a government of his choice in Constitution Square
regardless of the outcome of the elections scheduled for
May 28, 196?.^^
Prime Minister Panayiotis Kanellopoulos , following




GREEK POLITICAL PARTIES, GOVERNMENTS AND ELECTIONS
Political Parties Founded Political Spectrum
Center Union (EK) I96I
Liberal Democratic Center (FIDIK) I965
National Radical Union (ERE) 1956
Progressive Party (KP) 1955









































































May 28, 1967 (scheduled but never held because of the coup
d'etat on April 21, I967)
SOURCEt Stephen Rousseas, The Death of Democracy i
Greece and the American Conscience (New York: Grove
Press, Inc., 196?) » p. 3«
April ^, 1967, and 2,000 leftist building workers April
12, dissolved Parliament on April 14 and scheduled elec-
tions for May 28, From his self-imposed exile in Paris
former Prime Minister Karamanlis issued a statement on the
whole affair
I
Democracy in Greece is bankrupt. Those responsible
are the King, the Members of Parliament of all parties,
and the press. If an army takeover is to come, it will
merely be the coup de grace. Democracy has long been
assassinated in Greece. ^^
On April 21, I967 the colonels struck.
H. THE GREEK MILITARY
Obviously, when speaking of a military coup d'etat, a
key variable is the armed forces, because they are the
segment of society which executes the coup. In Greece this
translates into the army, since it is the army that
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traditionally seizes the reins of government. It is vital
to know something about the attitudes and perceptions of
the army before attempting to explain the rationale for the
1967 coup and the ensuing practices of the self-selected
leaders of the coup.
While naval officers in the Greek military tend to come
from a more narrow upper stratum of society, the army ajid
air force have typically been vehicles of upward social
mobility for the sons of middle and lower-middle class
families. Table 3 presents a demographic breakdown of army
TABLE 3
DEMOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF THE GREEK PROFESSIONAL
OFFICER CORPS, I9I6-I965
Population Group Army** Total Population
less than 1,000 32.1^ 3^.6?^
1,000-5,000 25.9^ 20.2%
5.000-10,000 6.2?S 3.2%
10,000-50,000 18. C^ 12.0^
50,000 or more* 4.2J6 3.5^
Thessaloniki & Athens 13.6^ 26,5^
SOURCE I James Brown, "Military Intervention ajid the
Politics of Greece," in Soldiers in Politics , eds. Steffen
W. Schmidt and Gerald A. Dorfmsm XLos Altos, CAt Geron-X
Inc., 197^), p. 231, Table 7.
*Does not include Thessaloniki and Athens




officer origins based on the size population group from
which they are recruited. The close approximation to the
total population distribution is a notable indicator of
the less well-to-do origins of army officers. It can be
seen that significantly fewer army officers come from the
urban centers of Athens and Thessaloniki.
A critical factor in understanding the motivation of
army officers in seizing control of the government is the
aspect of self-image. Professor George Kourvetaris has
conducted several in-depth studies into precisely this fac-
tor. He says that "the modal self-image of the Greek offi-
cer is a synthesis of a primitive and indigenous heroic
value system with a managerial ethic derived from the con-
temporary Western model." From interviewing one hundred
Greek officers of varying ranks smd experience the primary
quality of "ethics smd character" was cited as the key
necessary attribute of the good officer. This was chosen
above other choices of ethical and psychic qualities, such
as command and leadership qualities, professional competence
or expertise, health and bodily qualities, combat experience
and other qualifications. This characteristic is expressed
in the word philotimo which literally means "one who loves
honor." Philotimo corresponds with Greeknesst the greater
the intensity of philotimo the greater the degree of Greek-
ness.
Recurring throughout his interviews, Kourvetaris found
that ideally the sirmy should never intervene in politics,
^3

but when things get too bad it is the duty of the army to
save the nation from extreme peril, be it internal or
external. He observed that some of the interviewed offi-
cers said the politicians had lost their philotimo and,
consequently, their legitimacy to rule. A strain of
"Puritanism** is revealed in the response of one Greek
officer! "The officer is popular? he represents the real
Greek. The revolution spoke to the hearts of the Greeks.
The officer commands souls and dies in the fire; his pro-
fess ion is unique.** '
Prevalent in the Greek military, but certainly not
unique to it, is the presence of secret military societies.
A major clandestine society was the Sacred Bond of Greek
Officers ( leros Desmos Ellinon Aksiomatikon - IDEA) which
was a larger, expanded version of the Union of Young Offi-
cers (Enosis Neon Aksiomatikon - ENA) set up by elements of
the Greek officer corps in the Middle East in August 1943.
The purpose of IDEA is expressed in three areas i (1) anti-
communism, (2) loyalty to the King, amd (3) support of
conservative, nationalistic political leaders such as
Constantine Karamanlis. ^ After World War Two, IDEA
declined in significance, only to be revitalized following
the 1958 elections and the dramatic electoral gains of the
leftist EDA party.
Approximately ten years before the coup some of the
more junior officers in IDEA formed the National Union of
Young Greek Officers (Ethniki Enosis Neon Aksiomatikon -
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EENA). The chief organizer of this small band was
Colonel George Papadopoulos who, coincidentally, played a
key role in IDEA as the main figure responsible for passing
the order executing any coup that might be staged by IDEA.
Consequently, the night of April 21, military officers who
received orders originating from Papadopoulos to execute
the coup, readily complied, believing the coup was IDEA-
inspired rather than an act of the smaller EENA.-^
A final secret organization was ASPIDA. This orgami-
zation has already been discussed in connection with the
role of Andreas Papandreou and the downfall of George
Papandreou from his position as Prime Minister in 19^5
•
All that needs to be said here is that the effect of ASPIDA
on the army was to arouse fears that it was the vehicle for
the infiltration of leftists into the array. Also, it was
alleged to be supporting Archbishop Makarios in his efforts
to reject a NATO solution to the Cyprus issue,
^
Finally, the army functions as a major interest group
in Greek society, with four major differences from other
interest groups i (1) the hierarchical structure and chain
of command make the army a formidable foe in competition
for power and influence; (2) the Greek military possesses
the means of repression and violence; (3) the specific type
equipment and uniforms give the military a high visibility;
and, (4) in their capacity as the representative and nation-
al defender of the Greek nation and its interests, the mil-
itary carry added weight in their access to natural
53
resources and share of the governmental budget. -^-^
^5

II. TIffi COUP D'ETAT I THE MECHANICS AND STRUCTURE
.
ITS IDEOLOGY AND REACTION TO IT
A. MECHANICS OF THE APRIL 21, 196? COUP D'ETAT
The military takeover was a virtually bloodless opera-
tion. It commenced at approximately two AM, April 21,
1967 1 and, by sunrise, the key points, such as radio sta-
tions, communication centers smd airfields in Athens, were
under army control and the tentacles of military rule were
spreading throughout the nation.
The coup, code-named lERAX (The Hawk), put into opera-
tion the NATO plan Prometheus II which called for the
rapid roundup of communist leaders and other security sus-
pects in the event of war with a communist country. The
successful application of this plan depended upon two
things I sufficient men and equipment to seize and control
the key points, and the allegiajice of a high-ranking figure
whose name would be signed to the orders executing the
contingency plan. The first was provided by one of the
coup leaders. Brigadier General Stylianos Pattsikos, who
coimnaLnded the only tanks near Athens and also headed the
armored training center. The second was provided by the
last minute recruitment of the army chief of staff,
2Lieutenant General Gregorious Spandidakis.
The names of those arrested and detained in the early
hours of the coup came from a list several years old which
lf6

had been hastily updated. Consequently, many people were
arrested who were no threat to the military or the success
of the coup, while many others, who may conceivably have
been a threat, slept through the night undisturbed.
At six AM on April 21 the ruling junta broadcast to the
public the following announcementi
The armed forces have taken over the government of
the country. The king, in accordance with Article No. 91
of the Greek constitution "following a proposal by the
cabinet, in case of serious trouble or an obvious threat
to the public security and order of the country, ** has or-
dered with a royal decree the suspension all over the
country of Articles No. 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 1^, 20, 95f
and 97 of the constitution. The king also in accordance
with Article No. 91 has formed special coxirts-martial.-^
The use of the name of the King in this broadcast was
not authorized. The King had neither instigated nor sup-
ported the coup. One of the coup leaders. Colonel Nikolaos
Makarezos, admitted in a UPI interview on May 1 that the
coup had taken place without the knowledge of the King
"because we had to protect him from those who would accuse
k
him of being the instigator."
On April 21 it was also ainnounced that the country was
considered to be under a "state of siege" in accordajice with
the terms of Law DXTH of 8 October 1912. These conditions
were put into effect with Royal Decree No. 280 of April 21,
1967. (See Appendix A) The state of siege rules stipulated
that I
(1) Individuals can be apprehended and arrested with-
out charge. They can be detained for any length of time.
(2) There is no bail for political crimes. (3) All citi-
zens, independent of position, can be brought before an
emergency court-martial. (^) All gatherings, indoors or
outdoors, are forbidden. All gatherings will be dissolved
^7

by force. (5) It is forbidden to form a syndicate []union]
or group with labor union aims. Strikes are completely
forbidden. (6) It is permitted to search houses, politi-
cal premises, public buildings, all buildings, day and
night, without special warrant. (7) It is forbidden to
announce or publish any kind of information in any way
through the press, radio and television without censor-
ship beforehand. (8) Letters, telegrams and all means of
communication will be censored. (9) Crimes, political
crimes as well as those of the press, whether they have
to do with private life or not, as well as the crimes to
be judged by the court of appeal, will be judged by court-
martial. (10) Everyone who commits a crime which should
be punished by law, even if it is not aigainst the army,
will also be judged by court-martial,^
B. WHY DID THE COUP OCCUR?
There are numerous reasons for the intervention in April
1967. Professor Kotirvetsiris , in his interview of the Greek
officers conducted in the winter of 1968/69f posed the fol-
lowing question: "What do you think was the main issue(s)
prior to the I967 military intervention?" All of the in-
terviewed officers cited one or more of the following three
conditions I the communist threat, political decay, or
social inequality and decadence of the society at large.
Professor Theodore A. Couloumbis cites as contributing
factors the followingi the polarization of Greek post-war
politics between the right suid the left; a heritage of
short-term, opportunistic, personalistic political parties;
the divisions within the defense establishment seen in the
conflicting views of ASPIDA and IDEA; a history of U.S.
dominance in Greek affairs; and a press that is lacking in




Professor James Brown examined this issue of why the
coup occurred and provided some valuable insight. When
looking at the economic conditions, he found that in the
four years preceding the coup the rate of growth of the
Q
Gross National Product averaged 7.5?^ annually, inflation
in 1965 and I966 averaged about six percent,^ wages re-
flected an annual increase of about 8,^ and unemployment
was relatively high, especially in the agricultural sector.
Brown concludes that economic conditions were not a factor
in the coupi
In none of their immediate post-April 21st pro-
noxincements or in the interviews that this writer con-
ducted with varied officials of the government were the
economic conditions in Greece during the period of I963
to 1967 ever mentioned as reasons for their intervention,
although the government did. place major emphasis on the
economy after it took over. "
In looking at the political and social conditions, he
finds these to be quite unsatisfactory. Between 19^5 and
April 1967 about eighty percent of the trade unions went on
strike at various times — an estimated 950 strikes. In
these and other riots, about 1,200 individuals were injured
and about fifteen were killed. Of the injured, three hun-
dred were gendarmerie , who had the main responsibility for
12keeping public order.
Ironically, in a public opinion poll of Greek citizens
during I965-I966, forty-three percent felt that the most
crucial problem was the economy, while only twenty-seven
13percent said that political problems were worse. ^ This is




As mentioned earlier, the communist threat was a fre-
quent and major justification given by the military leaders
for the intervention, at least in the early days of the
coup. The junta leaders, however, failed to produce any
evidence to support their contention and the credibility of
this justification soon evaporated, Kourvetaris found that
the communist threat, real or imagined, was firmly per-
ceived as present and threatening by the army officer corps
at large. Kourvetaris observed thati "Those officers who
fought the Greek commimists in 19^4 to 19^9 ajid in the
Korean conflict were the most pro-interventionist of the
officers. In the words of severali 'We fought the commu-
nists in Korea; we defeated them three times in Greece,
Yet I was stimned to see them again on the sidewalks of
III
Athens,*" Certainly the junta made every effort to con-
vince the Greek people of the communist threat, A bulky,
illustrated booklet published in English by the Panhellenic
Confederation of Reserve Officers, entitledi "Why did the
Revolution of 21 April take place?" stated that before the
coup the communists had controlled "the beds of public
houses, the licenses of trifle-sellers, even the frozen
chickens" and that the houses of military officers had been
marked with yellow dye in preparation for the hour of
communist uprising, -^ The regime claimed to have discovered
numerous communist-owned caches and seventy three-ton truck
loads of bogus imiforms and weapons. Despite promises from
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the coup leader, Papadopoulos , none of this was ever
produced.
Historical and political developments preceding the
coup tend to support the perceptions of military officers
that there was a communist threat. The 1956 elections
legitimized the EDA, which was a recognized front for the
outlawed KKE. In 1958? "the EDA received almost twenty-
five percent of the vote and became the opposition party.
In 1963* "the Center Union party of George Papandreou took
the reins of government. This change of government was a
leftward shift from the ERE of Karamanlis. In addition,
Andreas Papandreou, who had rapidly ascended the political
ladder, was vocally critical of the crown, NATO and the
U.S., all of which the military stood for. Rightly or
wrongly, real or perceived, the threat of commimist taJce-
over was a major justification of the junta.
Even in the United States there were learned people
who believed in the reality of the communist threat in
Greece as long as four and five yesirs after the coup.
Professor D. George Kousoulas of Howard University, who
helped draft the I968 Greek Constitution, cited a four-
step plan of the EDA to gain power, in testimony to the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 15 » 1971.
His testimony cites a statement by Manolis Glezos, a key
leader in the EDA party and a long-time communist, given
May 25, 1966 in a closed strategy conference of the exec-
utive committee of EDA. Kousoulas says the EDA planned
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to assist the electoral victory of the Center Union party
of George Papandreoui
Then EDA was going to put into effect the following
four-step plan.
I quote I "Phase one. — We'll support the Govern-
ment" — meaning the Center Union Government which EDA
expected would be dominated by Andreas Papandreou.
"Phase two. — We'll participate in the Government,
"Phase three. — We'll be the government and they"
— meaning Papandreou — "would be the participants.
"Phase four. — We alone shall be the government."
This EDA plan was the well-known, almost classic,
process used in Eastern Europe in the late forties for
imposing Communist rule. ^7
Politically, the previous two years had been in con-
stant turmoil with repeated changes of government. For this
the politicians must bear a major share of the responsibil-
ity for the coup. The coup merely administered the coup de
grace to the wreckage of the previous multi-party system,
C. THE JUNTA LEADERS AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
Table k contains the names of the leaders of the coup
and the positions they assumed within the government. The
three primary figures, who were the initiators and primary
executors of the coup, were Colonel George Papadopoulos
,
Brigadier General Styliajios PattaJcos and Colonel Nikolaos
Makarezos,
At the time of the coup there were twelve to seventeen
officers actively involved in its execution with another
forty to fifty who willingly followed orders thereby insur-
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SOURCE » James Brown, "Military Intervention and the
Politics of Greece," in Soldiers in Politics , eds, Steffen
W, Schmidt and Gerald A, Dorfman TLos Altos, CAi Geron-X
Inc., 197^), p. 236, Table 12. Also George Zaharopoulos,
"Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece," in Greece
Under Military Rule, eds. Richard Clogg and George
Yannopoulos ( New Yorkt Basic Books, Inc., Publishers,
1972), p. 31, Table 1.
the junta appointed a civilian Prime Minister, Constantine
V. Kollias, the Crovm Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, In
addition, the majority of the cabinet was composed of
civilians, although each ministry contained at least one
military member of the "revolution" as secretary or
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undersecretary. Loyal officers were rewstrded for their
support. Many appointments to government positions made
sense only when viewed from the standpoint of blood or
18
marriage ties to army officers. In subsequent cabinet
reorgsmizations more military officers were appointed to
top ministerial positions.
From the outset the junta went through progressively
orchestrated government reorganizations to first consoli-
date power in the hands of the top three, and later, in
the hands of Papadopoulos . By reorganizing the government,
Papadopoulos was able to maintain a facade to the rest of
the world that the junta was demilitarizing. Initially,
the major decisions were made by the thirteen member
"Revolutionary Committee** below which was a forty-one mem-
19ber "Revolutionary Coimcil." ^ Both of these organizations
operated secretly. The only formal recognition of the
Revolutionary Committee was in Article 13^ of the 1968
Constitution, where it spoke of the Regent being appointed
by "proclamation of the Revolutionary Committee." Once
Papadopoulos became Prime Minister, the Revolutionary
20Committee ceased to function.
At the time of the coup, Papadopoulos was the deputy
director of the operations branch of the army general
staff, MsLkarezos was the officer-in-charge of an espionage
section in the Greek Central Intelligence Service ( Kentriki
Ypiresia Pliroforion - KYP) , while Pattakos commanded
21
armored forces in the Athens area. Following the
5*

abortive coxinter-coup by the King in December 196? » and his
subsequent departure to Rome, several chajiges were made to
the military government. On December 20, 196? Papadopoulos
,
22Pattakos and Makarezos resigned their military commissions.
Lt. Gen. Zoitakis was named as Viceroy and Regent of Greece
with all the powers of King Constantine. Papadopoulos
became Prime Minister and Defense Minister, while Pattakos
added the position of Deputy Premier. Lt. Gen. Spandidakis
was relieved of his position in the government December 13
for refusing to return from NATO headquarters and lead the
23
armed forces against the King. ^ A fxindamental change
occurred in the junta in February I968 when all but two of
oil
the military officers resigned their commissions.
Papadopoulos enlarged his cabinet on June 29, 1970 by
2*5
adding largely nonmilitary men. ^ On July 21, 1970 he
assumed the additional position of Acting Foreign Minister
following the death of Foreign Minister Panayiotis Pipinelis.
Christian Xanthopoulos-Palajnas was sworn in as Undersecre-
26
tary in the Foreign Ministry.
August 26, 1971 witnessed a major reorganization of the
junta cabinet, noted by foreign observers as a further "de-
militarization" of the government. The move reduced the
overall number of ministries, created new ones, reduced the
power of the closest army and political associates of
Papadopoulos and divided the nation into seven administra-
tive districts under the authority of undersecretaries.
Papadopoulos added to his positions of Prime Minister,
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Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministers, a newly created
Ministry of Government Policy which combined the old
Ministry to the Premier and the Economic Coordination
Ministry. Pattakos lost his position as Interior Minister,
while Makarezos was appointed Second Deputy Premier, but
lost control of the abolished Economic Coordination
Ministry. ^
The next major change occurred in Jxrne 1973 when the
Council of Ministers issued a decree abolishing the mon-
archy, proclaiming a "presidential parliamentary republic,"
and naming George Papadopoulos as the provisional President.
The remainder of 1973 witnessed rapid preparation for
civilian rule (but still under the former army officers)
t
September 9 — the official closing of all military courts
that had been operating since the coup in April 1967;
September 1^ — the government appointed an eleven-man
constitutional court to screen political parties sind candi-
dates for elections; October 1 — all current cabinet mem-
bers submitted resignations, and Spyros Msurkezinis agreed
to become the first civilian Prime Minister since
Constantine Kollias in I967. He was to set up an all-
civilian cabinet to prepare for parliamentary elections
in 197^.^^
But then the situation degenerated, with student unrest
and violence at the Athens Polytechnic, anti- junta senti-
ment arising in the navy, and rampant inflation all con-
tributing to the November 25 t 1973 overthrow of Papadopoulos
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and the installation of an even more oppressive dictatorship
imder Dimitrios loannides.
D. IDEOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES OF THE JUNTA
It has been widely stated that the junta had no ideol-
ogy aside from its desire to put Greece back on its feet
again after restoring order to the chaotic political arena.
Papadopoulos himself termed the regime a "psurenthesis"
between the old politics and a new system of democracy,
"
30
and a form of "guided democracy."^ Certainly, from the
things the leaders said, one can glean elements of puritan-
ism, idealism, populism and nationalism.
Professor Christos L. Doumas cites Document SS/II6,
April 21, 1967* from the Ministry to the Prime Minister,
which gave the following objectives of the jtintai (1) to
promote national unity; (2) to affect a just redistribu-
tion of the national income; (3) to bring about justice in
taxation; (^) to accelerate economic development; and (5)
to improve the lot of "farmers, the workers, professionals,
artisans and all persons of toil."-' The civilian Prime
Minister of the junta, Constantine V, Kollias, provided the
following political and ideological position in a speech
given at ten PM on April 21, I9671
The salvation of the nation is the superior law, , .
,
. .
.We belong to no party and support no particular
faction. .. .We are led exclusively by patriotic motives,
and we aim at destroying depravity, to clean up public
life, to throw out of the state organization the putri-
fication from which it was threatened.
After the establishment of normal life and the crea-
tion of suitable conditions in the shortest amount of
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time, the country will return to the parliamentarians on
a healthy basis. Then the mission of the new government
will be over.-^^
Professor Couloumbis describes the ideology of the
military regime based on the framework of one of the major
theoreticians of the regime, George Georgalas.-^-^ First,
the military officers considered their action a revolution,
and not a coup d'etat, in the sense that a revolution has
as its aim the fundamental changing of society while a
coup d'etat results only in the change of leadership.
Second, the social system was to remain essentially the
same, only more healthy and with more equitable distribu-
tion of wealth. Third, the economic system was to remain
unchanged except to operate more smoothly. Fourth, the
intellectual system was to remain based on Greek-Christian
values while a wider opening for the young and "technocrats'
would facilitate modernization. And, fifth, the political
system was to undergo "a complete and absolute revolution"
with a complete abandonment of the "old political world."
A great deal can be gleaned from the public statements
of the three key members of the junta. Papadopoulos said
the following when speaking of the restrictions imposed on
the Greek peoples
Do not forget that we are before a diseased person
whom we have on the operating table, and if the surgeon
does not fasten him to the table during the operation,
there is the possibility that, instead of restoring his
health, we will lead him to death. The restrictions are






Pattakos made the following comment about the armed
forces t "The surmed forces are the most democratic elements
in amy country — they have the most respect for the law.
We are taught to obey so that we can command, "^^
In a speech at the University of Jannina on December
6, 1969 1 Ladas made the following comment about philosophyj
"...no other people have any philosophers. The Greeks
have exhausted the subject, ,, .Foreigners can only imitate
them. . . . "^^
In early 1971 Ladas made the following pronouncement
about the quality of art: "Good art is that which is good
for the Motherland, Bad art is that which is bad for the
Motherland."^' A simple yardstick.
Papadopoulos, speaking about the Greek peasantry and
workers in a speech on December 15 t 19^9 i stated what the
basic attitude of the Greek people should bet "The Greek
people must eat less, work more and demand less."-^
Pattakos spoke in the following manner about Dimitrios
Stratis, a leader of prisoners on the prison island of
Yiarost "He calls himself a Socialist, but he is a Commu-
nist. In Greece, we have right people and wrong people.
All those who are against the country are Communists.
Stratis is a Communist in his heart and his works. They
39
are all liars. "^^
All of the above quotes display a considerable degree
of political naivete and simplistic populism. It seems
apparent that the military leaders had good intentions,
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but lacked the political acumen to carry them out. Their
methods were extreme and counter-productive.
Pattakos on April 27, 196? ordered the Education Minis-
try to haii long hair on boys and miniskirts on girls, and
to order students to regularly attend Sunday mass and to
avoid such entertainment as pinball machines. Pattakos, in
a joint statement with the Minister of Public Order, issued
the following! •'Foreigners with filthy and tattered
clothing and wearing beards or long hair will be turned back
40
at the border." At the same time such major issues as
drug addiction, sex education, handicapped children and the
existence of slums were declared nonexistent in Greece and
not investigated.
The ideology of the junta can best be summarized as
idealistic, with high hopes and aims for Greece. The
colonels were pursuing a "Greece of Christiaji Greeks."
Makarezos wrote in the introduction to the 1970 Greek
Government publication The Revolution of 21st April I967
Builds A New Greece i "...the Greek armed forces took the
responsibility of managing the country's affairs under the
ancient dictum salus populi suprema et lex Qthe public
safety is supreme aind is the law of the landJ." Unfor-
tunately, the achievements of the colonels fell consider-
ably short of their aspirations.
E. GREEK REACTION TO THE COUP
The militsiry takeover was virtually bloodless. That
fact alone seems to have contributed to what became a
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largely nonviolent response by the majority of the Greek
people, at least in the early months of the coup. One
author says that, contrary to other reports, more than
fifty percent of the people welcomed the coup, while as
many as seventy percent saw it as a necessary evil to
restore order to the chaotic political situation. ^ Many
Greek citizens, on the other hand, referred to the seven
and one-half year military dictatorship as the Katochi,
the occupation, a term that was usually reserved for the
German occupation of Greece in World War Two. It was
even possible to find writers who applauded the taJceover
believing that "if the center-left bloc had won the May
28th [I967D election the king would have been dethroned,
the political voice of the nationalist segment of the
population would have been silenced, and the country's
foreign alliances terminated." -^
Reaction to the junta was relatively passive in the
first one to two years, with criticism coming mainly from
intellectuals, journalists, politicians, human rights
advocates and others who, directly or indirectly, were
impinged upon, suffered and lost as a result of the coup.
Increasing acts of violence and resistance did occxir as
the period of military rule increased. These will be dis-
cussed in a later chapter.
One obvious manifestation of Greek dissatisfaction with
the junta was the rising tide of anti-American sentiment.
A typical example of the view held by Greeks was thati
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"Every Greek inside Greece, and every person of Greek con-
nections outside, painfully "believes that Washington in-
stalled the dictators who rule or misrule their country
and maintain them as a going concern." What led many
Greeks to believe in U.S. complicity was the open American
opposition to the Center Union party in the two years prior
to the coup. Furthermore, it was a commonly accepted view
in Greece that everything that occurred in Greece was per-
mitted hy the U.S. And the American CIA had a reputation
for making or breaking foreign governments. The American
CIA also established and bankrolled the KYP (Greek CIA).
Certainly, the U.S. took no overt negative actions to oust
the junta or convince the Greek people otherwise.
A major, outspoken critic of the junta was Andreas
Papandreou. Arrested by the junta, with his political ca-
reer seemingly ruined and subsequently ejected from Greece,
Papandreou certainly had grounds for the bitterness evident
in his accusations towsurd the junta and the U.S. This
Greek politician played a major role in convincing many
Greeks that the U.S. was directly behind the junta and
that the CIA was the vehicle through which the U.S. was
pulling the strings in Greece. Responding to an interview
question, Papandreou saidi "I know for a fact that such a
decision [military coup d'etat] was made at the White House
in February 196? » during a meeting at which presidential
advisor Walt Rostow, presided." ' In a speech he delivered
at Amherst College in the spring of 1971 Papandreou
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elaborated on that statementt
There was a meeting in February, I967 in Washington
of a subcommittee of the Security Council, under the
chairmanship of W, W. Rostow, In this meeting — the
CI. A., the Pentagon, the State Department participated
— Rostow ascertained that a victory in Greece for the
Center Union Party, of which George Papandreou was the
leader, would be contrary to the interest of the United
States. The election was due to taJce place in May, 1967,
Since that victory was certain and beyond doubt, some-
thing must happen to prevent it. Reportedly, Rostow
finished his meeting with the following sentence,
"Gentlemen, what we have said today, or rather what we
have failed to say, has set the course of events in
Greece inevitably," That means that at the Rostow level
at least there was a green light for a coup as of
February, I967. The coup occurred in April,^"
He went on to sayi
Cyrus Vance, on the morning of the coup (April 21,
1967) circulated ajnong various governmental offices in
Washington, D.C., to assure officials that this coup was
"ours," and that concern about it was unnecessary. What
is my source of this information? The junta itself. An
officer who has now defected from the junta has submitted
this evidence to me. ^9
Writing after the November 1973 student uprisings in
Athens, which brought about the demise of Papadopoulos
,
Papandreou exhibited a further tendency to base his rhetoric
on his feelings and not on accurate data. Nevertheless, his
rhetoric has had and continues to have significant effect
on Greek public opinion about the junta and the United
States, He praised the November I6, 1973 uprising as "a
genuine, if short-lived, social and political revolution,"
He continued, "it is certain that at least ^00 people lost
their lives and that at least 1,000 were wounded. Reliable
reports reaching us now indicate the existance of mass
graves in two army camp locations in the environs of
Athens."^ All other reports that this author has seen
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speak of 15-30 deaths, while none mention any mass burial
sites.
In that same article written in February 1974,
Papandreou saidi "...the primary objective is national
liberation — the ousting of the United States and NATO
from Greece."^
Certainly a major expression of the legitimacy and
acceptance of a government was manifest in the level of
resistance activity directed sigainst it. Despite consider-
able violence, resistance by most people to the junta took
the form of passive, nonviolent protest, at least among the
older generations. Among the intellectuals, protest took
the form of a silent strike, that is, failing to produce
sinything of literary, educational or artistic value. In
March I969, however, the floodgates were opened when the
Greek Nobel prize winner, George Seferis, released the
following statements
A regime has been imposed upon us which is entirely
opposed to the ideals for which our world fought during
the last war. Our spiritual values. . .have been sub-
merged in the muddy and stagnant waters of a swamp....
Tragedy lies in wait at the end... the longer tUis abnor-
mal situation lasts, the worse it becomes, .. .^^
Much of what was produced by Greeks was published out-
side the country in English and other languages. One of
the quirks of the junta was that while the Greek press was
censored, foreign books, periodicals and newspapers contin-
ued to be sold openly on the streets, so criticism of the
junta manifested itself widely in other languages. The
following limerick mocks the junta and is typical of the
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Greek criticism. It was composed by Greeks in English
for American consumption*
Pattakos, Pattakos, national man,
MaJce me a fascist as fast as you can.
Brainwash and grill me,
For Greece's sake kill me; (.-
Or send me to Yiaros to make me a man. -^
Resistance to the coup was manifest in the quality of
the people recruited by the junta into the government.
Many of the efficient, technically-oriented Greeks did not
wish to serve the regime because of differing ideological
views and fears of being labelled a collaborator.^ Promi-
nent Greeks such as Xenophon Zolotas and John Pesmazoglou,
Governor and First Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece,
respectively, resigned in 19^7 rather than continue under
a military government.''-'
More than one assassination attempt was made upon the
life of Papadopoulos , starting as early as August 13, I968.
Numerous underground organizations arose during the
seven and one-half years. One such group was formed by
political and cultural leaders — writers, artists, educa-
tors, lawyers, scientists, journalists and politicians —
to circumvent the ban on political parties and maintain a
resistance. The Society for the Study of Greek Problems,
of which John Pesmazoglou was a prime mover, was regarded
as perhaps the most effective resistance organization of
this type.-' Two more violence-oriented groups were the
Democratic Defense (Demokratiki Amyna - DA) and the Patri-
otic Front ( Patriotiko Metopo - PAM)^' who jointly issued
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a statement in Athens on May 23, 1968t •*all foreign
toiirists who visit Greece will be considered as sympathizers
who contribute directly or indirectly to the perpetuation
of the dictatorship. "-^ An underground organization
calling itself the Movement of National Resistance issued
a statement July 29, 19^9 threatening to kidnap or kill
Americans for alleged collaboration with the army-backed
Greek Government, ^
Resistance to the junta existed even within the Greek
military. Probably the best known case was the abortive
counter-coup in May 1973 in which some thirty-five senior
officers, both active and retired, planned to seize a
number of ships and use them to force the resignation of
the junta. Their arrest prompted the commander of the
destroyer Velos . Captain Nicholas Papas, to breaJc away on
May 25, 1973 from ongoing NATO exercises off the island of
Sardinia and, together with thirty members of his crew,
seek and receive political asylum in Italy.
Elements of every segment of society were opposed to
the coup. The longer the junta remained in power, the
larger and more vocal the anti-junta segments of society
became. With their vocalness came increasing criticism of
the U.S. as well. The junta was not well-liked and resis-
tance to it was present in both passive and violent forms.
F. FOREIGN REACTION TO THE JUNTA
Foreign reaction to the coup ranged from the "rape of
democracy," on the one hand, to "the Greeks got what they
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deserved since they were xmable to handle democratic
institutions and political liberty," on the other.
Governments around the world were cautious, but not long,
in recognizing the new military government.
The British formally recognized the new regime on May
8, when the British Ambassador, Sir Ralph Murray, called on
and congratulated the new Prime Minister, Constantine V,
Kollias.^^
Criticism of the junta was quick to develop. On Septem-
ber 21, 1967 t Norway, Sweden and Denmark presented a formal
complaint of human rights violations in Greece to the
European Commission of Human Rights of the Council of Europe,
A week later they were joined by the Netherlands. On March
25, 1968 charges of tortxire were added to the list of
grievances. More about these accusations will be said in
the following chapter.
Within NATO, pressure was exerted by Iceland, Norway,
Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, West Germany, Italy,
and Canada aigainst Greece as a member of NATO because of
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the undemocratic nature of her regime. The U.S. acted
openly to resist this pressure on behalf of Greece; Britain
sided with the U.S. in this move,^ The Plenum of the
Parliamentary Assembly of NATO voted 26 to k, with two
abstentions, on October 20, I969 to condemn Greece for its
64denial of democratic rights.
Following the abortive counter-coup by King Constantine
on December 13, I967, the Athens Ambassadors of Britain,
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Italy, France, West Germany and the U.S. ignored an invi-
tation to meet with Papadopoulos on December 1^,^ The
first two governments to recognize the new military gov-
ernment, aTter the departure of the King, were the Congo
(Brazzaville) on Jsinuary 13 1 1968 and Turkey on January 20.
The U.S. was third on January 23. Ambassador Talbot paid
a visit to the Greek Foreign Minister and afterward an-
nounced that I "This is a resumption of normal diplomatic
relations with the Greek government." State Department
spokesman Robert J. McCloskey reiterated the U.S. position
that, even in exile. King Constamtine remained the Greek
chief of state, but that "relations between the king and
the government in Athens are am internal Greek matter about
which it is not for the United States government to comment.
Reaction by most foreign governments to the junta was
to silently accept them on a business as usual manner. A
few were vocally opposed to the regime as in the case of
the Scsindinavian countries. But, not one foreign govern-
ment withheld recognition of the colonels.
The reaction and response of the U.S. Government will




III. TIffi PRACTICES . POLICIES AND
RELATIONS OF TIffi JUNTA
A. THE JUNTA AND POLITICS
In the political arena action by the colonels was swift.
The first political party to be abolished was the United
Democratic Left (EDA) on April 29. Under Proclamation Nos,
5 and 8 of May 6, No. 16 of June 2, No, 19 of June Ik, No,
22 of July 15 t No, 28 of September 22 and No, 30 of Novem-
ber 13, 1967, issued by the Chief of the General Staff, 279
associations and organizations were dissolved and banned.
These organizations were liberal and leftist, three-fourths
of which were labor unions. However, they also included
youth, student, athletic, civic and women's organizations.
The following day (April 30) all youth organizations affil-
iated with political parties were outlawed. The new Prime
Minister, in reference to students, saidi "they were aban-
doning their education and, instead of being educated to
become good citizens, they were educating themselves in
mob-rule and sidewalk demonstrations. It was time that
[youths] returned to their task and to the way of virtue
and duty."-^ On May 27, I967 the jtmta closed the head-
quarters of the right-wing National Unity Party and
k
arrested the leaders, an action demonstrating that poli-
tical repression was not limited only to the leftists and
liberals. On May 6 the junta abolished the constitutional
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provisions allowing for election of municipal smd village
officials? they now became jimta appointees. They also
disbainded all municipal and village councils.^ They pro-
ceeded to destroy the system of nonpolitical nomarchs
(district administrators). More thaai one-half of the
nomarchs were removed and most were replaced with army
officers. Tenure of civil servants was abolished, many
were removed, and army officers or their relatives and
friends replaced then,.^ ^ A 7 '^/'^^JiM£-i^
When democracy was restored, and Karamanlis became the
Prime Minister once again, 108,000 junta appointees, ranging
from village councillor to the President of the Greek
Supreme Court, were dismissed by the Karamanlis government,
Q
and 400 junta leaders and other collaborators faced trial.
1. The 1968 Constitution
Shortly after seizing power, the colonels appointed
a twenty-man committee, the Mitrelias Committee, to draft a
new constitution.^ On July 11, I968 the first draft of the
new 138-article constitution was made public. Papadopoulos
unveiled a revised edition on September 16. The revised
edition omitted one proposed article which banned Greeks,
who had obtained foreign citizenship, from serving in Psur-
liament. This article was intended to insure that Andreas
Papandreou, who had been an American citizen before return-
ing to Greece, would never again hold an elected office.
The major revision, however, was the amendment of the last
article so as to enable the junta to hold in abeyance
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twelve articles dealing with personal freedoms until the
"aims of the revolution" were achieved. Article I38 saidi
The present Constitution, after its approval by the
Greek people through referendum, signed by the Cabinet
and published in the government gazette, comes into imme-
diate effect, with the exception of the provisions of
articles 10, 12, 13 section 1, 1^ sections 1-3, 18, 19,
25 sections 2-3. 58 sections 1-2, 60, 111, 112, 121 sec-
tion 2, the national revolutionary government being
authorized to place these provisions into effect through
acts published in the government gazette.
The articles cited above pertained to arrest and
imprisonment (10) j right to trial by a judge in one's own
jurisdiction (12); inviolability of the home (13); freedom
of speech, press and censorship (1^ sections 1-3); right
of assembly (18); right to form associations, unions and
cooperatives (19); use of the royal decree (25 sections
2-3); political parties (58 sections 1-2); elections to
parliament (60); jurisdiction of courts over specific
types of cases (111); special laws over courts -martials
and juvenile courts (112); and the election of municipal
and villsLge officials (121 section 2). In addition, sev-
eral of the articles dealing with freedoms were qualified,
such as Article 9 (2): "Personal liberty is inviolable.
No one is prosecuted, arrested, imprisoned or otherwise
restricted, except whenever and in whatever way the law
rules," and Article 13 (1)» "The home of each person is
inviolable. No house search can taJce place except at a
time and manner prescribed by law,"
By decree on August 6 voting on the I968 Constitu-
tion was made compulsory for all Greeks between the a^es of
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twenty-one and seventy who lived within three hundred miles
of their voting district. A massive propaganda drive was
initiated by the jimta to insure the passage of the new
constitution in the referendum scheduled for September 29.
It included the display of banners and posters stating NAI
(YES) to the constitution. Electricity bills and incoming
mail were even stamped YES TO THE CONSTITUTION. In the
zeal to insure victory, an American family in Greece, whose
car sported a NO vote bumper sticker, was detained and
interrogated by the police. When released they were fol-
lowed. Driving past the U.S. Embassy in Athens the wife
jumped out, ran into the Embassy screaming "Help, help!"
A Greek policeman pursued her into the Embassy and was
dragging her out when he was stopped. Later the Greek
Foreign Minister apologized to the American Ambassador
saying, "The Greek Government forbids Americans to meddle
in Greek affairs smd also forbids Americans to criticize
America."
On the day of voting, newspapers carried the banner
headlines: "Set the Foundations For the New Democracy! —
12Greek People Summoned to Defend the Nation." A few days
before the referendum it was common knowledge that provin-
cial governors were told to hold all police chiefs, mayors
and village leaders personally responsible for every nega-
tive vote cast, ^ Police were used to keep order outside;




The new Greek Constitution was overwhelmingly-
approved by a vote of ninety-two percent. Information
Bulletin No. 26, September 30, 1968, from the Royal Greek
Embassy Press and Information Service in Washington, de-
scribed the outcome in this mannen
By 92.2^ the Greek people approved yesterday the
country's new constitution in a national referendum, held
in absolutely irreproachable conditions of freedom and
order throughout the country. Of the total nximber of
6,508,89^ registered voters, 5 i 0^2,5^5 cast their votes.
18,^73 of them were invalid votes. Of the valid votes,
4,633,602 were in favor of the constitution and 390,^70
SLgainst it.^^
Despite the massive propaganda blitz, a significant
number of people saw fit to vote OX
I
(NO). Various shady,
if not outright illegal, practices were observed. Early
voters at some polling places witnessed boxes of NO ballots
being strewn on the floors of the booths to discourage
voters from casting a negative vote, ^ while in outlying
districts such as Crete and Macedonia it was reported that
16
only YES ballots were available to voters. Civil ser-
vants and social security employees received ballots in
specially colored envelopes. In small villages and dis-
tricts with very few civil servants it was therefore easy
17
to trace NO votes to disloyal public servants. ' Ballot
boxes were taken away in army cars for tabulation and no
foreign journalists or observers were admitted at the
. . 18
counting,
Elias P. Demetracopoulos, an ant i- junta Greek
lobbyist, made the following comment on the I968 Constitu-
tion voting results to the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
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July 12, 1971» **...when they [the colonels] come and they
have the audacity to present a Stalinistic vote of 92.2
percent — for 3 #000 years the Greeks have not agreed "by
such a percentage on amy issue — would they agree on
1 Q
Papadopoulos with 92.2 percent?" ^ Incredulity such as
this was widely expressed throughout the world.
The Constitution, less the articles held in abey-
ance, went into effect November 15$ 1968. Not until April
9» 1969 were the first three of the suspended articles
restored. These concerned the inviolability of private
homes, the right of association and the right of assembly.
There are several additional criticisms of the
1968 Constitution. First, the new constitution severely
curtailed the powers of the King in several ways. (1) The
King was required by Article ^3 to appoint as Prime Minis-
ter the leader of the party "having the absolute majority
in Parliament," and, if no party had a majority, it was up
to Parliament, not the King, to elect the leader who would
then be appointed by the King. (2) The power of the King
to dismiss his ministers was made subject to the recommen-
dation of the Prime Minister. (3) The King could dissolve
Parliament only "after having heard the opinion of the
Council of the Nation." (Article ^6) And, {k) while the
King remained as leader of the armed forces, "the adminis-




Second, state supervision over political parties
was expanded and fiirther legitimized. Article 58 (2) saidi
"The chsiracter of every party must be approved by the
Constitutional Court, which checks as to the conformity of
its provisions in relation to the Constitution. No party
shall have the right to participate in elections if its
charter has not had the aforementioned approval.** Further-
more, "The general functioning of the parties.
.
.shall be
subject to the continuous supervision of the Constitutional
Court, which shall have the right to dissolve any party
whatsoever for violation of the Constitution or the laws."
(Article 58 (^))- To insure the obedience and existence
of the correct parties, Article 58 (5) specified thati
Parties whose aims or activities are manifestly or
tacitly opposed to the form of government or tend to
overthrow the existing social system or endanger the
territorial integrity of the state or public security,
shall be outlawed and dissolved by decision of the
Constitutional Court, as provided by law,^^
Third, the position of the army was expanded. The
authority of the service councils composed of high-ranking
military officers over matters of promotion, retirement,
assignments, etc. was increased and the Defense Minister
was bound by their decisions. The armed forces were
charged with defending "the national independence, terri-
torial integrity of the state and the existing political
and social system against any insidious attempt." (Article
129 (D).
Finally, the powers of the existing leaders were
strengthened with regards to the future. The first
75

parliamentary elections, after the constitution was
placed into affect, were to be carried out under the
provisions of a law to be promulgated by the junta govern-
ment (Article 135). The provisions of the new constitu-
tion, which designated the form of government a crowned
democracy, once ratified "may never be revised" (Article
137 (1)) and the nonfundamental provisions of the consti-
tution could only be revised after a period of ten years
22had elapsed.
2. The 1973 Constitution
On June 1, 1973f the Council of Ministers formally
abolished the monarchy and proclaimed a new "presidential
parliamentarian republic" with Papadopoulos as provisional
President. The period of the "Revolution of April 21,
1967" was officially proclaimed to have ended, -^ A public
referendum held on July 29 approved the Republic and 78.^
of the voters affirmed Papadopoulos as President, This
constitutional referendum was conducted under strict sur-
veillance by foreign press and diplomatic observers, and
can be considered to be more truly representative of the
wishes of the Greek people, although by no means a free
election.
During the referendum Papadopoulos permitted the
greatest degree of liberalization since the beginning of
the coup. He permitted former politicians to organize into
a Committee for the Restoration of Democratic Legality,
which was a violation of the law banning "revival of old
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political passions," ^ On referendum day, the entire
front page of the Athens daily Vradnyi above the fold was
devoted to an editorial urging the people to vote no and
it was overprinted on the Greek word for no, OXI t in eight
26inch high blue characters.
Under the ternis of the plebiscite the president
and vice-president were elected for nonrenewable seven year
terms. The president, in addition to his broad legislative
and executive powers, was given exclusive control over
foreign affairs, defense, national security and public
order, including the right to appoint the prime minister,
ministers and undersecretaries of the specified sireas. The
new Parliament was reduced to two hundred deputies from a
pre-coup level of three hundred, and the president appointed
ten percent of the deputies. The president also had the
power to decide which matters were of public importajice and
27
should be put to a public vote in the future. '
B. THE JUNTA AND THE ECONOMY
There are several reasons why the junta experienced a
significant degree of success in the field of economics, at
least until 1972. (1) Monetary stability in Greece in the
twelve years prior to the coup had instilled a sense of
confidence in the Greek people and encouraged a high degree
of savings. This in turn enabled Greek bainks to finance
housing and hotel construction, in particulsir, out of
current savings investment. (2) Pre-1967 economic growth
had created an excess productive capacity in basic
77

industries in addition to a slack created by the I966-I967
recession. This was exploited by the colonels. (3) The
ongoing boom in the world economy provided an outlet for
Greek exports as well as an inflow of invisible earnings
from shipping, tourism and remittances from Greek workers
28
abroad. Not until 1972-1973 did the regime run into
trouble, when the policies of their predecessors no longer
were bearing fruit and their own short-sighted practices
headed the economy in a downward direction.
The regime maintained the rate of growth and employment
which had started before the coup, but their expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies, especially in the non-produc-
tive sectors of the economy such as tourism, destroyed the
preexisting monetary stability and returned Greece to post-
World War Two rates of inflation. Between I96I and 1971
Greece had experienced the lowest average rate of inflation
among all the member countries of the Orgajiization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). By 1973 it
had reversed its position. The consumer price index in-
creased by 15.3?^ from 1972 to 1973 and by 37.8j6 from April
1973 to April 1974.^ In paurt, the phenomenal increase in
the rate of inflation was due to the rate of increase in
the amount of currency in circulation, which jumped from
7»l% in 1969 to 28.5^ in 1973 t and of the money supply,
which included currency in circulation and private deposits.
This increased from Q,2% in I969 to 22. 7?^ in 1973; both
rates exceeded the rate of increase in real income which
30
was 8.5^ and 9.7?S respectively.^
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1. Gross National Product
After experiencing a steady annual growth rate of
seven to eight percent between I968 and 1972, the Gross
National Product (GNP) in 197^ actually declined by two
percent for the first time since World War Two.^ The jxmta
had prepared a Five-Year Plaji for the years 1968-1972 aiming
for an increased annual GNP growth rate of 7,5 to 8,5?^.
With the exception of 197^1 the junta managed to stay within
the limits of their plan. By the end of 1975 1 after return-
ing to democracy, the Greek economy had recovered and the
Gross Domestic Product reflected an increase of 3 •7^.
2. Agriculture
The Five-Year Plan projected 5*^ real growth in
agriculture. Between 19^7 and 197^ agriculture grew at
only 1.8^ in contrast with 4.2^ growth between I963 and
1966,-^^ This decline was largely due to policies of the
regime which reduced subsidies and placed severe price
controls on agricultural products. In addition, private
and public investment in aigriculture declined,-' The con-
tributions of agriculture to the GNP fell from 27.7?S in
1958 to 19 » 5% in 1973 1 while employment in agriculture
fell from 54^5 to 37. 17?^ of the active population. -^^
3. Industry
Industrial production increased at an annual rate
of 8,39s between I967 and 1971. However, this reflected a
decline from the ten percent annual rate between I962 and
1966. The Greek Government attributed the decline to a
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slowdown in the building industry,-^ The rate of invest-
ment in manufacturing for I968 to 1971 was about one-half
of the 23.5^ rate for I963 to 1966, This was a reflection
of the termination of industrial projects initiated before
the coup and the relative absence of any newly initiated
projects during the rule of the junta, ^
k. Foreign Investment
The colonels went out of their way to entice foreign
investment to Greece. They offered special incentives to
foreign businessesi (1) low interest rates and tax conces-
sions to firms with high export potential, and (2) protec-
tion through special laws which stipulated that their
assets could not be nationalized, profits could be taken out
of the country and foreign employees were exempt from
taxes. Through these incentives the Government enticed
twenty-five firms, eight of which were American, to estab-
lish regional supervisory offices in Greece by May I968.
The Chase Manhattan Bank and Bank of America were two of
those firms to join First National City Bank of New York
and the American Express Company already in Greece. The
extent of foreign money involvement in the Greek economy
is evident in a 1971 survey of five hundred industrial
firms. Twenty-six {Q%) were totally owned by foreign in-
terests; fifty-seven (23^) reported "important foreign
equity participation," In a sample of the two hundred
largest firms, forty-five percent of the total exports were
... ^3
made by firms with "substantial foreign participation." -^
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The most noted exajnple of the colonels* efforts to
attract foreign investment was the arrangement with Litton
Industries. Three weeks aifter the coup, the colonels nego-
tiated a deal with Litton Industries to develop the whole
geographical region of Western Peloponnesus and Crete by-
procuring $8^0 million in capital for Greece over a twelve
year period. ^ The terms of the contract were lucrative,
Litton risked nothing. Every month Litton filed invoices
with the Greek Government for its costs and, in fifteen
days, it got back everything it had paid out plus an eleven
percent profit. By May 1969 Litton was to have attracted
sixty million dollars in foreign capital. As of December
1968, with two-thirds of the time gone, it had only attrac-
ted $3.5 million. ' The twelve year contract was cancelled
by the Greek Government on October 1^, I969 after Litton
failed to fulfill its obligations; however, Litton had lost
nothing in the venture,
5. Balance of Trade
The most dramatic failure of the colonels was the
rapid increase in the balance of trade deficit. Table 5
presents data on Greek imports, exports and balance of
trade. By and large, imports exceeded exports by a better
tham two-to-one ratio. Net invisible earnings, and long
and medium term capital inflows, were insufficient to cover
the rising trade deficit. In large this was a reflection
of the objective of the regime to support a continued rise
in demand as a sign of growth and development with little
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GREEK IMPORTS, EXPORTS AND THE
BALANCE OF TRADE, 1960-1977
(in Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Year Imports (cif) Exports (fob) Balance of Trade
i960 702.0 203.2 -498.8
1961 71^.1 223.3 -490.8
1962 701.2 250.1 -451.1




1965 1133.7 327.8 -805.
9
1966 1222.9 406.0 -816.9
1967 1186.3 495.2 -691.1
1968 1394.4 468.2 -926.2
1969 1594.1 553.6 -1040.5
1970 1958.3 642.5 -1315.8
1971 2098.1 662.5 -1435.6
1972 2345.8 870.9 -1474.9
1973 3432.6 1427.1 -2005.5
197^ 3807.1 1753.8 -2053.3
1975 4955.1 2144.0 -2811.1
1976 6388.9 2702.0 -3686.9
1977 7262.4 29I8.5 -4343.9
SOURCE t The Europa Year Booki A 1fiorld Survey, Volume
I. (Londont Europa Publications Limited, 1962-1979)
,
NOTEj The above figures were converted from drachmas
to dollars by the author using a conversion rate as
followsi 30 drachma to the dollar for 1960-1973; 34.72
drachma to the dollar for 1974-1977. The conversion rate




In 1967 the Government enacted a law which intro-
duced severe sanctions for tax evasion. The result was that
the number of tax returns in 19^7 rose from 327 » 000 to
601,677. In terms of declared income this reflected an
increase from 29 » ^65 million drachma to 58,172 million. ^
As a consequence of the rabid inflation in 1973 1 the
drachma was revalued upward by ten percent on October 19
»
1973 to curb inflation.^ On December 27 t 1973 it was
devalued to a rate of 29.3 drachma to the dollar, which was
close to its value before the prior revaluation,-^ As of
June 18, 1980 the exchange rate was ^2.80 drachma to the
dollar.
As in political affairs, the colonels lacked
expertise in dealing with the economy, Makaxezos, the
Minister of Economic Coordination, had no formal training
or qualifications for that position. He appointed his
brother-in-law, Alexander Matthaiou, to the position of
Minister of Agriculture. In an interview, Maurice Goldbloom
asked Matthaiou whether or not Greece belonged to the
International Wheat Agreement. Matthaiou replied that he
had never heard of it. When Goldbloom explained what it
was, Matthaiou said he was siire Greece was not a member.
But, as Goldbloom departed, an interpreter caught up to him
in the street to say that they had called another ministry
and found out that Greece was indeed a member.^
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7. Greece and the European Economic Community
Quick reaction to the military takeover came from
the European Parliament of the European Economic Community
(EEC). On May 11, 196?, the European Parliament went on
record in opposition to the coup. It (1) expressed its
concern over the suspension of democratic life in Greece;
(2) declared its solidarity with the Greek people; (3)
stated that relations would not return to normal until
civil liberties and rights were restored in Greece; {k)
delayed the accession by Greece to full membership until
the Greek Parliament was able to negotiate freely; (5)
expressed the hope that democratic life would return rapidly
to Greece; (6) stressed that Greece respect the European
Covenant on Human Rights; (7) demanded that the civil
rights of politicians and political prisoners be returned;
and (8) charged the various branches of the EEC to follow
developments in Greece and keep the European Psurliament
informed . -'^"^ The European Community and the Council of
Europe were the only two external organizations to take
real, substantive steps against the junta.
The European Community (EC) took steps against the
junta in June 19^7 f "by freezing negotiations for the even-
tual full accession of Greece to the EEC, Moreover, they
suspended the unused credits of $3^ million out of the
$125 million credits previously granted by the European
Investment Bank,-^ The seven and one-half year hiatus
that followed caused a substantial loss of outside
8^

investment smd aggravated the problems of the Greek economy,
Even though the motives of the EC for the freeze were poli-
tical, the colonels did desire full membership in the EC,
whereas they scorned the actions of the Council of Europe.
They dropped hints that Greece was getting closer to the EC
throughout the dictatorship. In May 1970, Makarezos sui-
nounced that, as a consequence of the dramatic economic
progress in Greece, full membership in the EC was feasible
by 1972, however, he completely ignored the political con-
siderations. Once the presidential republic was proclaimed
on June 1, 1973 t Makarezos stated that normalization with
the EC could no longer be delayed. -^-^
Not until the military junta was deposed and demo-
cracy restored under Karamanlis were relations with the
European Community restored to normal. Greek associate
membership in the EC was reactivated in December 197^ and
application for full membership made on June 12, 1975.
On December 21, 1978 the EC approved full membership for
Greece, Karamanlis signed the treaty of accession on May
28, 1979; it was ratified by the Greek Parliament on June
28, sind full membership in the European Community is
scheduled to take effect January 1, 1981.^"^
C. THE JUNTA AND THE MILITARY
The effect of the junta on the Greek military is impor-
tant for two reasons I first, it was the military which
executed the coup and possessed the means for sustaining or
overthrowing the military rulers. Second, and perhaps
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more importantly, it is imperative to examine how
Papadopoulos dealt with the military since it was primarily
for the sake of the Greek military contribution to the NATO
alliance that the U.S. Government maintained relations with
the Greek military government.
Sir Hugh Greene, former Director-General of the British
Broadcasting Corporation and Chairman, European-Atlantic
Action Committee on Greece, testified to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on July 14, 1971 thati
...out of 6399 serving Army officers at the time of
the coup in April I967 (excluding certain auxiliary
corps), 2577 were retired by May 1970, the majority of
them for political, not professional reasons....
The command structure and discipline of the army have
been undermined, first by promotions on the grounds of
political loyalty and not professional merit and second
by the formation of cells of jxmior officers especially
loyal to the regime who exercise command functions over
the heads of the senior officers formally in charge. -5°
Greene went on to say that the regime had weakened the
Greek armed forces through extensive purges and the promo-
tion of rivalry between the services, to the extent that it
was a "fundsimental error to regard the Greek junta as a
particularly reliable member of the NATO from a military
CO
point of view,"-^-^
Colonel Oliver K. Marshall (Retired), formerly Military
Attach^ to the American Embassy in Athens, gave the follow-
ing testimony to the same committee on July 12, 1971 « "The
Greek officers, all of them, the Greek Army, took great
pride in being part of NATO and took great pride in having
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American equipment — of being a part of the Western mili-
tary establishment. The junta, in large increments,
retired all of those people."
There was abundant criticism of the handling of the
military by the junta from Greeks themselves. A statement
by twenty former Greek ministers, October 27, 1970 to the
North Atlantic Assembly at the Hague, said that deportees
to prison islands in the Aegean Sea included "brave smd
distinguished generals, admirals, officers of the army,
navy and airforce of both high and low rank, some of them
decorated by member-countries of NATO, including the United
States." In an interview in the Baltimore Sun, June 27,
1971 » with Panayiotis Kanellopoulos , leader of the conser-
vative National Radical Union party and Prime Minister of
Greece when the coup occurred, Kanellopoulos said that
"some 3»000 to ^,000 officers, many seniors included, have
62been retired in the past four years." Professor John
Zighdis echoed the same sentiments and criticisms in testi-
mony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee March 27, 1974-,
saying that the removal for political reasons of practically
all the senior officers with war experience and modern
professional education had severely weakened the Greek
armed forces. ^
Despite seemingly abundant indicators of a severely
degraded Greek military capability to effectively contribute
to NATO security in that region, little investigation was
made by U.S. officials to exajnine the accuracy of these
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charges. Colonel James E. Campbell, Chief of the U.S. Army-
Section of JUSMAGG, stated to members of the House Armed
Services Committee January 12, 1972 that the Greeks at that
time were still using M-1 rifles and M-48 tanks, while the
U.S. Army had gone from the M-1 to the M-l^- and was then
using the M-I6, It appears that the Administration was
willing to accept a weakened Greek participation in NATO as
the preferable alternative to no Greek participation. The
allegiance of a weakened Greece to the North Atlantic
Alliance and the continued availability of bases and facil-
ities to American forces appears to have prompted the Ad-
ministration to turn a blind eye to the degradation of
capabilities within the Greek armed forces.
D. FOREIGN RELATIONS OP THE JUNTA
The area of foreign relations was one of the more
successful endeavors by the colonels in terms of expanding
relations. While encountering increasing alienation and
ostracism from Western Europe, they cultivated closer ties
with Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Despite
cooled relations in the West, no government withheld recog-
nition of the military junta of April 21, 19^7 or the
republic of Jime 1, 1973.^^
In many Western European countries contacts with Greek
officials cooled to the extent of avoiding social contacts
with Greek diplomats, Greek embassies and consulates in
Germany, Italy, Sweden and Denmark experienced demonstra-
tions and even bomb attacks. Except for a brief visit by
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Makarezos to Paris in I969 suid two or three other working
visits by other members to London or Washington, as of
September 1971 no junta minister had officially visited a
Western Exoropean country. Not one Western European minis-
ter, with the exception of the Spanish Foreign Minister in
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August 1971 f had come to Greece officially. '
Greek relations with the U.S. were of a love-hate tjrpe,
underscored by Congressional criticism of Administration
dealings with the junta. The U.S. -Greek relationship will
be examined in detail in Chapter Four.
Improved Balkan relations smd closer ties with neigh-
boring communist countries were the biggest foreign rela-
tions achievements of the colonels. This is ironic in two
ways I in part, the colonels were driven in that direction
by U.S. and Western intransigence toward them, and it is
ironic that the junta saw fit to become chummy with the
communists who were the archtypical foes of Greece when the
coup was executed.
Initially, the Greek Government on May 15 t 19^7 an-
nounced that it was closing its border with Yugoslavia
effective November 13 » 1967 t thereby abrogating a 1959
treaty with Yugoslavia. The cessation of free movement
over the border was a form of protest over the fact that
the communist countries were permitting demonstrations
against the Greek junta in front of the Greek embassies
68in those countries. This ban did not last long, however.
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On March 10, 1970, Greece and Bulgaria signed a five-
year trade agreement providing for trade of $25 million. ^
This was the culmination of negotiations initiated on
January 2^, 1970. This settling of long standing disputes
with Bulgaria was tied to general U.S.-U.S.S.R. detente
and the fact that the superpowers gave the green light for
the Greek-Bulgarian dStente.
In part, it also was due to Greek ties to the Soviet
Union. In mid-December 19^9 the junta signed an agreement
with the Soviet Union for Soviet aid in planning and erect-
ing an electrical plant in Macedonia. In January 1970 a
whole series of deals were concluded with the Soviets:
(1) January 20 — decision to admit Soviet goods at reduced
tariffs, (2) January 22 — awarding of a contract to the
Soviet Union to conduct a peat survey in Northern Greece
70in preparation for building an electrical power plant,'
and (3) the granting of most-favored-nation status to the
Soviet Union, In November 1972, the Greeks signed a pre-
liminary agreement with the Russians to build an $89
million electric power plant comprised of three 125-mega-
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watt generators at Philippi in Northern Greece.'
Since 19^0, Greece and Albania had been in a technical
state of war stemming from the Italian invasion of Greece
through Albanian soil. Following a 1970 agreement to
resume trade relations smd restore telephone connections,
an agreement to resume diplomatic relations was signed on
May 6, 1971 » and diplomatic relations resumed on November
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16,' The first formal trade pact between the two nations
was signed October 30 » 1972 and provided for exchange of
goods worth $8 million annually, '-^
Mutual visits were conducted between Greece and the
other Balkan countries. On September 9» 1970, the Greek
Deputy Foreign Minister, Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas,
visited Belgrade, the first official Greek visit to Yxogo-
slavia since the coup. A few months later the Yugoslav
74Foreign Minister visited Athens.'
Greek ties with Romania, briefly interrupted by the
coup, were resumed by the visit of the Greek Minister of
Trade to Bucharest in October 1969. The Romanians paid a
return visit in pecember 1970. A five-year trade treaty
was also signed.'^
The colonels sought increased contact with black African
countries. Pattakos visited Egypt and Ethiopia in February
1971, Libya in March, Congo-Kinshasa and the Central African
Republic in May. In April, Bokassa of the Central African
Republic, had visited Athens. He was one of only two heads
of state to visit Greece between April 19^7 and the end of
1971. The other was the Greek-born President of Panama.'
Greece has traditionally had good relations with the
Middle East Arab countries. The ties go back to the long
common experience of subjugation by the Ottoman Turks.
There are large, prosperous Greek communities in many Arab
coimtries and many Arabs share the Greek Orthodox religion.




country not to recognize Israel de .jure . In efforts to
insure continued U.S. favor, and, at the expense of some
Arab support, the junta appointed a full ambassador to
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Tel Aviv as a "diplomatic agent."'
E. THE JUNTA AND THE PRESS
The Greek press has always been an important factor in
Greek life, Greeks enjoy reading their daily newspaper.
The importance of the press also lies in the fact that, at
the time of the coup, radio was controlled by the Govern-
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ment and the country was basically without television.''^
Consequently, there was heavy reliance on newspapers.
The Greek press has always been rabidly partisain, fre-
quently having interests that are tied with specific polit-
ical parties. The press is mostly privately-owned, lacking
80in financial independence. Since the 1950 's the most
powerful newspapers were those belonging to the Lambrakis,
Vlachos and Botsis groups. The Lambrakis papers were the
largest amd backed liberal and left-of-center parties,
whereas the Vlachos and Botsis papers were conservative and
81
supported Karamanlis and the King.
Within three weeks of the coup, six of the fifteen
Athens dailies were shut down, including the communist
papers Avghi (Dawn) and Dimokratiki Allaghi (Democratic
Change); a liberal, democratic, center party paper Elef-
theria (Freedom); two Vlachos papers Kathimerini (Daily)
and Messimvrini (Noon) ; and a left-of-center paper
Athinaiki (Athens). Two more papers collapsed shortly
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thereafter, Ethnikos Kiryx (National Herald) and Ethnos
(Nation) , although the latter was resurrected by the
82junta. The following papers continued to operate after
the jtinta seized powen the extreme right-wing Estia
(Hearth) said Eleftheros Kosmos (Free World) , the latter
being the only paper to openly support the regime from the
outset J the Botsis* brothers royalist papers Akr0T30lis and
Apoyevmatini (Afternoon) j the conservative Vradyni (Evening);
and three centrist papers, Ethnos (Nation), Ta Nea (The
News) and To Vima (The Tribune), the latter two belonging
to Lambrakis. ^
Of the papers still publishing after the coup, Elef-
theros Kosmos was widely recognized as the voice of the
Ml
junta. The Vlachos papers were voluntarily closed by
their owner, Helen Vlachos, rather than continue to publish
under censorship. Helen Vlachos, an outspoken critic of
the junta, was arrested by the junta on September 28, I967
for her views. She was kept under house arrest until she
managed to escape to England on December 15 1 196? amidst
the confusion of the attempted royal counter-coup by the
King.^^
Strict censorship and pre-censorship were immediately
imposed by Papadopoulos after the coup in April, A decree
on April 27, 196? t establishing the Press Service, con-
tained extensive lists of what should and what should not
be printed. The papers were forbidden to publish! any-
thing disrespectful to the royal fajnily, critical of the
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government or anyone in it, criticism of foreign heads of
state, anything historical which may rouse the people or
criticize other countries or regimes, etc. They were in-
structed to print speeches and communiques of the King,
royal family or leading members of the government, communi-
ques of the government Information Service, photographs
submitted by the government and, at least, one commentary
86per day referring to the government and its work.
Not only did the censors dictate the texts of the
stories, but they specified their placement on the pages,
headlines and type sizes, creating a comic spectacle of
identical, supposedly competing newspapers. ' Papadopoulos
eased restrictions somewhat in February 1968, reducing the
number of obligatory items. On May 10, he exempted the
pro-j\inta paper Eleftheros Kosmos from all censorship as an
experiment, and, on May 12, all Greek magazines were freed
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of censorship. On October 2, 1969 t the press was declared
free of censorship, with the exception of publications con-
cerned with security, the economy and pre-coup politics.
The censorship office was disbanded although papers were
still required to produce their first copies at the Press
89Ministry. ^ It did not take long for opposition to the
regime to appear in print. In the summer of 1970, a number
of Greek intellectuals published Dekaokto Keimena
(Eighteen Texts) containing poems, essays, and short
stories critical of the junta. This was followed in the




Professor Couloumbis informed the House Foreign Affairs
Committee on July 12, 1971 thati "The circulation of the
newspapers indicates that newspapers which have taken a
critical, or mildly critical, position of the government
are selling much better, sometimes 10 to 1 in ratio to the
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newspapers that are for the regime."'^ This phenomenon
reflected the mainstream of public opinion.
Controls over the press closely approximated the general
liberalizing measures of the junta. As relaucation of con-
trols occurred, increased demands for more freedoms were
heard, especially from university students. As a conse-
quence of student violence on November 18, 1973i which
precipitated the ouster of Papadopoulos , Proclamation No.
7 broadcast by the Athens Armed Forces radio, essentially
returned the press to 1967 style censorship and control,'^
Following return to democracy in 197^ t the number of
Athens newspapers rapidly increased to thirteen. For the
first time since World War Two, the press included commu-
nist newspapers: Rizospastis of the KKE (Exterior) and
I Avyi . a joint daily of the KKE (Interior) and the EDA.^-^
F. THE JUNTA AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Criticism of the junta for human rights violations was
quick to appear. On May 5t 1967 the Danish and Norwegian
delegations to the North Atlantic Council in Paris distrib-
uted notes criticizing the military dictatorship as a "fla-
grant violation of the principles of parliamentary
democracy."'^ While the figures may vary, it is safe to
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say that approximately six to seven thousand people were
rounded up on April 21 and 22 and herded into stadiums
used as holding facilities, prisons and concentration
camps. -^ Many people were arrested for offenses committed
before the coup, offenses which had been perfectly legal
actions at the time such as making financial contributions
to a left-wing orgajiization. Three islands in the
Aegean Sea, Leros, Yiaros, and Agios, were hastily sind
crudely converted into prison isles. As for the number of
prisoners, in a letter from the Greek representative to
the Council of Europe, dated April 29, 1968, the Greek
Government reported that, since the coup on April 21, 1967f
6,8^8 communists had been deported and •*as a result of
various acts of clemency, ^.411 persons have been released ;
the number of deported persons currently amounts to
2,^37." Cunderlining in source]
Civil liberties were curtailed by a series of procla-
mations issued by the Chief of the General Staff. Procla-
mation No. 1 of April 22, 196? prohibited "all open air
gatherings of more than five persons smd all indoor gath-
erings apart from public entertainments. "-^ Proclamation
No. 1^ of May 29, 196? stated that "indoor gatherings were
allowed with the permission of the competent public author-
ity."^" Proclamation No. 26 in latter 196? modified the
restrictions on freedom of assembly to allow additional





aa indoor gatherings of persons attending a lecture
with authorisation of the competent military authority;
bb open air gatherings of a social or religious nature
Tweddings, etc.)i cc private indoor gatherings of a
social nature or for amusement (receptions); dd meetings
of the boards of directors and general meetings of
juridicial persons; ee public entertainments. ""
Violations of human rights can best be understood in
the context of Greek relations with the Council of Europe
following the coup. Greece had signed the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights aind Fundamental
Freedoms in 1950 under the auspices of the Council of
Europe. Article 15 of that Convention provided that a
nation may abrogate its responsibilities and gave the cir-
cumstances under which it may do so as follows
»
(1) In time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting
Party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention. •
.
(3) Any High Contracting Party availing itself of
this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary-General
of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures
which it has taken and the reasons therefor....
The junta notified the Secretary-General on May 3, 196?
of Royal Decree No. 280 in which it exercised this right.
The junta justified the suspension of human liberties with
reasons falling under the following headingsi (1) commu-
nist danger, (2) crisis of constitutional government, and
(3) crisis of public order. -^ The Council of Europe was
not notified of the reasons for the derogation until Sep-




On September 20 and 27, 196? t the governments of
Denmark, Norway, Sweden smd the Netherlands filed complaint
Numbers 3321/6?, 3322/6?, 3323/6? and 33^V6? respectively
against Greece with the Commission of Human Rights charging
that Greece had violated Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13
and 1^ of the Convention on Human Rights. On March 25, 1968,
amended pleas were filed which added violations of Articles
3 and ? of the Convention and Articles 1 and 3 of the First
Protocol. The European Commission of Human Rights conducted
a two-year investigation into the charges and produced a
two-volume, four-part, 1200-page report on the violations
of human rights in Greece. It was presented to the eigh-
teen member Council of Europe on November 18, 1969* Al-
though the findings were required to be kept secret, reports
of the investigation were lesiked to the press almost on a
daily basis, and, shortly after its delivery to the
Council, copies marked "Secret" were widely available.
The study listed 213 prima facie cases of torture. It
also refuted the justification of impending communist
overthrow cited by the junta:
The Commission has not found that the evidence ad-
duced by the respondent Government shows that a displace-
ment of the lawful Government by force of arms by the
Communists and their allies was imminent on 21st April,
196? I indeed, there is evidence indicating that it was
neither planned at that time, nor seriously sinticipated
by either the military or police authorit ies,-'-^^




...that the street demonstrations, strikes and work
stoppages in the first months of 196? attained the
magnitude of a public emergency. . .
.
The picture of strikes and work stoppages does not
differ markedly from that in many other countries in
Europe over a similar period; .. .^^"
In conclusion, the Greek Government failed to satisfy
the Commission of Human Rights "that there was on 21st
April, 1967. a public emergency threatening the life of
107the Greek nation." '
From the first signs of opposition to their practices,
the junta took the offensive against the Council. In
written observations to the Council of Europe on December
16, 1967» the Greek Government submitted that the Commis-
sion of Human Rights was not competent to examine the
applications filed by Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the
Netherlands, because they concerned the actions of a
revolutionary goveriment . ^ °8
On December 12, 1969» the Council of Europe met to vote
on the Greek case. However, before it caune to a vote, the
Greek Foreign Minister, Panayiotis Pipinelis, denounced the
Statute of the Council of Europe and the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Fundajnental Freedoms, and withdrew
Greece from the Council of Europe.
The expulsion of Greece from the Council was the first
step in isolating the military regime. It did draw reaction
from the colonels. On the one hand, the colonels spoke
sarcastically of their condemnation by the Council.
Pattakos saidi "That makes as much impression on us as a
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mosquito on the horns of a bull. Such things as the
Council of Europe we write off on the soles of our worn-
out shoes." ° The colonels called the expulsion a
victory and led the nation in celebrating its freedom
from "outside foreign interference." On the other
hand, the colonels took note of this foreign condemnation
by attempting to refute the expulsion action. In 1970,
the junta published their case in a three-volume set
entitled The Greek Case Before the Commission of Human
Rights of the Council of Europe .
Perhaps more importantly, according to the Athens
daily newspaper Eleftheros Kosmos the "Pipinelis Time-
table" for the implementation of the still suspended
guarantees and principles of the I968 Constitution was
withdrawn on December 15 t 196? by Papadopoulos , three days
after the expulsion.
G. THE JUNTA AND EDUCATION
The colonels introduced comprehensive reforms in the
field of education, literature and culture, which unfor-
tunately fell far short of their lofty intentions. Before
the coup, September 196^ had been a time of major reform
in Greek education. The junta managed to undo most of the
good this reform had brought about. The national budget
for education declined from 11.3?^ in 196? to 9.2?^ in
1121970. During the years of the junta, the route to
higher education became a narrowing bottleneck. In 196^,
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^5*7% of all university candidates were offered seats.
This declined to J^l.9^ in April 196? t 28.^ in September
1968, and 25.8^ in September 1970, In absolute numbers,
whereas 1^,650 candidates failed to obtain seats in 196^,
the number increased to 39t8^0 in 1970. "^
Following is a shortened list of the 196^ reforms 2Uid
the effect the colonels had on themi (1) the provision
of free public education for all at all levels of education
was retained, but the colonels introduced a stajnp tax on
diplomas and certificates. (2) Whereas the 196^ reform
raised the drop-out age from twelve to fifteen, the colonels
reduced it back to twelve in I967. (3) The number of com-
11 '5pulsory years of education was reduced from nine to six, ^
(4) The teaching and equal status of dimotiki Greek with
katharevousa was abolished. Only katharevousa was to be
taught or used in schools. This was promulgated by Royal
Decree No. 129 of September 5, I967. (5) The increased
emphasis placed on physical sciences and mathematics and
the introduction of new subjects such as economics, law and
sociology to primary and secondary schools was abolished by
the junta. The pre-196^ curricula, syllabuses and textbooks
were reintroduced. (6) Choice of subjects in the secondary
education curricula, permitted in the 196^ reforms, was
abolished in I967 , but reintroduced to certain schools in
1971. (7) Teachers training colleges, which had been reor-
ganized and the period of study extended from two to three
years, were abolished by the colonels, although in I97I a
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new three year coiirse was again introduced, (8) The 1964
reform established a Pedagogical Institute to develop edu-
cational research and undertake in-service training of
teachers. The junta abolished this and returned to the
pre-1964 Board of Education which operated according to
1914 regulations which did not include educational research
as a duty of the Board. (9) Free meal service for primary
school children was abolished. Surveying this list it is
hardly surprising that the colonels said that a major
educational reform was necessary before they would permit
a return to democracy.
The junta managed to propogate other equally absurd
decrees. On June 21, 19^7 it was decreed that ten percent
of all candidates to institutions of higher learning,
starting with the I967-I968 academic year, would be admit-
ted "solely on the grounds of high moral character and
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reproachless behavior," ' Decree Law 93 of January 1969»
called the "Student Code," decreed that any student con-
victed by the coiirts for a political offense would be
permanently banned from any further chance of higher edu-
cation. Deportation by administrative order also carried
the same penalty, and a student could be expelled if "his
conduct and his ideas are incompatible with 'national
ideals, '"^^^
At the primary and secondary education level, more than
250 teachers were dismissed from state schools together
with about fifty officials from the Ministry of Education. ^^^
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The junta abolished, degraded or merged some 2,500
primary schools in September 1970, mostly in small often
120isolated villages. Elitist education, patterned on
the British public schools, was established for the top-
notch students, schools such as Anavryta near Athens and
121Anargyrios on the island of Spetses.
Dismissal of teachers in the secondary schools was
often based on ridiculous and asinine charges such as
listening to the national anthem with one's hands in his
pockets or praising the athletic achievements of Russians
122
to a team of school athletes.
Universities were particularly hard hit by the junta.
Constitutional Acts "Theta** (No. 9) of July 18, 196? and
"Iota" (No. 10) of August 29 t 196? suspended the job
security of the Civil Service so that the public adminis-
tration could be "cleansed.** The mandatory retirement age
of professors was lowered from 70 to 6^ by Constitutional
Act "Iota Epsilon" (No. 15) of December 19 » 1967. Between
these Acts the universities lost about one-third of their
123teaching staff. ^ Even more insulting was that many of
these university professors discovered that they had lost
their jobs by first reading about it in the "Government
Gazette." Furthermore, Constitutional Act "Delta" (No. k)
of May 23, I967 forbad appeal to the higher courts. (See
Appendix B) Constitutional Act "Epsilon" (No. 5) cited
the following reasons for dismissal! "if they [professors]
behaved in a way incompatible with their capacity as
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functionaries and professors or lecturers?" "if their
conduct in general has been improper with regard to the
moral standing required;** if "they have acted for other
purposes incompatible with what is understood as profes-
sorship; " or "if their acts and behavior prove that they
aire not animated by the appropriate spirit, conforming
with the existing regime and its national ideals," (See
Appendix C)
In the cultural and literary arena, the junta main-
tained an equally dismal record. The music of Tschaikovsky,
124Prokofiev and all other Russian composers was banned.
The junta banned 1,0^6 books, both foreign gmd Greek,
including such authors as Euripides, Sophocles, Aeschylus,
Aristotle to Jean-Paul Sartre, Thomas Mann, T.S. Eliot,
Albert Camus and others. Hundreds of films were banned,
including Seven Days in May . Fahrenheit 4-51 and Zorba the
Greek as well as all films by the Greek actress Melina
12*5
Mercouri. ^ Previously mentioned was the suspension of
the ban on the sale of foreign publications in Greece. The
junta decided it was less costly to allow their sale and
thereby encourage tourism, consequently one could find just
about any of the banned authors in English or French, for
example, but not in Greek. A side effect of this policy
was that many tourists were impressed by the high degree
of free speech in Greece, thinking that what was available
in their own language was also available in Greek,
One writer aptly described the actions of the colonels
in the field of education in this wayt "It is not what has
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been done by the 'Revolutionary* government in education
that counts, but what has been undone and what has not
been done."
H. THE JUNTA AND THE COURTS
In May 1968, the junta moved against the courts,
specifically the Greek Council of State (Institution of
Justice), which is analogous to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Constitutional Act "Kappa Delta" (No, 2k) of May 28, I968
suspended the life tenure of judges and prosecutors for
three days. (See Appendix D) By Act No, 94 of the
Council of Ministers on May 28, and a Royal Decree on May
29 f the President of the Supreme Court, Stylismos Mavro-
michalis, the Attorney General at the Supreme Court,
Andreas Toussis, and twenty-eight others were dismissed.
These judges were dismissed for not possessing the moral
stature required in exercising their office, lack of
healthy social principles or general behavior deemed in-
compatible with the duties and dignity of their office.
Despite a ban against appeal, a number of the dismissed
judicial officers appealed to the Greek Council of State,
which ruled on June 24, 19^9 t that the dismissal was
illegal. Papadopoulos was furious. He denounced the
action of the Council as a coup d'etat, stated that he was
ignoring the decision and demanded the resignation of
Michael Stasinopoulos, the President of the Council. When
Stasinopoulos refused to resign, he was ousted on June 2?,
1969 by a decree nailed to the door of his home. Within
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three days the Council vice-president and sixteen other
members of the twenty-five man Council resigned in protest.
The Government on July ^, 19^9 passed a law retroactive to
June 1 stating that the "decisions of any tribunal, issued
on any case exempted from its jxirisdiction, are nonexistent
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and not to be enforced." ' In this manner, the junta
placed itself completely outside the jurisdiction of the
Greek Supreme Court.
I. lOANNIDES, CYPRUS AND THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY
1, loajinides
On November 25, 1973 » Papadopoulos was brought down
due to a combination of factors t (1) the inability of
Papadopoulos to handle the student unrest and violence
eairlier in the month; (2) the personal power aggrandizement
of Papadopoulos as evidenced by his elimination of the
monarch, establishment of a republic and self-appointment
as president? (3) the presence of corruption in the govern-
ment; and (^) indications that the economy was increasingly
beyond the control of Papadopoulos. The leader of this
countercoup on November 25, 1973 » was the head of the Greek
military police. Brigadier General Dimitrios loannides. He
announced a return to the "Revolution of April 21, 1967."^
General Phaedon Gizikis was sworn in as President of the
Republic. loannides operated behind the scenes,
loannides was even more draconic than Papadopoulos,
closing newspapers without explanation amd reopening island




Cyprus has been a perennial problem for Greece.
The roots of the dispute involving Greece, Turkey and
Cyprus go back to the struggle between Hellenism and the
Ottoman Empire, specifically the Greek view of Cyprus as
an "isolated outpost of Hellenism" following the mass
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exodus of Greeks from Western Anatolia in 1922. ^ In
February 1959 the Zurich and London Agreements were con-
cluded. It established Cyprus as an independent state in
i960, and constitutionally guarainteed that status by giving
Greece, Turkey and Britain the right to physically inter-
132
vene to maintain the constitutional status quo. -^
Violence had erupted in Cyprus in December 19^3 over
an attempt by Archbishop Makarios to amend the i960 Cypriot
Constitution which had given Turkish Cypriots veto
1 33power. -'-^ In I967 Cyprus again threatened to bring Greece
and Turkey to war, George Papandreou had surreptitiously
increased the number of Greek forces on Cyprus after the
1963 incident to 10,000, which is far above the 950 limit
imposed by the Zurich and London Agreement. Between the
efforts of Cyrus Vance, then U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary,
who was appointed by President Johnson as special aide, and
the responsible actions of Papadopoulos , this crisis was
also defused.
There were indicators that Cyprus was heating up
again as early as February 197^ » but they were largely
134
Ignored. ^ On June 2, 197^ f Makarios finally did heed
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the warnings of pending assault aigainst Cyprus as well as
assassination attempts against himself, by sending a very
inflammatory letter to the Greek President, accusing the
135Greek military government of plotting these actions. ^^
Within a few days the text of the letter was published in
the Greek newspaper Apoyevmatini . Makarios demanded the
withdrawal of Greek officers from Cyprus, a demand that
placed loajinides in the position of either complying and
thereby eliminating the most pro-enosis (union with Greece)
element on Cyprus, or refusing and risking war. A council
of high-ranking Greek officers including the President,
Commanders-in-Chief of the three services, and loannides,
unanimously opted to depose Makarios. ^
The coup attempt. Operation Aphrodite, was
launched under the tactical leadership of the Greek head
of the Cypriot National Guard. On July 15 » the notorious
thug and killer of Turks, Nikos Sampson, was sworn in as
the new President of Cyprus.*
The Turkish reaction was quick to follow; they
invaded Cyprus on July 20. Several ineffectual ceasefires,
arranged by British and U.S. negotiators, failed. The
Greek Government decided to use Greek submarines and air-
planes to sink the Turkish fleet, however, the only actual
assistance provided was some two hundred elite troops sent
The first choice for president of Cyprus refused. The
second and third choices„were out of the country. Sampson
was the fourth choice. ^-^"^
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to hold the airport on Cyprus, -^ The Turks did believe,
however, that the Greek fleet was sailing to the aid of
Cyprus and they proceeded to sink one and damage two
warships, only to realize the vessels were Turkish, not
Greek. '•^^
Joseph Sisco, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs, managed to get the Greek military
chiefs to side with him in not going to war with Turkey,
loannides was convinced to step aside and, with the fol-
lowing broadcast at seven PM on July 23. 197^ . the seven
yeair, three month, and two day long military dictatorship
came to an end}
The Greek armed forces, in view of the situation in
which the country finds itself, have decided to entrust.
a civiliain government with the running of the country. ^^^
3. Return to Democracy
Constaut ine Karamanlis returned from exile on July
2^, 197^ to accept the position of Prime Minister. He
moved swiftly sind fairly to restore order to Greece. On
August 1, by "constitutional act," the I968 amd 1973 Con-
stitutions were annulled and the 1952 Constitution was
restored with the exception of the articles pertaining to
the King which were held in abeyance. On July 26, the
military police were stripped of their power to sirrest and
interrogate civiliams; July 29, all regional commissars
and ministerial general secretaries appointed since the
1967 coup were dismissed. Junta appointed city auid town
mayors were dismissed at a later date. On August 6, all
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university lecturers and professors appointed under the
junta were dismissed and those dismissed by them were
reinstated. On August 12, the authority of the Defense
Minister was restored and the seven member Supreme Council
1 if?
of National Defense was reconstituted. Amnesty was
given to all political prisoners and Greek citizenship
and passports were returned to all who had been deprived
of them by the junta. ^
The junta leaders were tried and on August 23 t 1975*
sentence was passed. Papadopoulos, Makarezos and Pattakos
were given death sentences, later commuted to life impris-
onment by Karamanlis. Life imprisonment was handed to
loajinides, Spandidakis, Zoitakis, Ladas ajid four others.
The remainder received jail sentences of five to twenty
years. Two went free.
Elections were held in October 197^. Karamanlis
and his New Democracy party received 5^ of the vote and
220 out of 300 Parliament seats. The Greek communist
party was legalized and, although split into three factions,
they presented a unified front in the elections drawing
nine percent of the vote. Andreas Papandreou organized
the Panhellenic Socialist Movement ( Pane11inion Sosialis -
tikon Kinima - PASOK) and received 13^f following the
Center Union (EK) with 20^.
On November 8, 197^ f the Greek people decided in an
impeccably conducted referendum that the country should be













SOURCEt Basil Markesinis, "Recent Political and Con-
stitutional Developments in Greece," Par1iamentary Affairs
28 (Summer 1975)* 270.
NOTE J Percentages reflect total valid votes cast.
results of the 197^ referendum in comparison to previous
votes which were heavily rigged.




IV. TIffi AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE GREEK COLONELS
A. THREE PERSPECTIVES
The preceding chapters in this thesis examined the
period of the junta and established that it was neither
democratic nor a "parenthesis" in normal parliamentarian-
style political. life. In fact, had Papadopoulos not been
overthrown by loannides for liberalizing too rapidly, he
could conceivably have remained in power for a total of
thirteen years as stipulated in the 1973 Constitution.
The movement in Greece toward democracy dxiring the dicta-
torship was agonizingly slow. The consequences of the
junta were harsh smd touched virtually everyone, whether
it was through the lengthy tenure of martial law and press
censorship or the individual act of arrest, detainment or
torture. As people everywhere, the Greeks did not take
kindly to this deprivation of freedom by self-appointed,
middle-grade army officers.
This chapter will examine the relationship of the United
States to the colonels, from the perspective of the three
major American bureaucratic actors involved i the Executive
Branch, the Americam Embassy in Athens, and the Legislative
Branch. The affect of this relationship will be examined
from the vantage point of the American and Greek public as
well as the colonels themselves.
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1 . Executive Branch
The form and substsmce of the response by the
American Government to the coup in Greece has been the
subject of a great deal of question and suspicion. On the
surface, the Administration and Embassy in Greece appear
to have been caught by surprise by the coup on April 21st,
When looked at in greater depth, however, it becomes
apparent that only the timing was a surprise and that ample
evidence existed pointing to the high probability of a coup
in the very near future,
Laurence Stern in his book The Wrong Horse t The
Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American
Diplomacy states that the American CIA had for some time
been reporting on the activities of the National Union of
Young Officers (EENA) headed by Colonel George Papadopoulos
.
The fact that these reports ceased in mid-January 196?
aroused the suspicion of Charilaos Lagoudakis, a veteran
analyst in the State Department Office of Intelligence and
Research. On February 6, 1967* he submitted a memo to his
superior, entitled "The Right Wing Conspiratorial Group in
the Greek Armed Forces." It saidi
Since June 19 t 1965 » RNA [Near East desk] has seen
some 15 CIA reports from various sources on the so-called
"Rightist Greek Military Conspiratorial Group." The
latest report was dated January 23 i 196?. These reports
state that the "conspiratorial group" is ready to stage
a military coup when, in its view, a dictatorship would




... it would be useful to have further information
on this rightist group which may now be preparing for a
possible coup.-^
The American Embassy had been approached by the
King of Greece regarding the probable U.S. response to an
"extra-parliajnentary solution" to the political turmoil
and prospect of victory by George Papandreou and the Center
Union party in the May 28, 196? elections. The Embassy
response was that it "would depend on the circumstances."
Laurence Stern quotes from a memo drafted by an Embassy
staff member to the Political Officer, Kay Bracken, during
the week of April 17. 196?. This memo was still in draft
form when the coup was executed.
...I sincerely believe that the direction in which
we are heading is extremely dangerous at a minimum amd
potentially disastrous for American interests in Greece,
...Important political elements — the Palace, the ERE
hard core, the military, the conservative establishment
— are determined that they will not permit the
Papandreous to come to power.
The pro-dictatorship group would be unlikely to give
us much or any advance warning that they were moving
into a constitutional deviation. They could guess that
we might be opposed to the idea, and they would therefore
wish to present us with a fait accomgli, assuming that we
would eventually have to accept a de facto situation. We
might wake up one morning, say three weeks from now, to ~
find a dictatorship already installed and functioning.,..-^
Evidence exists to indicate that a "big coup" led by
high-ranking Greek military officers was either in the
making or planned as a contingency. The execution of a
coup by middle-grade officers, a "little coup," appears to
have been a surprise. The fact that many of the military
leaders of the "big coup" were locked up in the hours
im-

following the taJceover, and that the U.S. Ambassador to
Greece, Phillips Talbot, learned of the coup from the
nephew of the Greek Prime Minister, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos
,
supports this contention. Colonel Oliver K. Marshall
(Retired), Military Attach^ at the Embassy in Athens in
April 1967 » testified to the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee July 12, 1971 thati
We thought that the military was going to make some
kind of overture to the King, who might or might not
give his blessing, to some kind of a state of siege — a
state of military control...
What did happen was a mutiny by colonels against
general officers to effect their own version of this
plan, and this we were not aware of.^
Following the coup. Ambassador Talbot pleaded with
Washington for a strong denunciation of the coup, but was
unsuccessful in getting it. The State Department first
considered a message drafted April 23 stating thatj "The
U.S. by tradition is opposed to the change of democratic
government by force," but this was overruled by Secretary
7
of State Dean Rusk as too strong.'
Not until April 28, 1967f seven days after the
coup, did the State Department issue its first statement
on the military takeover in Greece, Secretary of State
Rusk said
I
We have followed closely the situation in Greece since
the military takeover there last Friday [April 21].
I am encouraged to see that King Constantine [on April
26] in his first public statement since last Friday has
called for an early return to parliamentary government.
We are now awaiting concrete evidence..."
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With this statement the Administration adopted a
"wait-and-see" attitude toward the military dictatorship,
and, with minor changes, that is essentially the attitude
maintained throughout the seven and one-half years of
military rule in Greece,
That this position was continued by the Nixon
Administration is evident in the "Secretary's Foreign
Policy Statement 1969-1970 (March 1971)- in which the
Secretary of State stated that:
U.S. policy toward Greece since the Administration
came into office has been guided by two principal and
parallel objectives i to maintain mutually beneficial
relations based on historically warm and close ties and
the Greek role in European and Mediterranean security;
and to encourage Greece toward an early restoration of
representative government — the expressed intention of
the present Greek regime.'^
In June 1970, Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, expressed the dilemma faced by the State Depart-
ment in formulating its policy toward Greece:
...the establishment of an authoritarian government
in Greece in April 1967f..tf has posed a dilemma for
U.S. policy. We disagree with the political system
which prevails in Greece and consider a return to pajrlia-
mentary rule essential to the long-term stability and
prosperity of Greece. At the same time, we must pre-
serve our important strategic interests in Greece as a
valuable geographic area in the critical Eastern Mediter-
ranean region. 1^
In testimony to a different committee in 1970,
Davies cited the choices the Administration felt it had,
and the option it chose to follow:
The U.S. Government was faced with three basic
choices. We could continue our relations as we had
before the change in government, or we could cut it off
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completely, cut off our relations completely, or we
could follow a course of coolness toward that Government
until it returned to constitutional procedures. We
opted for the latter course. ^^
One year after the coup. Secretary of Defense Clark
M. Clifford, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on May 17 f 1968, stressed the geostrategic value
of Greece to the U.S. and NATOi
The obligations imposed on us by the NATO alliance
are far more important than the kind of government they
have in Greece or what we think of it... If oxir military
aid to our allies was determined by the kind of govern-
ment they maintained at the moment, then NATO would
disintegrate. '•^
The overriding importance of Greece to NATO was
reiterated March 11, 1970 by Lieutenant General Robert H.
Warren, the Administrator of the Military Assistance Pro-
gram, who, in testimony to the House Committee on Appro-
priations, saidi "Her role in NATO is the main reason we
13
continue to support Greece." ^
Throughout the entire seven year dictatorship the
Administration maintained its belief in a continued rela-
tionship as the best means of influencing a return to
democracy, Davies told the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations in 1970 thati "...there is a trend toward con-
stitutional government, .. .1 believe that it is the quiet
but persistent influence applied by the U.S. Government
and Ambassador Tasca which have brought about this trend,
Ik
and we would like to see it accelerated,"
The most visible manifestation of U.S. Government
dealings with the colonels, however, came in the form of
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military assistance. Unlike "quiet but persistent influ-
ence," military aid was concrete and, therefore, highly
visible. Immediately following the coup in April 196?
t
the Administration had imposed an embargo on heavy military
equipment shipments to Greece. In October I968, following
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Administration
elected to lift its embargo on sin exception basis. In
justifying this action, Davies gave the following reason
j
...the fear was, as I recall, that the Soviets would
move militarily to stamp out the expansion of nationalism
which was glowing not only in Czechoslovakia but also
brightly in Rumania, and the thought was that the demon-
stration of NATO solidarity might be a factor in influ-
encing Soviet tactics within the Soviet bloc.^^
Interestingly enough, this exception to the arms
embargo was made by the United States on behalf of NATO,
but without first consulting any other NATO country.
In February 1970, while the embargo was still in
effect, the Administration approved the loan renewals of
five destroyers and one submarine to the Greek navy. The
rationale for this decision was given by a State Department
spokesman as follows t "Since these ships were already in
the Greek navy, their loan was 'not really related* to the
arms embargo on military equipment to Greece."
In September 1970 the arms embargo against Greece
was lifted permanently. Deputy Defense Secretary David
Packard told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April
27, 1971«
I am not supporting the attitude of the [Greek^
Government, but I am simply saying that our military
considerations are overriding. Furthermore, I think we
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have a better chance to influence the [Greek! Government
to change if we continue to work with them than if we
turn our back on them. '
The State Department position on lifting the
embargo was spelled out in a pamphlet released in August
1971 entitled "Greece: U.S. Policy Dilemma." It was
based on statements made by Rodger P. Davies to the Sub-
committee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
July 12, 1971
«
...it became evident that our partial suspension
of military assistance was weaicening Greece's ability to
meet its NATO obligations and was weakening the credibil-
ity of NATO cohesion. . .we concluded after careful study
that any progress being made was quite independent of our
assistance policy.
Indeed, we have come to recognize as a general pro-
position that withholding military or economic assis-
tance is am ineffective tactic in persuading foreign
-.g
governments to move in directions we consider desirable.
Davies went on to say thati "The military rela-
tionship with Greece overrides the natxire, I think, of the
19
regime." ^ The State Department was aware, however, of the
implications of lifting the arms embargo. Davies replied
in the affirmative to the following question by Congressmaji
Benjamin S. Rosenthal* "You do acknowledge that having
once embargoed military assistance the affirmative act of
renewing it obviously might be construed as a political
act?"20
Throughout the remainder of the dictatorship in
Greece the Administration became increasingly impervious
to the mounting opposition to its policies. It clung
tenaciously to its continued relationship with the colonels
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for the sake of NATO and U.S. national security while
believing that the U.S. should not interfere in the evolu-
tion of Greek affairs beyond "quiet but persistent influ-
ence," Secretary of State William Rogers made the following
statement in September 1972i
We believe that a democratic system offers the best
hope for achieving the spiritual and material aspira-
tions of people everywhere. But the choice, except as it
applies to our own country, is not oiirs to make. It
would be the ultimate arrogance of power to think that
we can, or should, impose our will on others — to
threaten or coerce others even in the name of conscience.
The kind of government other countries have must, in the
final analysis, be what their people want or will
permit . ^^
For some reason, the desire by the Administration
to avoid coercive methods ignored the fact that there are
various forms that coercive measures can take, and that
coercion can simply involve the denial of ongoing or
futtire aid. Thomas R. Wheelock in his article "Arms for
Israeli The Limit of Leverage" lists six forms in which
military aid can be employed as a coercive tool in order
of ascending severity. (1) Deny requests for the most
sophisticated items of weaponry. (2) Deny requested
increases in military aid, (3) Suspend delivery of se-
lected weaponry and/or supplies. (4) Suspend all deliveries
of supplies soid/or weaponry, (5) Reduce current levels of
military aid. And, (6) terminate all such aid.^^ It
appears that the Administration became convinced that NATO,
national security and the military relationship were
overriding, therefore the withholding of military assistance
was discontinued as a policy tool in pressuring the colonels
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to restore democratic rule. The actions were not carried
far enough. It is ironic that only a few years later the
State Department reversed its position, that withholding
military assistance was an ineffective tactic, by imposing
aji arms embairgo against Turkey for its part in the Cyprus
debacle.
The Cyprus debacle in 197^ » which brought down the
Greek junta, triggered the third in a series of State
Department efforts to prevent war between the two NATO
allies, Greece and Turkey. The first two were in 1963-196^
and 1967. These incidents were brought to a halt with
stop-gap measiares that were considered unsatisfactory by
all parties involved. On the day of the abortive coup
attempt against the Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios,
State Department spokesman Robert Anderson saidt "Our
policy remains that of supporting the independence and
territorial integrity of Cyprus and its constitutional
arrangements and we urge all other states to support a
similar policy." ^ While European nations were denouncing
the actions of the Greek colonels in Cyprus, and the
subsequent Turkish activities, the State Department did
not utter a word of criticism. On July 18, Anderson was
asked about a meeting of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
with Makarios t "Was the secretary meeting with Makarios
on Monday, July 22, as a private citizen, as Archbishop,
or as President of Cyprus?" Anderson said, "He's meeting
oil f- _
with Archbishop Makarios on Monday." Leniphasis in source J
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Not xintil August 13, 197^» almost one month after
the coup attempt against Makarios, did the State Depart-
ment take a position on the Turkish claims in this dispute,
and when it did it signalled a tilt toward Turkey
i
The United States position is as follows i we recog-
nize the position of the Turkish community on Cyprus
requires considerable improvement aind protection. We
have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them.
The parties are negotiating on one or more Turkish
autonomous areas. -5
Secretary of State Kissinger received considerable
criticism for the manner in which the Administration
handled this Cyprus incident. On August 15 i 197^f Con-
gressman John Brademas and other congressmen confronted
Kissinger in his office. Brademas told Kissinger, "We are
placing the blame squarely on you, sir. We are not
assigning responsibility for the failure of U.S. policy in
26Greece and Cyprus to President Ford, We feel it is yours,**
Kissinger, himself, seems to have admitted failure
in Cyprus. In the February 28, 1977 issue of Time maga-
zine, he saidt "If I had ever had twelve hours and been
able to pick out an intelligence report, I would have seen
27that the situation needed attention." ' In all fairness to
Kissinger, however, it must be said that the world was in a
vast state of disarray dtaring the Cyprus situation in 197^.
Kissinger was preoccupied with charges of involvement in
wiretapping, Watergate and the resignation of President
Nixon. The Vietnam War was slowly dragging to a close,
OPEC was raising the price of oil, Nixon and Kissinger had
knowledge of and had approved a secretly negotiated $1.1
122

billion grain sale to the Soviet Union, an action which
became very controversial when made public. All of this
impinged upon the conduct of American foreign relations
and undoubtedly contributed to the ill-pursued auid dele-
terious relation with the colonels.
2. The American Embassy
The involvement of the American Embassy in Athens
under Phillips Talbot during the early stages of the coup
has already been discussed in the previous section. When
Talbot departed Greece in January 19^9 1 "the post of
Ambassador remained vacant for approximately a year as a
mild form of protest to the colonels. On August 28, 1969f
President Nixon announced the appointment of Henry J,
Tasca to be the new Ambassador to Greece; in a congressional
protest, his appointment was not confirmed until December
8, 1969. He arrived in Greece in January 1970.
Tasca soon became known for his support of the
junta and was repeatedly criticized by Congress. Upon his
arrival in Greece, he returned to the U.S. those employees
of the Embassy who were considered unfriendly to the mili-
4. . 28tary regime.
Congressional committees issued several reports
which were highly critical of Tasca and the Americsm Em-
bassy. One of the most critical was an unpublished staff
study prepared November 1^, 1971 by Clifford P. Hackett,
Staff Director of the Subcommittee on Europe of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. Hackett identified several
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stages or phases in the relationship of the Embassy to the
colonels. Between April 19^7 and January 1969» when Talbot
departed, the Embassy maintained some distance from the
Greek Government while continuing to see the opposition
leaders. After January 19^9 until the arrival of the new
Ambassador, Henry J. Tasca, ChargS d'affaires Roswell
McClelland conducted business along the same lines.
Throughout both periods the CIA amd U.S. military main-
tained close ties and contacts with Greek militaury and
coup leaders.
Between spring 1970 and spring 1971 » Tasca saw no
opposition leaders and personally directed political re-
porting from the Embassy which was considered "highly
favorable to the colonels." Hackett reported thatt "It
now seems clear that Ambassador Tasca's assignment in
Athens was to 'justify* full resumption of aid." ^ Not
until following the spring of 1971 did Tasca resume con-
tact with opposition leaders and visit King Constantine
in Rome for the first time.
Hackett reported thatt
Athens is seen as a very undesirable post (despite
its amenities) where assignment meems service xmder an
ambassador who has seriously erred in his perceptions of
political developments and where political reporting
would be subordinated to the exigencies of rescuing that
ambassador and his career from those errors.
The political reporting has, in the judgement of
several embassy officers, been tailored to fit the pres-
ent Ambassador's preconceptions of what he hoped would
be a trend towaird constitutional government . -^^
12^

A report prepsired March 4, 1971 "by James G.
Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, stated thati "...the general atti-
tude of the Embassy is defensive about the regime — quick
to praise during the period before the embargo was lifted
but slow to criticize now that the embargo has been ended
and the regime in default [sic] on its assursmces."-^ It
went on to make the following observationt
. .
.we noted that in Embassy meetings the coup and
its aftermath was often referred to as the "revolution."
Those Greeks opposed to the regime in Athens refer not
to the "revolution" but to the "junta" or the "Colonels."
Others, less partisan, refer to the "government," or the
"leadership" or the "regime." It is only those who sup-
port the government who refer to the "revolution." The
term is certainly not neutral.-^
Professor Theodore A. Couloumbis, in testimony to
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 12, 1971 saidi
"In my visit with [Greek] political leaders. Ambassador
Henry Tasca was considered to be pro-junta by a number of
them."^^
Tasca justified his relationship with the colonels
to the saime congressional committee on August 3» 1971 f in
the following manner:
I do not see any conflict between our short-term
interests and our long-term interests because it is o\ir
view that the short-term interest is reconcilable with
the long-term interest in the sense that our policy pro-
vides for encouraging in every appropriate way the Greek
Government and Greek regime to get back to democratic
government, and that is how you would take care of the
longer term.^^
Tasca told the House Armed Services Committee on
Jainuary 12, 1972, that he believed the junta was moving
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toward democratic government and that the U.S. should not
interfere
I
In 1968 they [the colonels] adopted a constitution
that at least some of the opposition here and abroad,
including Karamsmlis, would be prepared to see imple-
mented, Papandreou wouldn't accept it, but his idea of
what he wants the United States to do is to use armed
forces to kick this regime out and put him back in so
that he can kick the United States out.
. .
.How do you get back to democracy? You encourage
them and talk to them privately and make statements pub-
licly. The council of Europe put them under great pres-
sure and other countries; but these fellows are soldiers,
and don't let anybody tell you otherwise; they all come
out of a combat background. They know what they want,
and they are tough ajid nobody is going to push them
around easily.-^ -5
Within a few days of the 197^ Cyprus debacle and
the downfall of the military dictatorship, Tasca was
replaced by Jack B. Kubisch. This was deemed necessary in
light of the many Greek politicians and newspapers who,
after the restoration of democracy and lifting of censor-
ship, had demanded his removal from office because of his
apparent sympathies with the military regime.-^
3. Legislative Branch
Congressional involvement in the handling of U.S.
relations with the Greek colonels by the Administration
became more prevalent and was trsinsformed from virtual
silence to increasingly more vocal criticism as the dura-
tion of the dictatorship lengthened. On July 30, I969,
fifty congressmen signed a letter to Secretary of State
William Rogers. It said in parti
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We are writing to you "because of our deep concern
over the situation in Greece, the only European nation
in the Western Alliance in the post World War II period
to fall to a military coup.
Accordingly, we respectfully urge your consideration
of the following actioni
2. That a clearer sign of U.S. moral and political
disapproval of the dictatorship be given and sustained.
3. That U.S. military aid to Greece should not be
increased, and indeed, should be curtailed.-^'
The letter contained the signatures of several
Congressmen and Senators who became recognized for their
stand against the Greek junta. Many of them became known
as members of the influential Greek lobby, John Brademas
was known as the "Chief Greek, "-^ Others included Benjamin
S, Rosenthal, Don Edwards, Donald Fraser, Senators Claiborne
Pell, Paul Sarbanes, Thomas Eagleton, amd J. William
Fulbright, The junta, however, was not without its sup-
porters in Congress, Among them were Congressmen Ed
Derwinski and Roman Pucinski, Peter Kyros and Gus Yatron,
Less than two weeks before the fall of the junta in July
197^. Derwinski and Yatron were given decorations by the
junta during their visit to Athens .-^'^
The advent of 1970 found the Administration
increasingly having to justify itself, amd defend its policy
toward Greece. Congressman Donald Riegle directed the
following criticism at Rodger Davies in a House hearing by
the Committee on Appropriations in April 1970i "...I think
we are going to have to, , .exercise more pressure in places
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like Greece in behalf of the ideals that we profess to
believe in,... I don't think that we are doing enough to
move that regime in the right direction."
In June 1970, congressmen began to outright accuse
the Administration of directly supporting the colonels and
thereby keeping them in power. Senator J. William Fulbright
saidt "It is quite obvious they say we do support them,
we give them money, and we give them axms and this tends
to keep them in and to defeat what you say is our purpose,
which is to return to parliamentary government..."
Even some State Department personnel believed this
to be the case. Alfred G. Vigderman, on the Greek desk at
the State Department and an aide to Rodger Davies, replied
to a question from Senator Claiborne Pell about the degree
to which the Greek people feel the U.S. Government supports
the colonels: "I am convinced that a respectable portion
of them do believe, in fact, that the Government is sup-
ported by the United States." Davies, in testimony July
12, 1971 to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, saidi "It
is probably true that a great many of the Greek people have
interpreted our continuing working relationship with their
government as evidence of across-the-board support for the
43government." ^
The first of several highly critical congressional
studies and reports on Administration policy toward Greece
was released in March 1971. It followed a February visit
to Greece by Senate investigators James G. Lowenstein auid
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Richard M, Moose. They reported thatt
Indeed, despite the embargo, lifted briefly in the
fall of 1968 after the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
Greece received even larger amounts of U.S. military
assistance, taking all categories combined, during the
three years and five months the embargo was in effect
than in the equivalent period before the embargo was
imposed.
...the average total military assistance in the
three fiscal yesirs preceding the embargo was about $95.2
million a year while the average total program in the
three fiscal years in which the embargo was in effect was
about $106.9 million a year....
The embargo of major weapons did not, of course,
affect the regime's military capability internally. The
United States continued to provide small arms, ammuni-
tion, communications equipment, and trucks which^^could be
used by the Army for internal security purposes.
Moose and Lowehstein went on to say thati
The Embassy appears to have operated on the assump-
tion that the regime was sincere in its declared inten-
tion to return to parliamentary democracy and that the
continuation of the arms embairgo was harmful to the
development of the kind of relationship which would per-
mit the. United States to exercise some persuasion on the
Greek regime... ^^
The study mission report concluded by saying
1
"Indeed, the regime seems to have been able to exert more
leverage on us with regard to military assistance than we
have been willing to exert on the regime with regard to
political reform. "*
In June 1970 Senator Vance Hartke introduced an
amendment to the Military Sales Act to terminate aid to
Greece. The Administration opposed this and lobbied
against it. On June 29, the Hartke Amendment was defeated
by a vote of fifty to forty-two. '^
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In July 1971 the House Foreign Affairs Committee
voted to terminate military and economic aid to Greece
until the internal situation in Greece improved. This
amendment, introduced by Congressman Wayne L. Hays, directed
the Administration to halt all military assistance to
Greece until the regime restored constitutional rule to
Greece, However, it contained the proviso that President
Nixon, by reporting in writing to Congress, could override
the ban in the interests of national security. If he
exercised this option, military aid was to be limited to
$80 million for the fiscal year. This amendment passed the
House on August 3» 1971 1 but due to intense White House
and Pentagon pressure, was voted down in the Senate, This
was the first legislative sanction to pass either side of
Congress against the colonels, but it did not pass both.
The White House felt justified in continuing mili-
tary assistance to Greece because some Greek politicians
felt that arms supplies should be kept separate from other
attempts to speed up the return to democracy. Moose and
Lowenstein reported thatt "A number of opposition leaders
told us that they had not objected to the resumption of
heavy arms aid on the ground that no patriotic Greek could
oppose the provision of U,S. arms to help safeguard the
iLQ
security of their country,** Former Greek Foreign
Minister Evangelos Averoff was quoted by Rodger Davies as
having said in a television interview thati "...the
the delivery of arms must be judged independently of the
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fact if rsid there is either democracy or dictatorship
here,**
Benjajnin Rosenthal voiced a widely held belief in
Congress in a hearing by the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee on August 3, 1971
1
From ray own point of view, for whatever it is worth,
and from the point of view of American interests, U.S.
aid ought to generally stand for certain principles
beginning with Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of
Independence. All of the actions we taJce in world
affairs ought to relate to the great principles that
have built this democracy. As a general principle we
simply cannot support military dictatorships, particu-
larly those who have been in m- years. ^^
In the same hearing Congressman Lee H. Hamilton
saids
The thing that bothers me is that the signal that
comes across to most of us is that we are pursuing our
military objectives much more vigorously than we are
pursuing our political objective in Greece. At least it
is much more visible. It certainly appears to be more
visible to the people of Greece. -5 J-
One visible manifestation of the military objec-
tive was home-porting in Athens approved by the Adminis-
tration on May 6, 1972. This accord was signed by
representatives of the Greek and U.S. navies in Athens on
January 8, 1973. Six destroyers from the Sixth Fleet had
already arrived in September 1972. The House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittees on Europe and the Near East issued
a report on December 30, 1972 denouncing the decision to
home-port in Athens at that time as "a serious mistake"
and "a serious disservice to American relations with the
Greek people, to our ties with our NATO allies, and, most
importajitly, to our own democratic traditions,"-'
131

Senator Claiborne Pell directed the following
criticism at Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, in an April 3»
1973 hearing on State Department Appropriations Authori-
zations for Fiscal Year 197^»
The danger to me is that the very fact that we are
home-ported there means to the Greek people one more
embrace by the United States for their regime, and will
give them the impression that we support it. It seems so
peculiar that we have a base there and we combine with
them in NATO when the very preamble to the NATO Treaty
. , .negates everything for which Greece stands at this
time.^-^
Congressman Donald M. Fraser, speaking about home-
porting in Athens, said May 1, 1973i "It seems to me the
Pentagon still runs the State Department in many major
policy areas..,.And I think they showed it on the home-
porting matter,"^
Lowensteln and Moose drew the following conclusion
in their 1971 report
t
For the United States, the principal conclusion from
our report is that we have pursued a faulty policy since
1967 from which we must now extricate ourselves. There
is no easy way to do this. Damage has already occurred
to American interests in Greece and more will occur before
the present situation ends. To redeem U.S. interests smd
terminate an unfort\inate appearajice of support for author-
itarian rule, we recommend the following actions
»
A) A public sinnouncement that the U.S. aircraft
carrier scheduled to homeport in Greece this summer will
not be deployed under existing circumstances,.,,
B) The assignment of a new American ambassador who
comes free of identification with past American policies,
either with their design in Washington or their execution
in Greece, , , ,^^
In hearings before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs in August 197^ » following the Cyprus debacle and
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the dovmfall of the colonels, Congressman Benjamin S.
Rosenthal saidi "The bitter summary conclusion these many
pages yield is that the United States chose to ignore the
fate of democracy in Greece in order to maintain its mili-
tary base rights in that country,""' Furthermore, he saidi
"There is no doubt that Greece holds the United States
directly responsible for these events [[the coup and Cyprus]
both for sins of commission and of omission."^'
A Jsmuary 1975 study mission of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee to (^eece concludedi
The misadventure of the Greek colonels in Cyprus in
July 197^ would probably never have occurred if the United
States had assessed more carefully its own national inter-
ests with Greece since 1967. The Athens junta was led to
believe by the implicit Americsm support they received
that anything would be tolerated as long as American
military bases were continued. -^^
Furthermore, it saidi
When European countries questioned Americam and NATO
policy during this period, the United States sought
quiescence; when American congressional critics wondered
what had happened to the alliance of democracy which
NATO was intended to be, senior American officials tes-
tified that such concerns had to be balanced by military
base considerations. 59
Senator Claiborne Pell, in a November 1975 report
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, concluded:
. . .The widespread public belief is that the United
States at best condoned, and at worst conspired in the
1967 coup by the Colonels; that the United States sup-
ported instead of tolerated the reign of the junta; and
finally that the United States, directly or indirectly






B. REACTION TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE COLONELS
1 . American Public
The relationship of the U.S. to the colonels has
variously been characterized by the American public as
"too busy elsewhere," "unimaginative, sadly irresponsi-
62
ble, and ultimately inexplicable do-nothing policy," and
a naive acceptance of the Colonels. ^
Professor George Anastaplo, a lecturer at the
University of Chicago, was a frequent critic of the U.S.
relationship with the colonels. In am article printed in
the Congressional Record in July I969 he saidi "The United
States will not be able to escape either the responsibility
for or the consequences of whatever happens in Greece."
Earlier, in April 1969» he saidi
I suspect that the underlying cause of difficulty
for the United States in recent years has been the lack
of a clear policy for Greece. Even as late as August
[1968] several officials I talked with in the American
Embassy in Athens were honestly puzzled as to just what
the policy of the United States .Government was toward
the government of the colonels."^
Professors Theodore A. Couloumbis of Americam
University and Nikolaos A. Stavrou of Howard University
analyzed U.S. policy toward Greece in an article in the
Congressional Record, September 1, 1970, entitled "The
Military Arm of Our Foreign Policy Takes Over Its Diplo-
matic Brain." They cited six indicators that U.S. policy
toward Greece was inordinately dominated by military con-
siderations holding sway over all othersi (1) over the
years economic aid to Greece declined and finally ceased,
13^

while military aid did not; (2) up to 1970 at least two to
three percent of the entire Greek officer corps were
trained in the U.S. each year; (3) the presence of U.S.
bases and personnel in Greece; (^) frequent visits of Sixth
Fleet vessels discharging large numbers of sailors for rest
and relaxation; (5) frequent joint NATO exercises in which
the Greeks participate; and (6) the Greek CIA (KYP) was
established and funded by the American CIA until the coup
66in 1967. They concluded their analysis in the following
manners
The paradoxical conclusion of this paper is that the
U.S. by paying greater attention to political factors in
the determination of our foreign policy toward Greece,
will protect even better our short as well as long range
strategic objectives in this most vitally located area
of the Mediterranean Sea. By abandoning sterile, short-
sighted, tactical objectives on the Greek situation the
United States will gain a significant victory in the ^„
political, economic as well as the strategic dimension. '
As early as March 19^9 U.S. policy smd decision
makers were being warned of the consequences of the U.S.
relationship with the colonels 1 "Now, another ominous
fact of Greek politics is emerging, a growing axiti-American-
ism, even among influential elements in Greece who could
once be counted upon as most sympathetic to the United
States. "^^
One of the more ringing indictments of U.S. foreign
policy toward the colonels put it this wayi
...the United States did not develop policies spe-
cifically designed for Greece. Rather, Greece was
viewed more as a means to wider strategic ends in the
East-West confrontation. The strategically located
junior NATO partner was, therefore, handled by Americam
policy makers as military real estate or a way station
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in the American lifelines to Israel and oil. Political
considerations, long-range interests, morality, and law
were dismissed as mere "theology" and as variables that
were totally irrelevant for busy, practical, hard-hitting,
and tough-minded men who were charged with the "awesome
responsibility" of managing the international system. 9
Professor Panayiotis Vatikiotis in his book Greecei
A Political Essay said essentially the same thing
i
Basically there has been no American policy toward
Greece as such. Rather there have been global consider-
ations in Americaji policy such as the containment of
communism, .. .by employing a panoply of alliances, bases,
and subsidiary arrangements throughout the world.
Greece, one might say has been one of these arrangements.
To this extent, U.S. policy in Greece from the Truman
Doctrine in 19^7 to the present, correct or faulty, has
been a function of wider interests and concerns.'^
2. Greek Public
Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, received a letter on
December 2, 1969 signed by thirty-two Greek politicisins.
It saidt
Our primary duty is to make clear to you... it has
become the common belief of all Greeks that the military
. J^
dictatorship.
. .even if it were not imposed on us with the ^inducement of some of the U.S. agencies in Greece, remains
in power after two amd a half years as a result of the
tolerance, if not the positive support, of the U.S.
Government, '^
In a speech to the North Atlantic Assembly Novem-
ber 6, 1970, reprinted in hearings before the Subcommittee
on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee July 14,
1971 f Dimitrios Papaspyrou, Speaker of the last Greek
Parliament before the coup, saidt "I know... the argument
which says that the Alliance, which is in danger of losing
the whole Mediterranean, is in greater need of the terri-
tory of Greece than the nine million Greeks who live there.
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But, Gentlemen, bewauret if you lose the people, it is
72
certain that, one day, you will lose the territory also,"'
Senate investigators Moose and Lowenstein found
during their visit to Greece in February 1971 that one
Greek critic voiced the opinion of many they heard when he
said I •*Is the Jxinta deceiving the Embassy, is the Embassy
deceiving the State Department, or is the State Department
73deceiving the Congress?'*'-'^ Their report of the rising tide
of anti-American sentiment was confirmed by Hackett in his
report later that same year. Hackett found that there was
unity among opposition leaders on the following points
i
"The American government exerts a considerable (most say
decisive) influence on the longevity of the regime." And,
The basic error of Americam policy since 196? » and
especially since the arrival of Ambassador Tasca, has
been a single-minded reliance on the short-term military-
strategic advantages of Greece as a naval and air base
complex without regard for the long-term interest of the
United States in obtaining sin early return of represen-
tative and popular government to Greece.''^
Professor John Zighdis, testifying to the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 27f 197^f opened by
pleading with Congress to cease support of the regime by
lending it credibility and respect and aid. To cease
"friendly persuasion" and take more overt actions to abolish
the dictatorship. He saidt
Had the allies, and specifically the United States,
fulfilled their [NATO] treaty obligations to defend
democracy and freedom, neither the imposition nor the
survival of the dictatorship would have been possible.
...Expressions of U.S. disapproval of the coup
were seen as mere lip service by the Greek people who
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felt that their intelligence was ^eing insulted ... by
contradictory words versus deeds. '-^
Many Greeks felt that the excuse of providing
military aid to the junta as a means of enabling the U.S.
to influence them to return to democracy was a worn-out
cliche. There were other factors which made the U.S. an
accomplice in Greek eyest continuing American tourism?
private American firms making lucrative investments; and
the absence of even a single statement from the State
76Department or White House denouncing the junta.
These few examples of Greek criticism of the U.S.
relationship to the colonels will suffice to illustrate
the widespread sentiment among Greek citizens. Very few
were in a position to speak so freely, ajid many of those
who did, did so at great risk. In various ways, though,
this anti-American sentiment managed to make itself felt,
not least of which was the increasing incidence of violence
in the form of bombings directed against American-owned or
affiliated property in Greece,
3. The Colonels ^-^^^^
The colonels were quick to use every means available
to broadcast their ties with the U.S. as a means of legiti-
mization. Visits by U.S. officials, mainly military, were
photographed and displayed widely in the state-censored
newspapers. At the same time the junta leadership made
light of their dependence on the U.S. in contemptuous
remarks such as this comment by Brigadier General Styliajios
PattaJcost "If there is any prospect of war the Americans
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will come begging us to take their tanks and planes. If
not, what we have is aunple for domestic purposes.**'
'
Pattakos also stated his belief that American military aid
was neither extensive nor essential for Greek domestic
needs smd in the event of war NATO would have no choice
78but to defend Greece,' They even went so far as to warn
the U.S. that it would have to maintain aid shipments if
it •'wanted Greece to stay outside the Iron Curtain."'^
The reaction of the colonels to the U.S. vascillated
from hot to cold. They proceeded to purge the Greek mili-
tary of many senior, experienced officers who supported
Greek membership in NATO, in their efforts to mold a
politically reliable military machine. The colonels
established extensive trading relations with neighboring
East European co\intries and the Soviet Union, The subse-
quent chapter will illuminate the extent to which the
colonels sought alternative sources of economic and mili-
tary assistance. All of these actions can be taken as
signs of a wesikened relationship with the U.S.
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V. INDICATORS OF Tffi AMERICAN
RELATIONSHIP WITH GREECE
A. THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP
1. Post-World War Two To The Coup
The American military-strategic interest in Greece
commenced in 19^7 with the enunciation of the Truman Doc-
trine. It was formalized in 1952 when Greece became a
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The preamble to that treaty contains the following words:
"To safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization
of [our] peoples, founded on the principles of democracy,
individual liberty and the rule of law," Together with
the wording of the Truman Doctrine, which saidi "This is
no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes
imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggres-
sion, undermine the foundations of international peace and
2hence the security of the United States," the action of
the United States toward the Greek colonels stood in sharp
contradistinction to these pledges of support for demo-
cratic principles, and was the source of considerable
criticism. Laurence Stern encapsulated that criticism when
he said: "In the case of Greece and Turkey the military
relationships conceived in the name of NATO became the
driving imperatives of foreign policy, with powerful
blandishments of money and weaponry, rather than a component
1^0

of a policy in which social and humanitarian considera-
3tions were given serious weight."-^
Table 7 furnishes data on the size of U.S. "Economic
and military aid to Greece from 19^6 to I966. This table
illustrates several points. While military aid tapered
down and remained relatively constant, averaging between
$50 and $100 million suinually, economic aid followed a
steady and sharp decrease to virtually zero. Second, while
this was occurring, military aid remained larger than
economic. The cumulative figures illustrate the overall
larger size of military versus economic aid — $1,7^1
million and $l,l66 million, respectively.
In addition to monetary assistance, 11,229 Greek
military personnel were trained in the U.S. between 19^7
and 1969 as well as another 1,9^5 Greeks being trained in
other overseas installations. This training was conducted
under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Considering
that the Greek officer corps at any one time is only about
11,000, the size of these training figures take on even
greater significance.
Not only was the U.S. role as arms supplier to
Greece massive in dollar value and numbers of items, it
was nearly the only source for Greece. The Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports that,
between 1950 and the coup in 1967f Greece received only
nine major arms transfers from foreign countries other




U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO
GREECE, 19^6-1966
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SOURCE: U.S. overseas loans and grants and assistance
from international organizations, AID special report, pre-
pared yearly for the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
quoted in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Greece
. Spain , and the Southern NATO Strategy .
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs , 92d Cong., 1st sess., July 12, 14,
19, 21, August 3f September 9 and 15, 1971 » p. 481.
transfers included all types of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, and armored fighting vehicles.
Table 8 on the following page provides a selective




SELECTIVE LIST OF U.S. ARIVIS TRANSFERS TO GREECE
BY TYPE AND NUMBER OF ITEB/IS, 19^6-197^




tanks (all types) If 259





Honest John missiles ^20





2i-ton trucks 16, 41
6
tactical radios 6,014
SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Greece and Turkey j Some Military Implications
Related to NATO and the Middle East . Prepared for the
Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs by the Congressional Research Service~
Library of Congress
.
94th Gong., 1st sess., February 28,
1975, p. 50.
NOTEi Grants only. Items shown are representative.
Military Assistance Program Data, Defense Security
Assistance Agency, as of August 7, 1974,
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and number of equipment, for the years 19^6 to 197^. This
data illustrates both the size of the military commitment
to Greece and the extensive range of weaponry included.
2. During the Junta ( 1967-1974 )
Almost immediately after the execution of the coup
the U.S. Government imposed an embargo on shipments of
heavy arms to Greece. However, it was a selective suspen-
sion of the delivery of major military items programmed for
Greece under MAP. The suspended items included ships,
aircraft, military helicopters, tanks, armored personnel
carriers, artillery, missiles and tank ammunition. It is
paradoxical that the items suspended were the hardware with
which Greece was to fulfill its role in NATO, yet the Greek
role in NATO was the primary justification given by the
Administration for the policy it pursued toward Greece,
Those types of weapons which were of use for internal secu-
rity, such as small arms and ammunition, were never halted.
In any case, the arms embargo existed in little
more than name. On October 21, 1968 the U.S. Government
announced the partial resumption of heavy arms shipments to
Greece in response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The military equipment released in this exception was
valued at approximately $28 million and included F-5,
F-102 and F-104 aircraft, HU-16 Maritime Patrol aircraft,
T-33 and T-^l trainer aircraft, 90-mm cartridges and 175-mm
self-propelled artillery pieces. The first portion of
this package, which also happened to be the first items of

major military hardware delivered since the coup, was sent
to Greece by cargo vessel on February 17» 1969. It con-
sisted of five F-104 Starfighter aircraft.
The next major exception to the arms embargo
occurred on February 3f 1970 when the U.S. renewed the loan
of six warships — five destroyers and one submarine — to
the Greek navy. The submarine and two destroyer loans had
Q
expired in 19^7; the remainder in 1969.
On September 22, 1970, State Department spokesman
Robert J, McCloskey ajinounced the lifting of the arms
embargo
:
The administration has now decided to resume normal
military shipments to Greece, The resumption of such
shipments will enhance the ability of the Greek forces
to carry out their responsibilities in defense of the
NATO area, and thus contribute importantly to the cohe-
sion and strength of the southern flank of NATO,,.,
Althoi:igh the United States had hoped for a more rapid
return to representative government in Greece, the trend
toward a constitutional order is established. Major
sections of the Constitution have been implemented, and g
partial restoration of civil rights has been accomplished.^
Two major examples will serve to illustrate that
arms sales to Greece were not long in returning to their
usual levels. Following negotiations, State Department
spokesman Charles W, Bray III announced March 29, 1972
that the U.S. and Greece had signed an agreement for the
U,S, to sell Greece thirty-six Phantom jet aircraft, Greece
was to pay a $2,5 million down payment on each aircraft and
the remaining $2,5 million per aircraft would be financed
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SOURCES! Data for 1967-1972 taken from U.S., Congress,
Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and
Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year* 1975 .
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appro -
priations
.
93d Cong,, 2d sess,, July 24, 197^i p. 1323.
Data for 1973 and 197^ taken from U.S., Congress, House,
Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1976 . Part 4. Hearings before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations
, 94th
Cong., 1st sess., December 4, 1975 » p. 458.
On June 14, 197^ t the U.S. concluded a major arms
deal to sell $400 million worth of aircraft to Greece. The
agreement included sixty A-7D aircraft and about eighteen
11C-130 transport aircraft as well as some training aircraft.
In Fiscal Year 1972, for example, approximately
eighty-six percent of all funds proposed for grants of
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military assistance for Europe was earmarked for Greece
12
and Turkey. Table 9 on the preceding page provides
data on economic and military assistance to Greece for the
years of the junta, 1967-197^« Even more evident than
with Table 7 on page 1^2, is the predominance of military
over economic aid.
3. Official Military Visits to Greece
On February 15 » 1968, less than one year after the
coup, Ambassador Talbot invited Papadopoulos and other
prominent members of the jxmta on board the aircraft carrier
U.S.S. Frajiklin D. Roosevelt during a port call. During
this occasion of handshakes and smiles, with numerous
photographers present, Papadopoulos was told by Admiral H.
13Rivero that it was an honor to have him aboard. ^
The presence and activities of military personnel
in their distinctive uniforms, especially high-ranking
military officers, served as an important indicator and
advertisement of the relationship between the two nations.
On numerous occasions association of the junta leaders with
American officers was given wide publicity and exploited.
The American military mission in Greece was aware of their
importance in conveying a signal of approval or disapproval
as evident in this statement by Colonel Austin C. Ayotte,
Chief of Staff, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group,
Greece (JUSMAGG)i "Our influence with the Greeks in mili-
tary matters is great, and they respect our judgement. As




of several U.S. interests in Greece." An American
major general told a visiting Congressman at the U.S.
Embassy in Athens t "It's [the junta] the best damn
Government since Pericles." -^
Lowenstein and Moose reported that there were an
average of about 2,000 U.S. fleet personnel ashore per day
in Greek ports. Ambassador Tasca told a Special Subcom-
mittee of the House Armed Services Committee thati "We
had over 500 fleet visits last year [1971]; .. .since I have
been here we hardly have had any incidents at all. If
people didn't like America, we would feel that very
17quickly." ' Table 10 provides data on the magnitude of the
official visits to Greece by general and flag officers
during the first three and one-half years of the junta.
Sir Hugh Greene, in speaking of possible sanctions
against Greece, to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
July 1^, 1971, saidt
I do think that the cessation of what happens — if I
may be allowed to call it "public love-making" — between
members of the administration in the United States, or
U.S. officials, generals and admirals, with the regime,
would be noted immediately by the regime and would be
noted by the people of Greece as indicating that the
United States was withdrawing its support from the
regime.^"
Clifford P. Hackett reported thatt
The Greek Government has vigorously and successfully
exploited every conceivable sign of Americaji support for
the regime including: wide publicity for every visiting
American general and admiral, of which there have been
many; special publicity for senior American civilian
officials,..; the serenades of the Prime Minister by
Christmas carolers of the American grade school for the








OFFICIAL VISITS TO GREECE BY U.S. GENERAL AND FLAG
OFFICERS, APRIL 196? TO JUNE 1970
Year/^ame No, of Visits Year/^ame No. of Visits
1^67 1?67
GEN D.A. Burchinal 1 RADM L.R. Geis 2
ADM J.S. McCain, Jr. 1 RADM R.W. Paine 2
VADM W.I. Martin 2 RADM J.E. Dacey 1
1^68 1^68
MG G. Ruhlen 1 VADM J. A. Tyree 1
MG W.E. Greer 1 VADM W.I. Martin 1
GEN T.W. Parker 1 VADM D.C. Richardson 3
GEN J.H. Polk 1 RADM V.G. Lambert 2
MG W.H. Craig 1 RADM L.R. Geis 1
BG A. Hurow 1 RADM W.E. Lemos 2
MG E. Helton 1 RADM J.F. Calvert 3
GEN D.A. Btirchinal 1 RADM V.P. Healey 5
LTG R.H. Warren 1 RADM E.C. Outlaw 2
1^69 1?69
GEN A.J. Goodpaster 1 RADM W.E. Lemos 1
ADM W.F.A. Wendt 2 RADM P.M. Charbonnet 1
GEN J.L. Throckmorton 1 RADM J.M, James 3
MG W.A. Enemark 1 RADM P.B. Armstrong 3
LTG H.M. Exton 1 RADM F.H. Price 1
RADM D.W. Wulzen 1 RADM R.E. Spreen 3
MG A.J. Bowley 1 RADM E.W. Dobie, Jr. 1
MG R.B. Martin 1 RADM E.C. Outlaw 1
MG R, Forbes 1 RADM A.F. Fleming 2
RADM Cassell 1 MG N,, . Ohman 1
MG J.N. Ewbank 1 MG J..T. Scepansky 1
BG E.B. Edwards 1 LTG H.J. :Leml ey 1
VADM D.C. Richardson 3
1970 1970
GEN D.A. Burchinal 1 RADM G.C. Talley 4
BG L.F. Boyle 1 RADM E.W. Dobie, Jr. 2
MG R.H. Anthis
,
1 RADM L.E. Hubbell 5
VADM D.C. Richardson 3 RADM A.F. Fleming 1
RADM W.H. House 2
(Table continued on next page)
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TABLE 10 — Continued
Total Visits for I967 (after April) 9
Total Visits for I968 29
Total Visits for I969 35
Total Visits for 1970 (through June) 20
Grand Total of Visits April I967 to June 1970 93
SOURCEi U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commit-
ments Abroad Part 2» Greece and Turkey . Hearings before
the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and
Commitments AbToad of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
91st Cong., 2d sess., June 9 and 11, 1970, pp. 1839-18^0.
Hackett also found most Greek opposition leaders
in accordance that an end to high-level and well-publicized
visits by American military and civilian officials would
contribute significantly to the downfall of the junta.
k, U.S. Base Rights
Table 11 provides a list of the major U.S. /NATO
bases and facilities in Greece. The value to the U.S. of
these facilities was enhanced shortly after the coup by the
June 1967 Arab-Israeli War in which the junta granted the
U.S. overflight and base rights and blanket use of the
landing facilities on Crete, Additional windfalls to the
junta were the appearance of the Soviet fleet in the Medi-
terranean ajid rapid Soviet naval expansion. All of these
combined to intensify the dependence of the Sixth Fleet on













































Athens area (7)» Nea
Makri, Crete (2)
Athens
SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Greece and Txirkey t Some Military Implications
Related to NATO and the Middle East . Prepared for the
Special Subcommittee on Investigat ions of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs
.
9^th Cong., 1st sess,, February 28, 1975,
p. 62.
Between 1972 and 1975 a segment of the U.S. Sixth
Fleet was able to home-port in Athens, The U.S. Navy motive
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in this action was an attempt to stem the rising divorce
rate among sailors in the fleet by creating an accessible
home life conducive to solving retention problems. Origi-
nally a squadron of destroyers was home-ported and the
intention was to home-port an aircraft carrier also. A
197^ Congressional study mission to Greece concluded thati
"The fact that the United States continued to press, in the
name of NATO, its naval and air base rights during the
dictatorship, make our country more culpable in the eyes
20
of many Greeks..." It went on to say thati
In the 1967-72 period, the official U.S. position
toward Greece was, briefly, that the United States
regretted the imposition of military rule in Greece but
has no responsibility for the events of I967. The United
States hoped the present military government wotild fulfill
its commitment to a restoration of Greek democracy since
only through such a restoration could the country gain
the stability it needed as a member of the NATO alliance.
Meanwhile, however, the United States had to continue to
protect its short term interests in retaining the mili-
tary base rights in the country which were important for
both NATO and for American policy in the Middle East.^^
That statement quite well highlights the nature of
the military interest in Greece pursued in the tangible
form of base and facilities rights. The success or failure
of that strategy can be derived from the fact that the
Greek Government denied the U.S. usage of bases in Greece
to replenish Israeli forces in the October 1973 Middle East
war. In August 197^1 Greece withdrew from all but the
political wing of NATO and even now U.S. base rights are
tenuous, pending final approval of a U.S. -Greek Defense
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) initialled July 28, 1977.
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5. Proliferation of Foreign (Non-U, S. ) Arms Suppliers
to Greece
An importamt indicator of the failure of the
American pursuit of its military interest in Greece was
the proliferation of foreign (non-U. S.) arms suppliers to
Greece. This is an especially stark indicator when con-
trasted with the virtual sole supplier status of the U.S.
before the junta. Between 196? and 197^ twenty-five out
of fifty-four major Greek arms deals were with foreign
22
countries other than the U.S. In the seventeen years
before the coup, Greece had received sixteen percent of her
arms from countries other than the U.S., whereas in the
eight years spanned by the junta forty-six percent of
Greek military hardware was supplied by non-U. S. foreign
nations. In other words, in one-half the time, three times
the number of arms deals were concluded with foreign
nations other than the U.S.
In 1964 the governments of Canada, Belgium, Italy,
Luxembourg ajid Britain had pledged varying amounts of aid
for the Greek military budget. However, because of the
coup, no aid was supplied in the ensuing years, although
most of these countries did sell them equipment. -^ Between
1954 and 1968 seven countries besides the U.S. had supplied
military assistance to Greece totalling about $35.9 million.
The seven countries were Belgium, Canada, West Germany,
Norway, Spain, Britain and Italy with the biggest contribu-
tors being Canada and West Germany.
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The French and the Germans were the two major arms
sellers to Greece during the junta. In May 1970, West
Germany began delivery of a total of forty Nord 2501
Noratlas military transport aircratft. ^ The Washington
Post on August 29, 1970 reported that Greece had secretly
bought fifty AMX-30 tanks from France at a price of $33
26
million. This was confirmed in the SIPRI register of
arms suppliers to Greece as being concluded in 1971. Some
of the more major arms deals included French Mirage F-1
aircraft, French Aerospatiale MM-38 Exocet missiles, French
and German torpedo boats and gun boats, German submarines
and additional French AMX-30 tanks and armored personnel
carriers. Table 12 provides a breakdown of the dollar
TABLE 12
FOREIGN ARMS SUPPLIERS AND VALUE OF ARMS
TRANSFERS TO GREECE, 1973-1977








SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
. 1968 -1977
(Washington, D.G.j U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament




FOREIGN (NON-U. S.) ARMS SUPPLIERS TO GREECE, 1967-1974
Date Number Item Supplier Comment
Sud Alouette II France
Republic F-84F FRG NATO aid
Republic RF-84F FRG NATO aid
MBB Bo 810 Cobra 2000 FRG NATO aid
Fast patrol boat Norway
M-47 Patton FRG NATO aid
Vosper torpedo boat FRG NATO aid
Vosper torpedo boat FRG NATO aid
M-44 FRG NATO aid




Grumman HU-16B Albatross Norway
Coastal minesweeper Belgium
Torpedo boat FRG
Nord 2501 Noratlas FRG
Republic F-84 Netherlands NATO aid
AMX-30 Frcuice
Lockheed T-33 Netherlands NATO aid




























• • • 40
• • • 2
• • • 130
• • • 100+
SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
,
Arms Trade Registers : The Arms Trade With The Third World (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 1975), pp. 124-126.
NOTE: indicates uncertain data
. . . indicates data not available
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value of arms transfers to Greece by supplier for the
years 1973 to 1977. Table 13 presents a summary of the
foreign (non-U. S.) arms deals concluded during the years
of the junta, concentrating only on selected major items
of equipment.
6, The Greek Arms Industry
Besides turning to foreign, non-U. S. suppliers for
military hardware, the colonels planted the seeds of what
has become a burgeoning indigenous sirms industry in Greece.
Before the coup Greece possessed virtually no domestic arms
production capability. The colonels were instrumental in
establishing an industry that not only provides lairge quan-
tities of military equipment for domestic use, but for
export markets as well.
In the May 197^ Facts on File . Greece is reported
to have signed contracts with a French shipyard for the
construction and purchase of four Combattante 3 guided-
27
missile patrol boats. ' Since 197^ Greece has made consid-
erable purchases of foreign (non-U. S.) military hardware
that enabled a transfer of technology which has been inte-
grated into the Greek arms industry. The Greek parliament
also ratified legislation to establish an indigenous arms
industry in order to attain greater self-sufficiency.
Vassilios Georgousopoulos, a retired admiral who heads the
Greek War Industry Department, in a 1977 interview saidi
A priority listing of war supply production factories
exists, the beginning being made with simple conventional
weapons and reaching highly sophisticated equipment. We
are starting with the production of nitrocellulose used
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in explosives, all types of gun powder, conventional
ammunition, light arms, electronic equipment, armored
vehicles and tanks, missile carrying gunboats, small
civilian aircraft and fighter plane spsire pairts, and will
then proceed into sophisticated equipment like ballistic
and guided missiles and jet fighters. °
He also said the Greek arms industry would be
export-oriented and could meet nonmilitary needs in time
of tranquility.
The Greeks are well on their way to accomplishing
their goal. In November 1975 f following negotiations
originated under the colonels, a contract was signed with
four U.S. companies establishing Hellenic Aerospace Indus-
try (HAI) Limited. This $300 million enterprise involves
Lockheed Aircraft International A.G. for the management
function and control, Lockheed Aircraft Service Company
which is responsible for identifying equipment and systems
requirements. General Electric Company to build the engine
facility at the plsmt, and the Westinghouse Electronic
Corporation for the aviation electronics (avionics) equip-
ment and installations.
Established as a modern aircraft maintenance and
overhaul facility, HAI provides these services to the Greek
Air Force and state-operated Olympic Airlines. It is ex-
panding to include other foreign commercial and military air
fleets. It includes an aircraft depot, an electronics depot
and flight line support facility, utility and ancillary
buildings covering ^57 acres and employing 1,500 people,
expected to increase to 2,500 within four years. On May
30, 1979 the plant delivered the first overhauled F-4E
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Phantom to the Hellenic Air Force, The ultimate objective
is to be able to produce eighty percent of the components
for small civilian aircraft and sophisticated jet fighters,
29including jet engines. ^
Besides the construction of four French patrol
boats in Greek shipyards, the Hellenic Shipyards are cur-
30
rently constructing a series of ten steel patrol craft.
This shipyard will soon be building ships up to 15,000
tons. The Athens Domestic Service, February 29, 1980,
reported that the Greek Skaramangas shipyaird had launched
the second of six missile boats being built to French
31
specifications.-^
In March 1979 the Greek Government bought control-
ling shares in the previously Austrian-owned Steyr army
truck plant in Greece. Beginning in 1978 Greece started
producing tanks and armored fighting vehicles. The tank
factory was the end result of negotiations begun in 1976
32
with the British company Vickers."^ At a recent parade in
Athens, Greek-produced Marathon and Leonidas armored
fighting vehicles were proudly displayed. -^-^
In terms of small arms, Greece signed a contract
with West Germany to produce Hecklar and Koch G3/H3 Gmbh
(Obemdorf-Neckar) rifles to be used mainly by Greek
forces, although an eye is on the export market in Africa.
The production target is 30,000 rifles annually.^ In
mid-1977 t $2 million was allocated to establish a factory
to produce FAL 7.62-mm rifles and Falo light machineguns.
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One hundred percent of the rifles were to be produced for
export, while fifty percent of the machineguns would "be
exported and the remainder used by the Greek military.
Besides equipment the Greek military is expanding
its role as a trainer. Since 1962 Greece has trained
Libyan air force cadets as well as providing a small Greek
military detachment to Libya to assist in maintaining their
35high performance combat aircraft. ^-^
The Greek Defense Minister disclosed in the news-
letter Greece J A Monthly Record of January 1980, that the
Greek small arms manufacturing plant is now receiving
sizeable export orders, and that by 1981, will be capable
of turning out medium and heavy machineguns and barrels for
10-mm and 35-mm anti-aircraft guns.-' He cited other new
Greek defense-related industry capabilities including
advanced naval construction, missile fuel manufacture,
modern telecommunications equipment and ammunition. All of
this is indicative of a bustling and growing arms industry;
an arms industry that received its impetus during the reign
of the colonels. Furthermore, it evidences a lessened
dependence on the U.S. for military hardware, and conse-
quently a weakening of ties.
B. THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP
American assistance to Greece in the immediate
post-World War Two yesirs was substantial. However, it
tapered down and by I969 ceased altogether. The greatest
amount of economic aid was furnished between 19^9
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and 1952 in the amount of $706.7 million, with an addi-
tional $188 million from 1953-1957. This assistance was
motivated "by the American desire to see the Greek economy-
rebuilt in order to withstand the pressures of communism.
In this sense it was politically motivated.
There are several reasons for the halt in economic
assistance. Foremost was the attainment of economic
strength in Greece itself. Equally importajit was the Greek
association with the European Economic Community (EEC).
Although this association was frozen for the duration of
the junta in Greece, it was anticipated that it would
resume once democracy was restored. On May 6, I98O the
last of the nine EEC parliaments ratified the acceptance of
Greece as a full member as of January 1, 1981."^ A ter-
tiary reason for the cessation of economic aid, and with
it weakening of economic ties, was the increased Greek
economic ties with her neighboring Balkan countries, parti-
cularly the East Exiropesin countries and the Soviet Union.
Up until the time of the colonels the American business
investment in Greece had been substsmtial. Senate investi-
gators Lowenstein and Moose foxind that between 1953 and
1971 U.S. business investment in Greece constituted the
single largest share of Greek foreign capital, some forty
percent. U.S. tourists to Greece constituted over twenty-
five percent of the Greek tourist trade and sixty percent
of its tourist receipts.-^"
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1. Greek Trade With the U.S.
Greek trade with the U.S. is an indicator of the
economic relationship between the two countries. Table 1^
provides data on Greek trade with the U.S. for the years
i960 through 1977. It is apparent in this data that Greek
trade with the U.S. as a percentage of the Greek total
trade has declined significantly since i960. In 1977 the
Greek-U.S. trade value was approximately one-third the
value of seventeen years earlier. In part this can be
attributed to the Greek turn toward other European countries
as a result of EEC ties. However, the decline commenced
most significantly in the early to middle years of the
junta, when the association with the EEC was frozen, and
undoubtedly reflects the foreign policy of the colonels.
As the economic ties with her Balkan neighbors and the
Soviet Union strengthened, a corresponding weakening of
economic ties with the U.S. occurred,
2. Greek Tourist Trade
Table 15 provides data on the total number of
tourists visiting Greece, the number of U.S. tourists and
the percentage of U.S. tourists in relation to the total
for the years 196O through 1979. The most obvious charac-
teristic is that during six of the eight years spanned by
the junta U.S. tourists constituted the largest percentage
ever in the nineteen year period, ranging from 23.5^ to
29.8^. When viewed from the Greek perspective this increase




GREEK TRADE WITH THE U.S. — IIVIPORTS
AND EXPORTS, 1960-1977
(in Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Year
Imports (cif) Exports (fob)
T-r Q U . . SLS yo
^'^' of Total
TT Q U . id * as /O
^'^' of Total
i960 9^.8 13.5 27.3 13.^
1961 81.0 11.3 32.4 14.5
1962 67.2 9.6 19.2 7.7
1963 8^,6 10,5 54.9 18.9
196^ 101.0 11.^ 44.9 14.6
1965 112.7 9.9 31.2 9.5
1966 131.2 10.7 42.6 10.5
1967 100.1 8.^ 65.1 13.1
1968 106.8 7.7 47.6 10.2
1969 151.9 9.5 54.1 9.8
1970 116.0 5.9 48.3 7.5
1971 139.1 6.6 59.4 9.0
1972 1^5.6 6.2 85.0 9.7
1973 287.3 8.^ 91.9 6.4
197^ 3^8.6 9.2 106.2 6.1
1975 365.5 7.^ 108.5 5.1
1976 ^3^.5 6.8 154.4 5.7
1977 371.0 5.1 135.5 4.6
SOURCE
1
The Europa Yeair Booki A World Survey, Volume
I (London* Europa Publications Ltd., 1962-1979)
.
NOTE I The above figures are converted from drachmas
using the following exchange rate as given in the source






NUMBER OF TOURISTS TO GREECE, 1960-1979
Year Total Tourists U.S. Tourists
^of'Total
i960 315. 805 not available -
1961 MO, 909 93,875 22.8
1962 508,821 108,448 21.3
1963 644,032 147,561 22.9
196^ 649,091 140,935 21,7
1965 816,261 172,475 21.1
1966 966,890 195,346 20.2
1967 821,073 179,246 21.8
1968 786,804 201,875 25.7
1969 1,047,813 311,796 29.8
1970 1,252,875 304,681 24.3
1971 1.781,578 438,981 24.6
1972 2,234,219 548,141 24.5
1973 2,620,103 615,606 23.5
197^ 1,766,111 371,795 21.1
1975 2,642,623 458,575 17.4
1976 3,672,054 493,008 13.4
1977 3,961,112 598,470 15.1
1978 4.532,411 513,181 11.3
1979 5,800,000 601,456 10.4
SOURCES I (1) Greece, National Statistical Service,
Statistical Yearbook of Greece cited in Greece, National
Tourist Organization, Statistical Data (n.p., n.d.).
(2) United Nations, United Nations Statistical Year-
book 1960-1975 (New Yorki United Nations, 1961-197^Tr"
(3) The Europa Year Book 1979 i A World Survey , Volume
I ( London t Europa Publications Ltd., 1979)
.
(4) Greece, Greece : A Monthly Record (Washington,




was not very sericxus about backing up with substantial
action its professed dissatisfaction with the military
government. In other words, the American public found
Greece a tempting vacation spot regardless of the type
of government.
The decrease in total and U.S. tourists in 196?
and 197^ can be attributed to a reaction to the turbu-
lence manifested in the coup in April 196? and the Cyprus
debacle and downfall of the colonels in 197^. In both
instances the numbers of tourists increased significantly
the following years.
Table 16 furnishes data on the size of the tourist
contribution to the Greek balance of trade. For each year
shown credits have exceeded debits and there has been a
generally steady increase in the balance surplus,
3. Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from this exami-
nation of the American economic interest in Greece. (1)
While the level of economic assistance provided Greece was
declining, and ceased altogether in 19^9 i military assis-
tance remained relatively constant at amounts around $50
to $100 million per year in recent years. This tends to
substantiate the argument that the military interest in /
Greece was more important than the economic interest.
(2) In the 1950 's and early 196o*s U.S. trade with Greece
was of greater value and size than in more recent years.





GREEK TOURISM RECEIPTS, 1960-1978
(in Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Year Credit Debit Balance
i960 ^9.3 18.8 +30.5
1961 62.5 19.3 +43.2
1962 76.0 21.8 +54.2
1963 95.^ 27.5 +67.9
196^ 90.9 38.6 +52.3
1965 107.6 M.5 +61.1
1966 1^3.^ ^0.6 +102.8
1967 126.8 ^0,7 +86.1
1968 120.3 ' 42.5 +77.8
1969 1^9.5 47.9 +101.6
1970 193.5 55.3 +138.2
1971 305.3 73.7 +231.6
1972 392.7 95.8 +296.9
1973 51^.9 113.3 +401.6
197^ ^^7.6 129.1 +318.5
1975 6^3.6 154.8 +488.8
1976 823.7 150.7 +673.0
1977 980.6 164.0 +816.6
1978 1,326.3 223.8 +1,102.5








European trading partners, and a concomitant deterioration
in the Greek-U.S. trade relationship. (3) The statistics
on numbers of tourists to Greece and tourist receipts
reflect several things. The high percentage of U.S.
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tourists visiting Greece during the years of the junta
stand in contradiction of official U.S. displeasure with
the colonels. It was not only a reflection of business
as usual, but more than usual. Since the end of the junta,
U.S. tourists to Greece have been the lowest percentage for
five consecutive years. While this probably reflects in
psurt the weakened U.S. dollar vis-a-vis other European
currencies, it is reasonable to deduce that after the
demise of the junta, the Greek welcome for U.S. tourists
was considerably cooler and therefore contributed to the
decline. And, (^) while the coup in 196? and Cyprus in
197^ caused a momentary drop in the number of tourists and
tourist receipts, the numbers quickly rose again. Unrest
and uncertainty impaired the tourist industry briefly, but
the presence of a military dictatorship failed to deter
foreign visitors for very long, especially Americans.
C. THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP
The American involvement in Greek political life was
most pronounced in the late 19^0 's and early 1950 's. At
first the U.S. supported and strove for the leadership of
centrist and left-of-center political parties as the most
likely mesms of preventing the spread of communism. By
1952 this was no longer seen as a feasible course of action.
Blatant U.S. interference was evident in the example dis-
cussed in Chapter One where the U.S. Ambassador took out a
newspaper ad in an Athens daily officially endorsing a
right-wing, conservative candidate for Prime Minister. It
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also carried a thinly veiled threat that should this advice
not be heeded it was likely that American aid to Greece may
be altered.
As with the economic relationship, political ties to
Greece have taken a back seat to the military-strategic
relationship, although to a lesser extent. The U.S. Govern-
ment since the 1950 's through the Embassy in Athens has
made known its support of center-right, conservative
leaders and parties, such as Karamanlis, and its opposition
to left-of-center candidates such as George and Andreas
Papandreou. This line of reasoning insured that the King,
the army and the conservative establishment remained loyal
to the U.S. aind as centers of power in Greek politics.
Conversely, it alienated the center-left elements.
1, Official Civilian Visits to Greece
As with the presence of U.S. generals and admirals
associating with the junta leaders, high-rajiking civilian
officials conveyed a signal of how the U.S. Government
viewed the ruling military leadership in Greece. This
factor did not go unnoticed by the Greek public or the
American public. Typical criticisms included this state-
ment by Congressman Brademas, who said July 1^, 1971 that
the U.S. should •*cease the policy wherein U.S. Government
officials of the highest rank say warm and gracious things
about the junta." Elsewhere, he said, "American officials
in Greece don't have to get their pictures taken with their
arms around junta officials."
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Besides the message conveyed within Greece, U.S.
officials expressed themselves in ways that were obviously
biased toward the junta. The New York Times of May 15
f
1971 attributed the following statement to Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs Martin J. Hillen-
brauidi "The United States told the Council of Europe
today that the four-year-old Greek military-backed regime
received broad support from the people despite what the
United States called disappointingly slow progress toward
Zft
greater democratic freedom."
The first official civilian visit to Greece was not
until May 20, 1970, when Secretary of the Air Force Robert
C. Seamans paid an official call. An official announcement
quoted the secretary as expressing his "deep admiration"
for the Greek armed forces.
One of the most controversial visits was that of
Secretary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans, who in a speech to
the Hellenic-American Chamber of Commerce in Athens, April
23f 1971 » was reported to have expressed appreciation for
the "sense of security that the government of Greece" ren-
dered U.S. investments in Greece. He also stated that
President Nixon "has warm regards for the people of Greece,
for the wonderful way in which Greece has kept its commit-
ments to NATO and for the way in which the two countries
are working together." ^ Stans later stated that he was





MAJOR OFFICIAL VISITS TO GREECE BY HIGH-
RANKING CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, 1967-197^











































SOURCE! Facts on Filet World News Digest (New Yorki
Facts on File, Inc., 1970-19727T
Vice President Spiro T, Agnew toasted Papadopoulos
on his visit to Greece October 17, 1971. He also told
newsmen on his plane enroute to Greece that he would stress
Nixon Administration support for continued military aid to
Greece,
Table 17 lists the names, dates and positions of
six major official visits, ranging from the Vice President
to an Assistant Secretary of Defense. As with the visits
of military generals and admirals discussed in an earlier
169

section, official visits by these high-ranking civilian
officials were well-publicized by the junta. Ample criti-
cism existed that these visits rendered State Department
denunciations virtually worthless to the ordinary Greek
citizen. Certainly it conveyed a signal to the colonels
that the U.S. was only criticizing them to appease the
anti-junta segments of society, while in the daily affairs
of government relations were expected to continue as nor-
mal.
2. Anti-Junta/Anti-U.S. Resistance and Violence
A second indicator of the success or failure of
the political relationship with the colonels was the level
of violence directed against the junta and against U.S.
owned or affiliated property. The political relationship,
in this case, included the military ties with the colonels.
Table 18 provides a chronology of the violent incidents as
they appeared in Facts on File and several other sources.
Those incidents marked with an asterisk indicate incidents
that are affiliated with Americans. This chronology raises
two points. First, the list is lengthy, not all-inclusive
and contains violent or potentially violent activities.
This tends to contradict those people who believed that the
Greek resistance to the junta was virtually passive.
Second, there are a number of cases where the U.S. Embassy
was the target of extremist activity. This activity
clearly contradicts the statement by Ambassador Tasca to






























bomb explodes at U.S. airbase cononissary
bomb destroys 2 U.S.-ovmed cars
bomb destroys 1 U.S. -owned car
bomb damages building housing American Express and
Litton Industries offices
unexploded bomb found inside U.S. Information Service
Library in Athens
bomb explodes in Athens Constitution Square cafe
injuring six people
bombs destroy/damage 8 U.S. -owned cars
bomb explodes in Olympic Airways office injuring 7
including 2 U.S. tourists
bomb explodes in Athens office of Nea Politeia
bomb explodes in Athens city hall and central post office
bomb destroys car of brother of Minister of Economic
Coordination
8 bombs explode near Athens Constitution Square
unexploded bomb found in U.S. Embassy in Athens
bomb damages headquarters of pro-junta Greek General
Confederation of Labor
bomb explodes in U.S. Embassy parking lot killing
2 people (not U.S. citizens)
bomb explodes in Athens National Gardens near
visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
bomb damages bronze statue of President Harry S. Truman
2 bombs found and defused near radio station
bomb explodes at Athens hotel used by U.S. Air Force
bomb explodes at Americcin servicemen's club in Athens
bombs damage 3 cars in Athens (2 U.S. -owned)
bomb explodes outside printing office of Estia
bomb explodes at Esso-Pappas Oil Company
bomb explodes outside Athens department store owned by
an advisor to Papadopoulos
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TABLE 18 — Continued
Date Incident
Apr 21, 1971 bomb explodes in Athens cement company office
Apr 21, 1971 bomb destroys car outside Athens cathedral
Apr 26, 1971 bomb e:q)lodes outside HQ of General Confederation of
Labor
*Apr 26, 1971 bomb explodes outside HQ of U.S. Air Force group in
Greece
May 11, 1971 Athens police arrest 4 people possessing bombs
May 14, 1971 bomb explodes killing 1 policeman, injuring 1
Jul 8, 1971 bomb damages railway tracks and tank truck at Esso-
Pappas Oil Company
*Jul 1971 bombs planted in U.S. -owned cars at Iraklion
*Oct 16, 1971 2 bombs explode near Athens airport to protest arrival
of Vice President Spiro Agnew
*Feb 17, 1972 3 bombs destroy 3 U.S. -owned cars in Athens
*Apr 20, 1972 2 bombs damage U.S. -owned cars in Pireaus and Athens
Apr 21, 1972 4 bombs explode in Athens
*May 13, 1972 2 bombs destroy caurs of U.S. diplomats
*Aug 29, 1972 bomb explodes inside U.S. Embassy in Athens
*Dec 7, 1972 2 bombs damage 2 U.S. -owned Ccurs in Athens
*Jan 18-20, bombs deunage 7 U.S. official cars in Athens area
1973
SOURCES: (1) Facts on File ; World News Digest (New York:
Facts on File, Inc., 1967-1974).
(2) Peter Schwab amd George D. Frangos, eds., Greece Under the
Junta (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1970).
(3) George Yannopoulos, "The State of the Opposition Forces
Since the Military Coup." In Greece Under MilitcLry Rule
, pp. 163-190.
Edited by Richard Clogg emd George Yannopoulos (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., Publishers, 1972).
(4) Thomas W. Pew, "Conversations in Greece," The Nation 212
(January 18, 1971) : 75.
Indicates acts of violence towards U.S. citizens, U.S. affiliated
property or activities connected with the U.S.
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we hardly have had any incidents at all. If people didn't
like America, we would feel that very quickly," -^ Either
this means that Ambassador Tasca was unbelievably out of
touch with reality in Greece, or he was making every effort
to play down and ignore the presence of amti-American sen-
timent for the sake of the continued Americsm relationship
with the Greek colonels. In either case it was undesirable.
3. United Nations Voting — Percentage Correspondence
of Greece , United Nations Average , NATO Average and
Warsaw Pact Average With the United States
The third and final indicator of the Greek-U.S.
political relationship is presented in Figure 1, with
supporting data in Appendix E. Figure 1 graphically
illustrates the percentage correspondence in United Nations
General Assembly voting between Greece, the United Nations
average, the NATO average, the Warsaw Pact average and the
United States for the years i960 through 1977.
Several observations can be made from this graph.
In the early 1960*s the percentage of correspondence in
voting between the U.S. and Greece was much higher than it
was in the late 1970* s. While all the percentages depicted,
except the Warsaw Pact average, reflect a decreasing trend
in correspondence with the U.S., the Greek trend has
followed a steeper decline. Between I967 and 197^ when the
military dictatorship was in power, the percentaige of
correspondence remained relatively constant around fifty




UNITED NATIONS VOTING — PERCENTAGE CORRESPONDENCE
OF GREECE, UN AVERAGE, NATO AVERAGE AND
WARSAW PACT AVERAGE WITH THE U.S.
o
SOURCEi Rodney G. Toinlinaon, "UnJtod NatLonn Roll Call
Votes, 19<iO-1963, 1965-1977." U.S. r.'iival Acadc-myi Auto-
mated Data Bai:o, 1979. (Data furnichod to Uo;;A by the U.S.
Department of State).
NOTESi (1) Sec Aripendix 3 for nupportin". statlrtica,






• •... y/arcaw Pact avora,];e
17^

low of forty-three percent. While this data does not
support a convergence in voting between the colonels and
the U.S., it does reflect a degree of continuity and con-
stancy. Perhaps the most significamt aspect to this
graph is the percentage of correspondence for 1975 i 1976
and 1977. Those years were the first time that the level
of correspondence fell below forty percent, reaching an
all-time low of twenty-nine percent in 1976. While in
1977 Greece rebounded to thirty-nine percent, it was the
first time that Greece had fallen below the United Nations
average
,
The fact that Greece, the United Nations average
and the NATO average have all followed a steadily decreasing
degree of correspondence with the U.S. , while the Warsaw
Pact has followed a slight upward trend of convergence, is
an interesting phenomenon that can perhaps be understood
as dissatisfaction with the U.S. position and policies by
her allies and agreement by her opponents. The steepness
of the Greek pattern is in part explainable by the fact
that Greece usually sided with the Arab nations either
abstaining or casting an opposing vote over issues in which
the U.S. sided with Israel,
^. Conclusions
The observations gathered from these three indica-
tors tend to signify that the U.S. political relationship
toward Greece was not well-served by the policies with the -^
Greek colonels. They illustrate that there has been a ''
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decline in the nature and strength of the Greek-U.S.
political relationship, and that the decline originates
with the time-frame of the military dictatorship. The
conclusion to be dravm is that the American political
relationship with Greece has now taken on a different
character and it is therefore necessary to maintain politi-
cal relations with Greece in a different manner than in





Two major points are evident from the preceding
examination of the most recent military dictatorship in
Greek history: (1) the regime of the colonels was both
harsh in its practices amd detested by the vast majority
of Greeks, and (2) the Americaui relationship with Greece
was ill-served by the policies established and carried out
by the U.S. Government. The regime has ended, Greece
will, as it has in the past, overcome the internal effects
of the seven and one-half years of military rule. In
terms of Greek-American relations, however, the era of the
colonels was a watershed. In the twenty years preceding
the 1967 coup d'etat, Greece and the United States were
intimately bound together in numerous spheres, foremost
among them the military-strategic relationship embodied in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With the advent
of the military dictatorship the strength in the relation-
ship between Greece and the U.S. has diminished. Fiirther-
more, the relationship has been undermined by additional
external variables such as growing Greek ties with the
Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries. Internally,
the Greek Left, personified in the figure of Andreas
Papandreou, has had considerable success in exploiting the
widespread resentment among Greeks of the U.S. for its role
in the lengthy hiatus in democratic practices. Electoral
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gains and public opinion polls continue to register gains
for the Left, while the Center and Right continue to
decline in popularity.
A brief exaimination of several current issues in Greece
will clarify the damage done to the Greek-American relation-
ship by the military rulei (1) the political leadership of
the country, (2) current geographical disputes, specifically
in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, and (3) the status of the
Greek relation with NATO.
(1) Greek politics, since the demise of the jiinta, have
witnessed electoral and popular gains by the Left, specifi-
cally the socialist PASOK party of Andreas Papandreou.
These gains have occurred at the expense of the New Democ-
racy party of Constantine Karamanlis. Of perhaps even
greater concern, however, has been the declining popularity
of the Center, giving rise to greater polarization of Greek
politics between the Left and the Right. Table 19 furnishes
data on the two post-junta elections in Greecei November
17, 197^ and November 20, 1977. As a result of the 1977
elections, Andreas Papandreou leads the largest opposition
party in Parliajnent.
Papandreou is a very vocal critic of the U.S., NATO
and the West. There is no shortage of evidence elucidating
his position. The Greek newspaper, Elevtherotipia . April
10, 1980, discussed the details of a meeting between
Papandreou and several visiting U.S. Senators. The report








National Rally (EP) l.l/O 6.82/1
(National Democratic Union) (EDE)
New Democracy (ND) 5^.37/220 M. 85/172
Neo-Liberal Party - 1.08/2
Union of the Democratic Center 20.52/60 11.95/15
(Center Union/New Forces)
Panhellenic Socialist Movement 13.58/12 25.33/93
Alliance of Progressive and
Left-wing Forces**
(United Left)*** 9.^5/8 2.72/2
Communist Party of Greece (KKE) - 9.36/11
Others O.98/O O.89/O
SOURCES! (1) Nicos Mouzelis, '*0n the Greek Elections,"
New Left Review 108 (March 1978) i 6I
.
(2) Marios L. Evriviades, "Greece After Dictatorship,"
Current History 77 (November 1979) t I63.
(37 Richard Clogg, "Greece t The End of Consensus
Politics?" The World Today 3^ (May 1978) 1 I89.
*Party-coalition titles in parentheses are designations
used in the 197^ elections,
**The Alliance of Progressive and Left-Wing Forces in
the 1977 elections consisted of the Communist Party of the
Interior and four other smaller parties.
***The United Left (EA) in the 197^ elections consisted
of the Communist Party of Greece (Moscow-oriented), Commu-
nist Party of the Interior (Eurocommunist-oriented) and
the United Democratic Left (EDA) . This precarious alliance
disintegrated immediately after the election.
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on the immediate withdrawal of Greece from NATO and on the
closing of U.S. bases..." Papandreou also recounted "the
role and responsibility of the United States for the 7-year
dictatorship, for the Cyprus tragedy and the Aegean issue
and stressed that the balance of power in the area is pri-
marily the work of America." Papandreou outlined to the
Senators the position of his party should they come to
power I "...the main line of our course will be to
strengthen national independence, implement a nonalined
foreign policy and place Greece within the sphere of the
nonalined .
"
A Papandreou electoral victory, with its consequences
for Greek-American relations, becomes even more probable
when seen in light of the current status of the ruling New
Democracy party. Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of
Greece since 197^ and leader of the New Democracy party,
was recently elected to succeed Constantine Tsatsos as
President of Greece, a position that is largely ornamental.
He was sworn in on May 15 » 1980. The election of
Karamanlis to the position of President (on the third round
of balloting in Parliament, which yielded a slim three vote
edge) was accomplished in the face of abstention by
Papandreou and his ninety-three PASOK deputies. Even worse
than the obvious lack of unanimity in the election of
Karamanlis, is the serious rift that developed within the
majority New Democracy party over a successor to the
leadership of the party and the position of Prime Minister,
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George Rallis, with the support of the moderate faction,
received 88 votes, while Evangelos Averoff, supported by
the conservative faction, received 84; however, three
2
members of the party abstained from voting.
Since Greek politics are highly dependent on charis-
matic personalities, the charisma of Papandreou, combined
with the rift in the New Democracy party, could conceivably
overshadow the new Prime Minister, George Rallis, and
result in a PASOK victory in the next elections which must
be held by November 1981 at the latest,
(2) Central to the restoration of a mutually satisfying
relationship between Greece and the U.S. is the resolution
of the two major territorial disputes between Greece and
Turkeyi Cyprus and the Aegean. Cyprus has been the object
of dispute between Greece and Turkey for many years. How-
ever, the present situation — Turkish occupation of
approximately forty percent of the island and the displace-
ment of thousands of Greek Cypriots — stems directly from
the malicious activities of the Greek colonels. The Aegean
Sea dispute, on the other hand, arose primarily with the
1974 Cyprus incident and is multi-faceted, including seabed
mineral rights, territorial boundaries and aerial over-
flight rights.
The history, legalities and positions of the two anta-
gonists in these disputes lie outside the scope of this
thesis. The important point is that these ongoing disputes
have damaged the relationship of the U.S. with both Greece
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and TLirkey, and the longer the disputes continue unresolved,
the greater the damage is likely to be. These geographical
disputes have contributed to a loss of American prestige in
both countries and to a decline in influence? they have
added fuel to the anti-American sentiment; they have con-
tributed to a weaJcening of the southern flank of NATO; and
they have contributed to the higher cost the U.S. must now
pay to maintain a military presence in both countries,
(3) At the present time, the Greek relationship with
NATO remains virtually unchanged from its status in August
197^ when Karamanlis notified NATO that Greece was with-
drawing from the military section of the Alliance, but
would remain politically attached. This action was part of
the Greek backlash to their experiences under the dictator-
ship and the perceived American complicity with the
colonels. Currently, Greece does not belong to the NATO
Defense Planning Committee and does not assign troops to
NATO commanders. She does, however, belong to the NATO
Military Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, the Budget
Committee, the High Level Group and the Special Group,
Greece also maintains liaison with all NATO commands
except Izmir, Turkey."^
Despite the lack of progress in reintegrating Greece
into NATO, there has been considerable activity on this
front. As early as fourteen months after the second
Turkish invasion of Cyprus (August 20, 197^) » Karamanlis
commenced negotiations to reenter the military wing of
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NATO. Various plans and terms have been proposed, but all
have failed either because of Turkish veto or rejection of
the terms by the Greek Parliament. The most recent plan
was submitted in February I98O by General Bernard Rogers,
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; however, it was rejected
by Greece. Appendix F contains a chronology of the nego-
tiations to return Greece to full status in NATO,
In the absence of normal Greek relations with NATO, the
U.S. has continued bilateral negotiations for base rights
in Greece in exchange for U.S. military aid. Following two
and one-half years of negotiations, a new Defense Coopera-
tion Agreement (DCA) between the U.S. and Greece was ini-
tialled July 28, 1977. This agreement committed the U.S.
to provide Greece $700 million in military assistance over
four years, of which $1^0 million was in the form of grant
aid. These amounts are calculated on a ratio of 7 to 10
believed to be adequate by the Administration to maintain
the balance of power between Greece and Turkey, respec-
tively. Unfortunately, this agreement, initialled almost
three years ago, is still pending approval by the Greek
Parliament, and military relations continue on the basis
of mutual consent to the expired DCA. The fact that a
negotiated settlement of a new DCA has not been concluded
after three years reflects the seriousness of Greek mis-
givings over continued military relations with the U.S.
,
especially when put in light of the continued failure to
fully reintegrate Greece into NATO.
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In summsLTy, it is obvious from this brief examination
of several current issues in Greece today that the posi-
tion of the U.S. in Greece is considerably inferior to
what it was before the coup and that the probability is
high that Greek-U.S. relations may weaken even further in
the near future. The predicament in which the U.S. now
finds itself is a direct consequence of the years of mili-
tary rule in Greece and the pursuit of a policy by the U.S.
that was based excessively on military considerations, was
short-sighted in planning smd execution, and was unmindful
of the democratic principles upon which this nation was
founded. Under these circumstances, anti-American senti-
ment in Greece is quite understandable, arising as it does
from the activities of the junta and the indefensible record
of U.S. policies toward these dictators. While the bond
between the U.S. and Greece has been strained and weakened,
the differences are not hopelessly irreconcilable. A con-
scious effort must be made to cultivate a new relationship
with Greece based on broader, mutually satisfactory terms,
rather thain solely on narrow military-strategic objectives.
Anti-American sentiment in Greece can be reversed, but only
with long-term efforts aimed at restoring strength to the
Greek-U.S. relationship. In all probability this will re-
quire risks and, perhaps, short-term losses. It will ne-
cessitate opening a meaningful dialog with the long-ostracized
Greek Left and recognition of a more independent role for
Greece. Rather than looking backward in hopes of restoring
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the pre-coup status quo, the U.S. must look ahead with the




ROYAL DECREE NUMBER 280
Article 1_
On the proposals of the Council of Ministers, we here-
by bring into effect throughout the territory the Martial
Law Act DXTH of 8th October, 1912, as amended by Section 8
of Legislative Decree k23k/l962, by Act 2839/19^1 and by




From the date of publication of this Decree we
suspend throughout the territory the application of Arti-
cles 5. 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 1^, 20, 95 and 97 of the Consti-
tution,
2. Military tribunals which are already in existence,
militsiry tribunals as may be set up as extraordinary
measxire, and the competent military authorities shall
exercise the jurisdiction, provided for by Act DXTH as
amended, and, in particular, in accordance with the
decisions of the Minister of National Defense,
Article 2
Cases pending before the Criminal Courts shall not be
transmitted to the Military Tribunals, unless the Military
Judicial Authority sees fit to request transmission thereof.
Article ^
This Decree shall enter into force as from the date of
its publication in the Official Gazette.
SOURCEi Council of Europe, European Commission of
Human Rights, The Greek Caset Report of the Commission
.




CONSTITUTIONAL ACT "DELTA" (NO. ^)
Concerning the restriction of the right to appeal to
and request annulment from the Council of State.
THE CABINET COUNCIL
having in mind the suspension through Constitutional
Act "B** of the regulations of article 101 of the Constitu-
tion and the fulfilment of the intended aim, i.e. to render
the Public Services healthy the soonest possible, dec ides
j
Article !_
It is from now on inadmissible to appeal to the Council
of State or to request, according to article 83 t paragraph
1, point c) of the Constitution, annulment against any
administrative Act, issued from April 21st \mtil publica-
tion of the present, or against those acts which will be
issued from now on, on subjects connected with the condi-
tion of service and the position of the functionaries in
general or judicial functionaries, the employees of state
enterprises and agencies belonging to them, to those
belonging to the Army, the State Safety Police and the
Church (clergymen or priests of any rank), as well as
against any administrative act issued or to be issued in
execution of the Obligatory Law ^/1967 as it has been later
modified.
Article 2
The above mentioned regulation applies also to the
appeals and requests of annulments already pending with
the Council of State against administrative Acts issued




The validity of the regulations of the present act can
be abrogated or suspended, in whole or in part, by decisions
of the Cabinet Council, published in the Gazette of the
Government,
SOURCEi Coiincil of Europe, European Commission of
Human Rights, The Greek Case ? Report of the Commission ,





ARTICLE ONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACT "EPSILON" (NO. 5)
Article 1^
Professors or Lecturers of the Highest Educational
Establishments caji be placed under temporary suspension for
a duration of up to six (6) months, which can be prolonged
once for the same period, for one of the following reasons
t
a) If they have behaved in a way incompatible with their
capacity as functionaries sind professors or lecturers of
Highest Establishments, or if their conduct in general has
been improper with regard to the moral standing required of
Highest Educational Instructors.
b) If certain of their acts and occupations, besides
those in the institution they serve, prove that they have
not been dedicated to their science and to their position
but that they have acted for other purposes incompatible
with what is understood as professorship, and whereby they
have been exposed to various commentaries.
c) If they have not possessed the necessary qualities
for the position they hold or have taken over a professor's
position without previous choice by the Institution; then
the present paragraph is specially applicable.
d) If their acts and behavior prove that they are not
animated by the appropriate spirit, conforming with the
existing regime and its national ideals.
e) If they have entered into the service in an irregular
way and without the previous recommendation to the chair or
the position of professor of the Institution they serve, or
without previous recommendation about promotion to the
chair of professor.
The choice of professors, made by committees according
to the law for newly established Educational Institutions
is considered as regular. The same is valid for the promo-
tion, made by common consent of the proper Institution, of
an extraordinary professor to the rank of regular professor
for the same chair.
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As irregular choice is considered the appointment or
re-appointment or transfer to a chair of professor without
previous decision of the proper Schools or the proper
Association of professors and irrespectively of whether
this was allowed by the Laws in force at that time.
SOURCE* Council of Europe, European Commission of
Human Rights, The Greek Case : Report of the Commission
.





ARTICLE ONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACT "KAPPA DELTA"
(NO. 2^) OF 28TH MAY, I968
Article 1,
1. Within three days from the publication of the
present Official Gazette, the life tenure and permanency
of Ordinary Justice administrators under Article 88 of the
Constitution is hereby suspended. They can be dismissed
within this delay if
1
a) for any reason whatsoever they do not possess
the moral stature required for exercising their office;
b) they are not imbibed with healthy social prin-
ciples, or else, if their general conduct within society or
the body of Law cannot be deemed as being compatible with
their duties and the dignity of their office, this resulting
in a lowering of their prestige among their colleagues and
the public.
2. The dismissal of judicial functionaries referred to
in the preceding paragraphs will be affected by decision of
the Council of Ministers, following an inquiry into the
elements of their case, by Royal Decree proposed by it.
3. Dismissals under the present are not subject to
recourse or plea for annulment before the Council of State,
or lawsuit for damages before Ordinsiry Courts.
SOURCEi Council of Europe, European Commission of
Human Rights, The Greek Casei Report of the Commission
,





UNITED NATIONS VOTING — PERCENTAGE CORRESPONDENCE
OF GREECE, UN AVERAGE, NATO AVERAGE AND
WARSAW PACT AVERAGE WITH THE U.S.
Year Greece UN NATO Warsaw Pact
Average Average Average
i960 78. i^ 50.9 76.1 22.4
1961 89.3 51.2 84.3 13.6
1962 80.0 48.3 85.0 18.2
1963 7^.1 44.4 67.6 18.0
1965 ^7.5 44.9 68.9 23.3
1966 71.7 46.9 75.9 20.6
1967 ^5.5 35.2 68.1 16.1
1968 52.5 37.8 70.3 14.7
1969 53.3 41,2 70.0 19.4
1970 ^7.8 41.8 64.6 19.6
1971 ^8.8 43.0 58.7 28.6
1972 55.0 38.5 65.3 30.1
1973 50.3 33.4 53.6 33.7
197^ 43.1 39.7 62.7 37.1
1975 37.3 33.4 58.2 24.5
1976 29.1 28.0 51.8 23.4
1977 39.0 39.9 61.2 29.8
SOURCE! Rodney G. Tomlinson, "United Nations Roll
Call Votes, I96O-I963, 1965-1977.** U.S. Naval Academy:
Automated Data Base, 1979. (Data furnished to USNA by
the U.S. Department of State).




CHRONOLOGY OF THE EFFORT TO REINTEGRATE
GREECE INTO NATO
1. "The coiirse of negotiations for Greece's return to the
NATO military wing has been cloaked with absolute secrecy
by both the Greek and the allied sides,"
2. Aiigust 28, 197^ — letter from Prime Minister Karamanlis
announcing his decision to "withdraw from the NATO military
wing but remain a member of the alliance."
3. The Greek Government asked to return to NATO fourteen
months after the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
^. July 1978 — the Haig-Davos Agreement reached with two
main characteristics!
a) the agreement was not a final action, i.e. it was
"a feasible framework for Greece's return to the NATO
unified military structure under temporary military arrange-
ments until such time as the remaining political issues were
finally resolved."
b) Greece was to return under the conditions in force
prior to withdrawal in August 197^ » not under Greek desires
to follow the Norwegism model in retaining operational con-
trol of Greek forces in peacetime,
5. August 1978 — the NATO International Military Staff
unanimously approved the Haig-Davos Agreement, however
Turkey wanted a new status for the allied collective defense
of Aegean airspace, and that Greece accept the reinstatement
of zones of responsibility and the concept of task forces
for naval defense of the Aegean,
6. August and September 1978 — the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate lifted the arms embargo against
Turkey,
7. Msirch 2, 1979 — a new meeting between Generals Haig and
Davos. Greece made some concessions including reduction of




8. March 12, 1979 — Haig met with Turkish General Evren
who specified that Turkey would officially consider the
Greek proposals in a new agreement different from that of
July 1978.
9. May 6, 1979 — meeting between Haig and Davos at
Verona, Italy. Haig gave Davos proposals containing the
Turkish demand for total renegotiation of zones of
responsibility in the Aegean, It contained two basic aims
of the Turks:
a) the establishment of new boundaries for the
command and control of air defense in the Aegesm,
b) the establishment of task forces for naval defense
of the Aegean Sea.
10. The Verona plan was rejected by the Greek Government.
11. May 29 1 1979 — Haig submitted a new plan to the Greek
Government that was a variation of the Verona plan, however
the essential points remained the same. The new plan was
submitted "to avoid having the final settlement of this
complex issue as a prerequisite for Greece's immediate
return to the imified military structure (of NATO)."
12. June 1979 — Davos requested NATO experts come to
Greece to clarify several points.
13. June 29 f 1979 — Haig replaced by General Rogers.
14. September 10, 1979 — NATO experts arrived in Greece;
they failed to satisfy the Greek questions.
15. November 8, 1979 — Rogers submitted a new variation of
the Verona plan. This plain was rejected by the Greek
Government,
16. February 11, I98O — a new plan submitted by Rogers.
"The preamble stresses that until bilateral issues between
Greece and Turkey are resolved, Greece's return will be
only temporary."
17. February I98O — the latest Rogers' plan rejected by
the Greek Government.
SOURCE I To Vima [Athens newspaper], March I6, I98O as
cited in U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service , Daily Edition , Western Euro-pe . Wash-
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